tical intercourse. He did not believe it was the opinion of any gentleman in that House that commerce ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended to. He believed it was well understood that our commerce in foreign countries was attended to by our Consuls, and not by our Ministers Plenipotentiary; and Consuls would exist, if we had no Ministers at all. Therefore, all that gentleman's arguments, which tended to show that the amendment would affect our commercial intercourse, had no foundation whatever. Returning to the question of foreign political intercourse: Was it proper to bring it back to what it was eighteen months ago? And, before he proceeded further, he would observe that, though the gentleman from South Carolina had been tolerably correct in his statement of the business, he was mistaken in one point, in which he would set him right. He had stated that the first additional appropriation was $20,000; but this sum was not appropriated for foreign intercourse, but for defraying the expense of the suits of our merchants in London. On the first of January, 1796, there remained a balance of unexpended appropriation for this object, of $30,000. To that day no extraordinary appropriation had been made; the whole allowance was $40,000 a year, which was found to be more than sufficient. On the 28th of May, 1796, an estimate was sent by the President of the United States, stating the sums already appropriated for foreign intercourse, and that $23,500 were yet wanting, in order to change the establishment, which had till that day existed, by sending Ministers Plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of Ministers Resident. This estimate, he just stated, was received on the 28th of May, and the law received the signature of the President on the first of June, so that it could not have received a very full discussion (being passed just as the session was about to close) and he thought there was good reason for examining the thing again. The next appropriation was made in the second session of the fourth Congress. In that session, he allowed, the additional appropriation was passed after full discussion. It was made upon an estimate stating $17,900 wanted; and, during last session, an appropriation was made for a Minister to Berlin, of $13,500. The committee had been told that it would evince great versatility if they were all at once to change what had already been done. But it must be recollected, that when the change in the system was first made, it underwent little discussion; and he would venture to say, that our business abroad was as well done from the year 1786 to 1796, as it had been done since. As the question was whether a larger or a smaller sum of money should be appropriated, he would call upon gentlemen in favor of the larger sum, to show what benefit was derived from Madrid and Lisbon by the change; what necessity there was for a Minister at Berlin, and what good was to be derived from giving a larger salary than $4,500. The gentleman from Connecticut had said, why send å Minister Plenipotentiary to London or Paris, any [H. OF R. more than the other Courts? This was done at first, and the mover, he supposed, wished not to innovate upon the law as originally passed. But they were told it was improper, upon this floor, to say anything about patronage, and that all arguments of that kind are well understood, and are by no means novel in their nature; that such complaints are made under all forms of Government by discontented people out of office. To say that these complaints are well understood, was the same as to say that the ground upon which they complained was also well understood: it was to acknowledge, that persons who were in the favor of the Executive had some advantages which persons in the other party desired or envied. To admit of one position, was to admit of the other. But, if no particular advantage was to be derived from Governmental patronage, then the cause of jealousy, according to this doctrine, must cease. But it was said, it would be weak and foolish to change what had been already established in respect to foreign Ministers. But had nothing, he asked, taken place since the House sanctioned the principle, which had a tendency to bring the effects which might be produced by patronage to a closer view? Had gentlemen forgotten that a member, the most active upon that floor, especially in all financial business, came (if not with a commission in his pocket, at least with the full prospect of it) to support the estimate out of which his salary and outfit were to be paid? He would ask, when such a fact was seen to take place, whether it might not be believed that such an influence as had been spoken of might not exist? Mr. G. wished it not to be supposed that he meant to make a personal attack upon any one; he only meant to infer that persons in such a situation were liable to be improperly influenced. He would not pretend to say that the evil was of great magnitude; he believed not. He believed, upon the whole, our Government was in a great degree pure. Patronage was not very extensive, nor had it any material effect upon the Legislature, or any other part of the Government; yet, he should suppose our Government to be liable to abuse in this way, By the nature of the Government, the different powers were divided. The power of giving offices was placed in the Executive—an influence which neither of the other branches possessed; and if too large grants of money were made, it might give to that power an improper weight. Our Government, he said, was in its childhood; and if this patronage had any existence, it could not of course be as yet alarming. But he desired gentlemen to look at all Governments where this power was placed in the Executive, and see if the greatest evil of the Government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist in the Government which was constituted most similarly to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, the Government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect? He did not, however, speak against the power itself; it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The