The SPEAKER laid before the House a communication from the Secretary of War, enclosing an estimate of the appropriations necessary for holding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians, which was in substance as follows: For three commissioners, ninety days, at Secretary, at four dollars per day $2,160 [JANUARY, 1798. certain inconveniences and disagreeable circumstances, which have occurred in the execution of the law passed on the 28th day of May, 1786, entitled "An act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt," as well as of certain doubts which have been raised concerning its construction; this representation, together with a report of the Attorney General on the same subject, I now transmit to Congress, for their consideration, that if any amendments or explanations of that law may be thought advisable, they may be adopted. JOHN ADAMS. UNITED STATES, January 18, 1798. This Message, with the papers accompanying it, was referred to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report on the petition of William Bell. FOREIGN INTERCOURSE. 360 On motion of Mr. HARPER, the House resolved 360 itself a Committee of the Whole on the bill pro15,000 viding the means of intercourse between the Uni5.000 ted States and foreign nations, Mr. DENT in the 2,000 Chair. The bill was read as follows 1,200 25,880 This statement was referred to the Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the former Message of the Presdent on this subject. SEC. 1. Be it enacted, &c., That the President of the United States shall be, and he hereby is, authorized to draw from the Treasury of the United States a sum not exceeding $- annually, to be paid out of the moneys arising from the duties on imports and tonnage, for the support of such persons as he shall commission to serve the United States in foreign parts, and for the Mr. TILLINGHAST called up his resolution re- expense incident to the business in which they may be specting a repeal of the stamp act, which was re-employed: Provided, That, exclusive of an outfit, which ferred to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report of the Committee of Ways and Means on this subject. Mr. SITGREAVES, from the committee appointed on the subject of W. Blount's conspiracy, made a supplementary report, containing the deposition of Abraham Holden, of New York, which seemed to imply that I. P. Ripley (whose evidence related to what he had heard Captain Eaton say) had been supplied with money by the Spanish Minister, whilst he lived in New York, when he was in needy circumstances. He told the deponent that he had received two hundred dollars from him, and was to have more. The report was ordered to be printed.. Mr. FINDLEY presented the petition of Clement Biddle, of this city, in behalf of sundry Europeans, possessed of certificates of the debt of the United States, which were barred by the section of the act making provision for the public debt, which he prays may be excepted from its operation, as the persons holding the claims had no knowledge of the law. Referred to the Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the subject of considering the propriety of excepting certain claims from the operation of the limitation acts. shall in no case exceed the amount of one year's full salary to the Minister Plenipotentiary, or Chargé des Affaires, to whom the same may be allowed, the President shall not allow to any Minister a greater sum than per annum, as a compensation for all his personal services and expenses; nor a greater sum for the same than $4,500 per annum to a Chargé des Affaires; nor a greater sum for the same than $1,350 per annum to the Secretary of any Minister. SEC. 2. That in all cases where any sum or sums of money have issued, or shall hereafter issue, from the Treasury, for the purposes of intercourse or treaty, with foreign nations, in pursuance of any law, the President shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause the same to be duly settled annually with the accounting officers of the Treasury, in manner following, that is to sayby causing the same to be accounted for, specifically, in all instances, wherein the expenditure thereof may, in his judgment, be made public, and by making a certificate or certificates of the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therein expressed to have been expended. SEC. 3. That for defraying the expenses of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, during the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, there be further appropriated, in addition to the aforesaid sum of $and out of any moneys PERSONS IMPRISONED FOR DEBT. The following Message, with the papers to in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise apwhich they refer, was received from the PRESI-propriated, the sum of $DENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives : A representation has been made to me, by the Judge of the Pennsylvania district of the United States, of SEC. 4. That the act passed on the first day of July, in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety, entitled "An act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," and the act passed on the ninth day of February, in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, en titled "An act to continue in force for a limited time, and amend the act, entitled 'An act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations,'" shall be, and they hereby are, repealed. SEC. 5. That this act shall be and remain in force for and during the term of two years, and from thence until the end of the next session of Congress thereafter, and no longer. Mr. NICHOLAS inquired with what sums the blanks in the bill were to be filled. Mr. HARPER said he proposed to fill the first with $40,000, and the last with $28,650. Mr. NICHOLAS Conceived this to be a good time for the House to attempt to bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government, and