Constitution had placed it in the Executive. If the same power had been placed in the Legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the Executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the Executive; and though it was right to keep grants of money within proper bounds, in order to prevent the abuse of power, yet it was proper to grant all that was necessary. Mr. G. concluded, by saying, that if he thought it was proper that our political intercourse should be extended, he should not support the amend ment; but as the conviction was strong upon his mind that our foreign political intercourse had at least been as expensive as it ought to be; that it was owing, in a great degree, to our political intercourse with foreign nations, that our present critical situation was produced; that this intercourse produced more evil than good to us; that he wished to bring the business back to the state in which it stood in 1796. If the wisdom of future Legislatures shall think proper to abolish the establishment of foreign political intercourse altogether, it must be left to them to decide. He himself thought it would be going too far to do so at present. He believed, situated as we were, it was necessary to have some political intercourse; but he believed it would be best, by degrees, to decline it altogether. In answer to the gentleman from Connecticut, with respect to majorities being always right, he said he himself was sometimes in a majority, and sometimes in a minority; and at the time he was speaking, he did not know in which he might be; but it might be, though he were in a minority, and must of course be bound by the majority, that he might be convinced that his opinion had been correct. (JANUARY, 1798. therefore, (and he supposed he had some meaning in what he said,) he could mean no more than this, that it was improper in the Executive to appoint improper persons to public offices in the Government. This proposition was self-evident, and there could be no disagreement upon it, and no general observations on the ruinous effect of patronage were necessary. No man was disposed to say, that if the Executive power were unlimited, it might not be abused, and all knew that it was wrong to appoint improper persons to public offices; but the true application of the argument used on this occasion appeared to be, that the appointments made by the Executive were made with the single view of increasing Executive influence, and that, consequently, the motives of the Executive were impure. This position had not, most assuredly, been supported by the introduction of any fact; but the declamation was as broad, and as little specific, as the charge itself. It had also been observed, that it had become an avowed principle in the Government to exclude from public offices all those who were of a different opinion from the Executive. He knew not upon what foundation this assertion was made, and it was very immaterial, whether true or not. For himself, he had no objection to declare it to be his opinion, that wherever the administrators of the Government had deviated from a rule of this kind, they had done so to their sorrow and to their loss; and the experience of Government in this respect had produced a sad and awful lesson, which would doubtless have its effect in future. But, was it for that House to inquire into these things? He believed not. The Constitution and laws of the country had made certain offices neMr. SITGREAVES said it was much to be regret-cessary, and left it to the Executive to fill them as ted, that when gentlemen thought it necessary to introduce their opinions to the consideration of the House, they should suppose themselves justified in taking a latitude remotely and unnecessarily connected with the subject under consideration. These sort of remarks could not be permitted to go without reply; and, in consequence, the debates of the Legislature appeared as if they were intended more to influence the public mind than the minds of gentlemen in that House on the decision of the question before them. He did not think the observations without their application on the present occasion. If the gentleman who made the motion before the committee had confined himself to the proposition of the propriety of appointing Ministers Plenpotentiary to certain Courts, it would have been decided by this time; but he had thought proper to go into a declamation on the fatal effects of Executive patronage, and of the particular uses made of it in this Government. He asked if any gentleman could dispassionately say that this had any connexion with the subject before the committee. If the gentleman's observations were taken in their broadest extent, they went to say that the patronage of the Executive was dangerous to the liberties of the people of this country; they went to defeat and dishonor a power created by the Constitution of the country. If the gentleman meant anything, he pleased; and was it for that House to attempt to control this discretion? If it were executed to the injury of the people, the Constitution had pointed out the remedy to be by impeachment. But where was the crime, the offence, or the impropriety, of the conduct ascribed to the Executive, if it had been adopted? Would gentlemen say that the Executive ought to appoint persons to office who professed an opinion contrary to its own? Did gentlemen suppose that there was such a want of integrity in this department of Government, that it adopted a political opinion which it did not believe to be right? And, if it were believed to act from principle, would it be prudent or right to admit to a participation in the execution of the important duties of Government persons whose sentiments were not in unison with those of the Executive, and who could only create discord and confusion, where nothing but harmony and union ought to prevail? If the Executive acted upon just principles, it would endeavor to give singleness of design to its operations, and it could only do this by admitting persons into the Government who thought with it. This would be a right, prudent, and honorable conduct; and where it had been deviated from (as he had before observed) Government had received an awful lesson for its future conduct. But why deviate into this wide field of specu JANUARY, 1798.] Foreign Intercourse. [H. OF R. lation? The single question before the commit- Constitution had not vested them with the autee was, whether an appropriation should be made thority of controlling the Executive, it was suffiin support of our present diplomatic establish- cient to say that the Executive had thought it nement. In arguing on this question, gentlemen set cessary to introduce the change in the diplomatic out with saying that at the origin of this Govern- department, which was complained of, and that ment a certain diplomatic establishment was neces- they felt themselves bound to carry his determisary, and that there had been no occasion to change nation into effect; but those who think that the it; and, if it had been changed, it was now the House of Representatives may control the Exectime to correct it; and they called upon gentle-utive in this respect, will of course act accordingly, men to show what necessity there had been for the Mr. BALDWIN said he perceived there was a real change. To that call it was sufficient to answer, difference of opinion between the gentleman last and it was an answer which must be given, that up and himself. The gentleman supposed the they did not know. They had no means of know- diplomatic establishment was fixed by the Execing; the Constitution had not placed those means utive, and the Legislature had nothing to do with in their hands. For whatever control that House it but to provide the money. Every person must might assume to itself over the Executive, it see, even from a cursory view of the Constitumust be admitted that a right judgment on this tion, that this was designed to be a Government subject could not be formed by them, as the infor- of departments, Legislative, Executive, and Judimation necessary to this judgment was not upon cial, to be kept distinct as far as possible. It was the files of that House. All the diplomatic agents the business of the Legislature to establish offices corresponded with the Executive alone, and that by law: it was the business of the Executive to branch of Government only could form a correct fill those offices. It would appear, from tracing judgment upon diplomatic agencies. Suppose back the law, now proposed to be continued, that they were, in their turn, to ask gentlemen why it originated in this manner. He had not been was not the present establishment necessary? notified of the subject as being likely to be called Were they prepared to give a well-grounded opin- up to-day, and was not prepared to be as particuion on the subject? He believed they could not. | lar as he could wish as to facts. He had endeaAnd the burden of proof lay upon them, because vored to refresh his recollection since it had been they were endeavoring to destroy an existing es- under discussion, and he found that it originated tablishment without knowing the reasons which from the Speech of the President at the opening had induced the change. of the second session of the first Congress, in which he said, "that the interests of the United States required that our intercourse with other nations should be facilitated by such provisions as will enable me to fulfil my duty in that respect; and to this end, that the compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed, should, according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by law." This part of the Speech was referred to a committee, and from that originated this law. Want of information, at that early time in the Government, prevented their being as particular as they wished. They fixed a sum to each grade, and a sum beyond which the whole amount should not extend; limited the law to a short period, that it might be open to be corrected by experience. The present motion, if he had understood it, proposed now to be a little more particular in the establishment, by fixing the sum for particular places-to do the very thing then recommended by the President. The same has always been the intention of every succeeding Congress, which was the reason why they continued it only for short periods, leaving it open to such amendments as should be suggested by experience. These ideas of the offices being first to be established by law, appeared not only to be the sense of the former President and of each succeeding Congress, as he had stated, but appeared also to be the opinion of the present President. At the last session he thought that a higher grade of office was necessary at Algiers: this he stated in a Message to Congress-that as there were great expenditures of money on that coast, he thought it necessary that an establishment should be made which would enable him to appoint a It had been said by his colleague that the power of appointing officers vested in the Executive was liable to abuse, and he had referred to the late appointment of the gentleman from South Carolina, whilst a member of that House, as a proof it. Mr. S. asked if there was anything in the Constitution which forbade the President from appointing members of the Legislature to Executive offices? and, on the contrary, if it had not been the constant practice to do so? If the Constitutionality of the practice could not be called in question, the abuse of its execution could only be blamed. In the particular instance alluded to, his colleague had not supposed the Executive had been actuated by any improper motives in the appointment, but only that the fact showed the power was liable to be abused. Unquestionably this and every other power might be abused, but if the power was Constitutionally used, it could not be found fault with except it were abused. Where could the Executive look for fit persons to fill diplomatic offices, if he were not to choose them from the legislators, whose situation evinced that they possessed the confidence of their constituents, and in which they had had an opportunity of showing that they possessed abilities for such an appointment, such as would