continued down till the year 1796; and to prevent in future the probable increase which he apprehended from the recent examples, he thought it necessary to take a view of this subject, not only from the increase of expense, but from a variety of other considerations. It is not the manner in which a Government is constituted which makes its operations easy and certain. But the execution of the powers of the Government itself is more to be considered than the nature of its formation; for I do believe there is a tendency in all Governments like ours to produce a union and consolidation of all its parts into the Executive department; and that the limitation and connexion of the parts with each other, as settled in the Constitution, would be destroyed by the influence I have mentioned, unless there is a constant operation on the part of the Legislature to resist this overwhelming power. I think we have the most convincing proofs that a representative Government can be made the most oppressive and burdensome, and yet preserve all the forms which are given to it by a Constitution; and the Legislature shall appear to act upon its own discretion, whilst that discretion shall have ceased to exist. Where the Executive has an influence over the Legislature, and the Government is a representative one, the Executive is capable of carrying its views into effect in a manner superior to what can be accomplished even in the most despotic monarchy; the mischief will be carried further in the former case than in the latter, because the people will be more inclined to submit to the decisions of a Government of its own choosing than to one which rules them by hereditary right; monarchs cannot carry their oppressions so far, without resistance, as republics. Under this general view of the subject, he conceived it to be the duty of a Legislature to guard cautiously its own independence, and to limit, as far as consistent with the general welfare, the influence of Executive patronage. With respect to our own Government, although he did not insist that the evil had already taken place, he conceived it to be a duty they owed to themselves and their constituents, as well to secure liberty as to perpetuate the Constitution itself, that the President, who had the power of making appointments, should be kept from extending this power beyond [H. OF R.. what the nature and wants of the Government absolutely required; and he thought, unless better reasons were assigned than any which had heretofore been offered, that the Legislature ought to reduce the diplomatic establishment to what it had heretofore been. This arrangement, besides having the beneficial influence he had mentioned, would also tend to retrench the expenses of the Government, now become an article of considerable importance. He would, in order to elucidate his argument, suppose that that kind of Executive patronage he had mentioned had now extended its influence into the Legislature, and that in consequence of a thirst for office majorities were formed in both branches of Congress devoted to the views of the Executive, by which the Executive could hold on with the Legislature a regular and concurrent course to effect any object however hostile to the public good that the President might think proper to pursue; where, he asked, would be the check? in what branch of the Government would you look for it? Was it to the Senate? The majority of that House under this supposition could effect no check. Will you look to the House of Representatives? The majority are humble expectants of offices; here then, also, you are disappointed! Where, then, will you find anything capable of controlling this overbearing influence? It must be in small and feeble minorities, who, by their opposition and attention to the interests of the people against arbitrary power, may rouse the people to a sense of their danger, and force the public sentiment to be respected; this he conceived would be the only check. But this check, he believed, could only with great difficulty and inconvenience be brought into action. It would be difficult, because the people would be inclined to approve the proceeding of a majority on the fundamental principle of Republicanism; because, on account of the vast extension of our country, the individuals of a minority could not be generally known, and without being known, their motives for opposition could not be justly appreciated; nor without being known could they attract the attention of those who form the representation. It appears, also, to be proper to guard against Executive patronage on account of the small numbers of the Representatives; if the offices are increased in only a small degree, they become so many additional temptations, and the chance of an appointment increases in a two-fold ratio to the increase of the number. He conceived that this extension of influence of one branch of the Government over another was strictly guarded by the Constitution, which was framed on the principle of checks and balances-of departments acting and controlling each other; but he was sorry to see the idea of patronage drawn into a closer compass than it had formerly been, as it increased the evil. He was sorry for it, because it tended to manifest a circumstance which had been sought to be concealed. Every insinuation that there was a division between the Government and the people H. OF R.] Foreign Intercourse. [JANUARY, 1798. had been repelled as an insidious and malignant crease. With this view he proposed to alter the design; but the Administration, by acting on a bill so as to direct that there should be appronew principle, which he was too well assured was priated $9,000 for a Minister Plenipotentiary at the fact, had established the idea that there was London, and $9,000 more for another near the a division between it and a considerable portion French Republic, and that the President be left of the people. The evidence of this fact had at