do honor to themselves, and such as were calculated to procure advantages for their country? The question whether that House had the power to interfere with the Executive authority, by withholding appropriations, had been fully discussed in a former Congress, and the opinion of the country was not now to be fixed on this subject. For that part of the House who thought the H. OF R.] Foreign Intercourse. [JANUARY, 1798. from that policy as fast as possible; as these expired in course, they were careful not to renew them. For several of the last years of that Congress he well recollected that clusters of candi very confidential person, on whom the other officers there should be, dependent, and who should control their proceedings and expenditures. Congress concurred in this opinion, passed a law for the establishment of the office, and then the Ex-dates for these appointments, supported by powecutive appointed the officer. For these reasons he considered the question within their proper powers, and fairly open to their deliberation. He was always sorry to hear of the hostility of the departments of the Government, and of how much harm they could do if they were hostile to each other. They are designed, and have every inducement to cultivate harmony, and not hostility; and, in the harmonious exercise of their powers, they control each other; there can be no great danger of excessive patronage in appointments to office, if the office must be first established by law. If he had not misunderstood the gentleman last up, he had expressed some belief and approbation of the Executive's having a political system as to legislation, and rewarding and punishing friends and enemies of that political system. To be sure it was by the Constitution made the duty of the President to lay information before the Legislature and to recommend measures. When he has done this, he has done his duty; but to conceive that there is a general system of legislation always existing in the Executive, which is to be regarded as a standard; or that the Executive and Judiciary Departments of the Government are to be considered as floating round on the small and frequently casual majorities and minorities which will for ever take place in representative Legislatures, was sapping the very principles and foundation of a Government of departments like ours. If a law happened to be made by the wrong side, it would have had but a bad chance with the Executive or at the seat of judgment. There were old Republics in this country. He believed their Executives or Judiciaries had rarely taken part, or been carried round on the thousand storms with which they had been agitated. He could not persuade himself that he had understood the gentleman as expressing an approbation of it, as he thought it was stated by him. [Mr. SITGREAVES said he had certainly been misunderstood.] Mr. BALDWIN said he therefore considered the question a fair one, and a question which was always expected to be made at the different times when this act has been continued by short limitations; it was even an old question, and always considered a very important one, before the present Government was formed. At the close of the Revolutionary war, the disposition of forming many treaties, and having extensive diplomatic connexions with European Powers, was carried even further than it has been since. It was among their first national acts, and discovered marks of youth and inexperience; a few years convinced them that they had gone too far, that this country had little to expect from treaties and much to lose, and that many diplomatic connexions were more frequently the cause of perplexity and embarrassment, than of any national advantage. The Congress under the articles of Confederation were extricating themselves erful interests and connexions, were uniformly resisted; and, if he mistook not, when this Government came into operation, this country had but one Minister in Europe. The conviction on this subject was so strong, and experience had so fully settled it as the true policy, that it remained immoveable for some time after organizing the present Government. All appropriations for foreign Ministers were refused at the first session, as far as he recollected. At the second session it was urged, in the Speech of the President, as before stated, and enforced by more particular explanations to individuals, as designed to be for temporary purposes, respecting the Northern forts and the property that was withheld. Under these explanations a law passed, as before explained. It was true this policy had been of late, in some measure, departed from. He thought experience had already been useful to them in this course also, and ought to administer caution to them in seeking to intermingle in European politics. Ambassadors and Ministers cannot be entirely indifferent to the characters and events with which they are constantly surrounded; the share they take is very apt to be exchanged between the countries to which they belong. He did not wish to be too particular on that point; he was persuaded facts enough presented themselves to the recollection of every member to confirm his remark. It might be said that on this also we have an awful lesson. If evil had been experienced from this cause, he hoped it would operate as a reason to endeavor to diminish it. He thought it not unreasonable for the House to interpose their restraining power as to granting money, and the more particular establishment of the officers, and thus aid the other departments of the Government in bringing back, by degrees, this part of our policy to its former principles, so well sanctioned by experience. Whether the present motion was well timed, or whether it was best to give it another short limitation before we went into a definite establishment, was another question, on which he was willing to hear more remarks. Informed as he was at present, he should vote for the motion, and thought they might make some amendments to the former bill, already suggested by experience, and which would be useful. The committee rose, and had leave to sit again. JANUARY, 1798.] Foreign