liberty to reduce the Ministers Plenipotentiary been long shown, and he feared the operation of at Berlin, Madrid, and Lisbon, to Ministers resicircumstances of this nature on the public mind. dent, which would diminish their salaries oneHe said he had clear and satisfactory proof that half-a resident Minister being of a lower grade no man was hereafter to be admitted into the has only $4,500 per annum. He then went into Administration, or other departments of the Gov-a detail of the proceedings of the first Congress, ernment, unless he was willing to sacrifice all in- in order to show that it was admitted on all sides dependent political opinions and bend at the by that body, that the Constitution vested the shrine of Executive wisdom. He believed the power of specifying and limiting the salaries of Administration did not hesitate to make the open foreign Ministers and Consuls; he read the avowal, that no person should be initiated into speeches of Mr. LAWRENCE, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. the mystery of their affairs unless he would give W. SMITH of South Carolina, Mr. SEDGWICK, Mr. a test of his belief in Executive infallibility. If HUNTINGTON, and several others, from the Conthis was the case, and he believed it was, it be-gressional Register, by which it appeared, that came another cogent reason why the Legislature there was but one opinion on their powers under should show itself attentive to limit a patronage the Constitution; and showed from hence, that which was to be exercised in this way, and which the only reason why the House did not undertake cut off from the Administration at one stroke all to enumerate and fix the salaries of foreign Ministhose who did not join in their confession of faith; ters in detail, arose merely from the want of inbut this reason was strengthened when we draw formation as to the places where they should be into our view the appointments that have been fixed, and the sum necessary to cover their exmade of foreign Ministers taken out of the Legis- penses. As his construction corresponded with lative body itself. It does present a most formi- that of the gentlemen who fixed the principles dable aspect to the liberties of this country, when upon which the Government was put in motion, we see the most lucrative offices, the most tempt- he was encouraged to expect his motion would ing and most honorable-offices with the great- succeed, seeing that the House had now had suffiest attraction-filled by draughts from the Legisla- cient experience to enable them to say what were tive body, and there, too, of one particular class, the regulations proper to be made. and that class the believers of the new doctrine, a thing entirely unknown to the principles upon which the Constitution is formed; he repeated that it was a subject of alarm, and ought to excite attention, that the diplomatic corps was filled by draughts from Congress. He gave it as his opinion on our foreign intercourse, that the United States would be benefited by having no Ministers at all. He did not think that we could be benefited by any sort of compact these foreign agents could form for us, for we only bound ourselves by any treaty we entered into, as we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures. It might be thought necessary to make commercial arrangements with some European Powers; but, he asked, if they had the force to make a foreign country conform to its engagements? No gentleman would say that they had; therefore such regulations only tended to entangle ourselves, without rendering commerce any efficient aid. He would, therefore, leave our commerce to seek its own markets totally disembarrassed. All the protection we could furnish it with, consisted in officers of another grade than those mentioned in this bill: Consuls who should reside in the seaports, and not Ministers Plenipotentiary residing in the interior. He did not intend by the motion he was about to make, that the whole diplomatic establishment should be destroyed at this time, but merely to reduce it to what it had been before the late in He also showed that he was supported in his construction by the President himself in his late application to extend the appropriation to cover the appointment to Berlin, which would not have been requisite had the House not possessed a discretionary power on the subject. He concluded by professing it to be his intention to let the appropriation continue to the Ministers at Berlin, Spain, and Portugal, until they had either completed the business in hand, or till the President had given them notice that the Legislature did not mean to support them in the manner they had heretofore been maintained. He deemed it proper to curtail the expenses of this department as soon as possible, but not sooner than convenient. He commented upon the necessity of having a Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin, by saying we had little or no commercial intercourse with that nation, and if the Executive had sent one there on such pretence, it would perhaps become soon necessary to send Ministers Plenipotentiary to two or three other northern Courts, though we have but a very inconsiderable commerce with them; yet, inconsiderable as it was, it was more than we had with Prussia. If the House were to retrench at this time it would manifest their intention to resist any further demands, and put an end to a growing evil. Mr. HARPER Supposed it would be remembered by all those gentlemen who had attended to the business of Congress for several years past, that the doctrine of the gentleman from Virginia was by no means new. The subject of foreign inter course was never taken up, without that gentleman, or some other who agreed with him in sentiment, advancing these opinions; they never failed to speak of the danger to be apprehended from Executive influence, from its power to appoint foreign Ministers; that foreign intercourse was unnecessary; that our