Intercourse. [H. OF R. country to return a Minister of the same grade. Besides to go into the proposed measure at this time, would exhibit a degree of instability in our councils which would have an unfavorable appearance to foreign countries. If peace were restored in Europe, and we had no difference to settle there, he should agree with the gentleman from Virginia, and with the opinion of the old Congress, that it would be well to keep no foreign Ministers in Europe. All commercial regulations might be as well carried on by Consuls as by Ministers; and if any differences should arise between this country and any of the European Governments, special Envoys might be sent to settle them, as heretofore; for when the situation of this country was considered, it would appear to be for our interest to have as little political connexion with Europe as possible, and therefore Ministers could be of no use, but might do mischief. Gentlemen of different opinions in that House, must see that we have had Ministers in foreign countries who have done no good, and that foreign Ministers have been sent to this country who have done harm. He, therefore, thought that the gentleman from Virginia was right in principle; but he thought the time improper, and he did not approve of the mode proposed to be adopted. He should wish that the subject should be brought forward by way of an original motion, and receive all the discussion which the rules of the House will admit of. ipotentiary to London and Paris, and that no higher grade than Ministers Resident should be employed in any other country. He was opposed to this change at this time, and to the mode proposed of doing the business, if the time were seasonable. It was proper that at this juncture our Ministers should remain as they were, as it was prudent to derive all the influence and advantage we could from the situation of our agents in Europe, who would not only be enabled to communicate more correct information from thence, than could be derived from any other source, but who could also explain the motives and objects of this Government, and by that means remove any unfavorable impressions which may be attempted to be given with respect to this country; and thereby put our business in the best train for securing the neutral standing which we have taken. He was against it for another reason. To change the diplomatic intercourse in the way proposed, would be forcing upon the Executive a measure contrary to its wishes. It would also be affording testimony to the charge heretofore made, that there was a division in the Government and in the people-a situation in which many wished to see us. He should be sorry to afford the appearance of one department of Government having forced upon another a change of measures of which they are the competent judges, and upon which they have acted. As it was well known that there was a very intimate connexion between Spain and Holland, and the country with whom Mr. P. concluded by observing, that he had we have at present a misunderstanding, he should avoided touching upon what gave color to the be unwilling to deprive this country of the advan- debate of yesterday. It was with concern he tages to be derived from having Ministers at those heard such topics introduced. It must be laplaces; besides, if our Ministers were to be re-mented by every friend to the country, as tendcalled from thence, it would be considered as an ing to destroy that harmony and good will which extraordinary proceeding; and might be construed was at all times proper and desirable, but at this as intended to be hostile to them. Whatever in-time peculiarly so, when all our efforts ought to fluence Spain or Holland may have in the councils of the country which he had alluded to, by continuing our Ministers there, it was probable that weight would operate in our favor. There was an additional reason with respect to Spain. It was well known that we had points yet to settle with that country. Our treaty with that Power was not yet carried into effect, and negotiations might at this time be going on in relation to it, which might be frustrated by the recall of our Ministers. With respect to the grade of Ministers proper to be employed in different countries, we must not consult on this subject our own ideas alone, but pay some respect to the light in which this business is seen in other countries. From a fact within his own knowledge, he knew of what consequence these forms were looked upon in the Court of Spain. When they wished to finish a treaty which was begun with this country, they desired it might be done by a Minister of a higher grade than the one resident there. It was on this requisition that an Envoy Extraordinary was sent. There was considerable etiquette in this business, which it would not be proper altogether to neglect. It was necessary when a Minister Plenipotentiary was sent to a country, for that 5th CON.-28 be joined to avoid the calamities of war; but when, if these calamities could not be avoided, we ought to stand shoulder to shoulder, and oppose every Power who was determined to impose upon us. So strongly was this impressed upon his mind, that he thought every means should be taken to harmonize and conciliate. The best way to effect this harmony, in his opinion, was to avoid in debate all personalties, and those subjects which tend to heat the passions, and which, instead of elucidating, embarrass investigations; for there was no chance for rational inquiry, when full vent was given to resentments and anger. Mr. P. asked pardon for this digression and sat down. Mr. NICHOLAS wished to explain his intentions in bringing forward this amendment. He believed the gentleman last up would find they nearly corresponded with his own. He had no idea of putting an immediate veto upon the Ministers at present employed. He considered this bill, though passed with a limitation, as a permanent system, and a subsequent clause of the bill would enable the committee to fix the time at which the salaries of Ministers should cease. His wish was to put a limit to this extension of Executive power. He reminded the gentleman |