public affairs abroad were not to be attended to, and that commerce ought to be given up, or left to shift for itself. Nor was this a doctrine confined to this country, or this age. Whenever a set of gentlemen in any country found their views opposed by the measures of Government, they became vexed, and attributed the proceedings of those who differed from them in opinion to any motive rather than the public good. The desire of Executive favor, or Executive offices, was an usual charge, and it was at this day well understood. It would also be remembered, that whenever the subject of foreign intercourse had been discussed, though these objections had been constantly made to it, they had been as constantly disregarded by the Congress of the United States. The good sense of the country had weighed these objections in the balance, and declared them wanting; and he trusted the same fate would now meet them as heretofore. [H. OF R. months after the solemn sanction of the House was given to it, it was to be withdrawn, and that without any additional light on the subject. He trusted that the House would not be induced, from the unfounded suspicions of any gentleman, thus to act. In aid of the $40,000 per annum, originally granted for this purpose, Mr. H. said, various supplementary appropriations had been made. First, a sum of $20,000, then a sum of $23,000, and, in March last, 17,000, and, in addition to this, $14,000 for a particular appointment. The House had, therefore, not only deemed it expedient to continue the original act, but to make additional appropriations from year to year. He thought the good sense of the country had never been more firmly shown than on this subject. But now a new course was to be taken, and all former proceedings declared to have been wrong. But it was said this country had no need of foreign Ministers, and that commerce might be left to itself. He did not believe the House would think so. Did not the United States trade with all the nations of the earth? How, then, were it possible to do without accredited agents to attend to our concerns in foreign countries? Were we to give up our commerce? There were gentleThat the House might judge more accurately men, he knew, who would answer, Yes. They on this subject, he would advert to the course would tell the House, commerce was a bad thing, heretofore taken. But, before he did this, he and that it rather ought to be outlawed, than prowould observe, that the motion of the gentleman, tected. But was this the sense of the country? instead of bringing the business back to the state Was it the sense of that House? Would they disin which it stood in the year 1790, would be a card the property of that class of citizens who dedirect innovation upon that institution, and, ac-pended upon it, for their support and their wealth? cording to his doctrine, the best way of correcting change would be to introduce it; for the present bill was a copy of the original act, which had been acted upon from the year 1790 to the present time. But, instead of leaving the business as placed by Congress at that time, the gentleman from Virginia wished it changed. Why was this to be done? Because it was found that the President, after seven years' experience, had found no necessity of making any difference in the allowance to Ministers at different Courts, and therefore the House ought to make the change. This was reasoning from effects to causes with a witness to it. No contradiction was more palpable. But it was said, there was danger from the Executive influence-danger of legislators being bribed by the hopes or promises of foreign appointments. Or would they be ready to forfeit the revenue arising from it? Mr. H. said he had often heard of the dangerous nature of foreign intercourse; but it was the discovery of a few men who believed that everything which had been done by this Government had been radically wrong. He trusted, however, the House would adhere to what it had so frequently sanctioned, and that the proposed amendment would not be agreed to. Mr. ALLEN said, that by the bill before the committee they were brought to consider what provision should be made for the Ministers of the United States abroad. He wished the gentleman from Virginia had produced facts to the committee which, by being considered, might have been acted upon; and when he had proposed to have Ministers Plenipotentiary at two Courts only, it would have been well if he had shown These objections had been urged on former oc- why there should be Ministers of that description casions. When the appropriation was made for there, and not at other Courts; or why we should a Minister to Berlin, the gentleman from Vir-have any Ministers abroad at all; but after lisginia then made a stand, as he terms it. He tening to him with attention, he had been able to then told the House the appointment was uneces-hear nothing from him but general declamation. sary; but, notwithstanding, the money was appropriated. The House was not afraid of Executive influence. If this appointment had been improper, that was the proper time to have prevented the extension of our foreign intercourse; but, after a full discussion, the extension was deemed proper. What versatility-what foolishness-what childish capriciousness, would it appear, if, in a few What he intended for arguments, he thought illy applied to a Government like this. He had strongly warned the House against Executive patronage. He spoke of the different departments of Government as distinct bodies, having different interests; as if the Executive was forming a patronage against which it was important for that House to guard. He thought language of this kind very improper. He believed it might H. OF R.] Foreign Intercourse. [JANUARY, 1798. Mr. NICHOLAS assured the gentleman just sat down, that he might say what he pleased of him, he was at liberty to proclaim him in what character it pleased; it would not affect him in the least. With respect to the charge he brought against him for insinuating, without authority, that a preference was given by the Executive to persons professing certain opinions, he did not make the charge without authority. It was the avowed declaration of men who considered themselves as have a bad effect out of doors, when the people ought not to be supported, and who believed that heard of the Executive being thus charged. In- the most effectual way of destroying it was to stead of making these charges, he wished the destroy the confidence of the people in the indigentleman had said, "Come now, and let us rea-viduals who administer it. He wished the House son together." This would have been preferable to assume the true American character. to calling of hard names, to speaking of the lust of dominion and of patronage; as if one branch of the Government was in danger of being swallowed up by the other. The gentleman had declared that republican Governments might become more burdensome and corrupt than any other, as if the people of the United States were to be informed that this Government was progressing towards that point-towards a point which would bear it down! This language struck him the more, as he doubted not it would be faith-guides of the President, that this was the case. fully reported. A combination of all the branches of Government was spoken of, against which there was no security but in feeble minorities. Did the gentleman mean to insinuate that majorities in republican Governments were not to be trusted, but that all virtue was in minorities-the enlightened few, who were to be the guides of the people? Mr. A. said, the gentleman from Virginia had told the House that Executive patronage was exclusively confined to those who came up to the standard of Executive infallibility. This assertion was to spread over the United States as a fact. But were any proofs offered to support these charges? No. Yet these charges would go out to the world, and would tend to weaken the confidence of the people in the Government, and they would of course conclude, that such a Government ought not to be supported, but demolished. Was there any peculiar propriety, he asked, in introducing language of this kind at this juncture, when they were every moment in expectation of hearing news that might be very disagreeable, and require a union of every citizen in the country? Was this a time to say that Government was not to be trusted? He could have wished, instead of making these charges, the gentleman had reasoned upon the subject, that such measures might have been taken as true wisdom and love of country should have dictated. But when gentlemen spoke of Government departing from the principles upon which it was instituted, who that believed this, would respect it? But he had himself even heard native Americans who had not been poisoned by any foreign influence whatever, declare that such a Government as ours could not stand, that it must be overthrown. He believed that these opinions were produced by such declarations as those that they had heard to-day, and such as if "this law be passed, it will not be carried into effect by the courts of the States," which was language used on a former occasion. Mr. A. concluded by saying, the committee were told that our foreign intercourse ought not to be continued. He confessed that this country had reason to wish that foreign intercourse, so far as it related to importing intriguing foreigners, had long ago ceased. He believed there were persons within that House who thought the Government ought to be overset, and that it could not and He acknowledged it was to be lamented that, at a time when it might be necessary to join in a common cause, that such sentiments should be declared; but if gentlemen will divide the country into parties, it was a business of their own and not his. What he said was true. Mr. GALLATIN believed that there was a number of people in the United States-people otherwise enlightened, and who, upon all common subjects, possessed sound understandings-who were fully convinced that there was a faction existing within the United States, and even within the walls of that House, who wished to demolish the Government; and he further believed that this opinion was supported by such declarations as had been made by the gentleman from Connecticut. He should be sorry that such a belief should be considered as dangerous to the safety of the community. Nor could he consider the determination of the Executive to employ only such persons as are of the same political opinions with themselves, as of such a nature as to produce fatal consequences, and that Government, on that account, was unworthy of confidence. He believed that such a line of conduct must flow from the present state of parties in America, divided as the people were upon many important occasions. To say, therefore, that the Executive employed persons of consonant political opinions to its own, was not to say the Government did not deserve confidence. But if the committee turned their attention to the amendment proposed, it only went to declare that Ministers to London and Paris should not have a salary of more than $9,000 a year; and that Ministers to other parts of Europe should not have more than $4,500. In support of this amendment, it was said that this was the ground upon which this Government first fixed the business of foreign intercourse. He believed this statement correct. Until the year 1796, there was no Minister Plenipotentiary except at Paris and London; at other places there were no higher grades than Ministers Resident. Hence the committee might be led to argue the propriety of bringing back our foreign political intercourse to what it was before that period. He said foreign political intercourse; because he thought the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARPER) had blended two subjects together, viz: foreign commercial intercourse. and foreign poli |