H. OF R.]

with France. Whether the United States shall have peace or war with the French Republic, was, in his opinion, to depend upon events over which we have no control.

The French are not pointing their measures against the United States in particular, but they mean to compel all other neutral nations to abandon the British commerce. To this end they have coerced the Republic of Genoa. Their influence has been more direct still upon Geneva, whose Government they have overturned without any open war; they have annihilated the independence of the Dutch, and they lead as in strings the humbled Monarch of Spain. It is not the United States alone that is threatened: Denmark, Hamburg, and Bremen, have heard the mandates of the French Directory, and are required to withhold from any commerce with England. It depends, then, upon the power which France may have to execute these intentions whether the United States shall be alike coerced.

Looking upon this country as involved in the general designs of France, we should provide for our defence before she shall suddenly overwhelm us, annihilate our Government, and reduce us again to the abject state of Colonies. If this cannot be done, we must abide the misery which we cannot avoid. Let us have it to say that we were not negligent in providing against the evil; that our nation did not meet its fate without a struggle; and that we did not at once join with France in producing the misfortunes of our country. Let us have it to say that we have fortified our harbors; that we animated our militia, and armed our shipping; but, after all, that we were forced to submit to events we could not control.

He believed that we had resources in ourselves, and that we should obtain the aid of foreign nations. It is not to be supposed that they will look on inattentive, or that they will be indisposed to join in alliance with any nation likely to be involved in their common calamity. If France has already divided many nations, and by that means overcome them-if she is still rushing on in her mad career, the time may come when all nations, seeing no end to her ambitious projects, will rise together to oppose her. Their united exertions may succeed against the overwhelming power of France, and secure to the nations their independence.

There is a hope that our danger may be prevented by various circumstances. France is yet in a revolutionary state; there are frequent changes in the French Government. A change of men may produce a change of measures, and the apprehension of driving us into a close foreign alliance may have considerable effect in preventing her from prosecuting any hostile intention she may entertain against us.

He did not mean to insinuate that any gentle man in the committee was in the smallest degree under the influence of France. He would attribute observations and arguments unaccountable to him to that sentiment of gratitude to France of which so much has been said.

He thought if we could relieve ourselves in the

[MAY, 1797.

present crisis by our own exertions, we shall be more secure hereafter, we shall have less confidence in the kindness of France, and we shall become more secure, as we are convinced that our happiness depends alone upon ourselves, upon the love of our country, and the support of the Constitution, and a disposition to defend it against all encroachments from foreign influence or domestic faction.

If the Address to the President is viewed in this interesting light, we cannot hesitate to reject the amendments; we cannot hesitate to leave it to the proper constituted authorities to make the compromise, which we all desire with the French Republic.

He had been surprised to hear it said that the President's Speech was a declaration of war. Nothing can be more contrary to the truth. In what part is the sound of war? Is a recommendation to arm in our own defence a declaration of war? Is it a declaration of war to say we will defend our Government and ourselves? It might be understood that Americans are attached to their own institutions, and will defend them to the last.

We

The means of this defence recommended by the President are not now under consideration. There is no choice of measures in the report of the Select Committee; there is nothing intimated that implies such an idea. He understood the reported Address merely to express that we will undertake the defence of the country. If the subject had been thus considered, we had been spared from hearing accusations of the Executive, and a debate to settle the articles of a treaty. ought to leave that business to the proper envoys, and attend to the necessary public defence, which, instead of plunging us into hostilities, is the best mode of avoiding them. A country well prepared for its defence is not likely to be attacked. Are these counsels of war? No, they are counsels of peace. He then read the principal passages of the Address, observing upon their propriety to the occasion, the necessity of declaring the indignation which every one must feel at the insults offered by the French Directory to the Government, and, as it ought to be understood, through them to the people of the United States, and upon the call we now had to vindicate, by a public declaration, the conduct of the Government in maintaining their neutrality, which he himself was of opinion had been perfectly impartial, and from which no one would accuse them of an intentional departure; and observed that the words of the Address which had been objected to as applicable to the Executive departments alone, evidently comprehended the whole Government; and, after some other observations upon the tenor of the Address, concluded with observing that gentlemen were very improperly anxious to provide for a negotiation with France, and to settle the terms, but for his part, he thought that, if we would promote the negotiation as well as prepare against an unfavorable event, our principal care should be to provide for the public defence.

MAY, 1797.]

Mr. FINDLEY followed Mr. SEWALL in favor of the amendment, and the sitting was closed by some additional observations of Mr. Oris, and some remarks upon them by Mr. NICHOLAS.

SATURDAY, May 27.

Two other members, to wit: from Kentucky, THOMAS T. DAVIS; and from Massachusetts, TOMPSON J. SKINNER, appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats.

ANSWER TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

The House again went into a Committee of the Whole on the Answer reported to the President's Address; when, Mr. NICHOLAS's amendment being under consideration, Mr. BAYARD opened the debate against the amendment. Mr. SHEPARD followed on the same side. Mr. RUTLEDGE also again occupied the attention of the committee against the amendment, and in the course of his observations having noticed some remarks of Mr. SWANWICK, he was replied to by him. Mr. SMITH next occupied the floor in behalf of the amendment; afterwards Mr. DANA, who was opposed to the former part of it, which related to the rejection of our Minister, but in favor of that part which had reference to the placing France on the footing of other countries with respect to treaties, and with some small exceptions to the other parts. Mr. DANA having finished his observations, and it being the usual hour of adjournment, there seemed to be a pretty general wish to take the question, the call for it being very loud; when Mr. HARPER rose, and wished to deliver his sentiments on the occasion. After he had spoken about half an hour, in opposition to the amendment, Mr. Oris informed the committee that he was sorry to say that the SPEAKER was indisposed, and suggested the propriety of the committee's rising, that the House might adjourn.

The motion was immediately put and carried, and the House adjourned.

MONDAY, May 29.

ANSWER TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. The House again formed itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Answer reported to the President's Speech, and Mr. NICHOLAS's amendment being under consideration

Mr. HARPER resumed his observations against the amendment, as follows:

[H. OF R.

strictly relative to the question on the amendment now under consideration.

[Mr. H. here observed, that he should go a little out of his way, in order to notice and refute some positions laid down by gentlemen in favor of the amendment, which, though wholly irrelevant to the present question, would have a tendency, if allowed to pass uncontradicted, to render the people discontented with the Government. Having concluded his remarks upon this subject, he proceeded thus:]

The scope and object of this amendment is to recommend it to the President, to offer certain concessions to France, in the negotiations which he has declared it his intention to commence. These concessions are understood to relate to the list of contraband, which is more extensive, as stated by the British Treaty, than in that with France; and to the right of taking enemies goods out of neutral ships, which Britain enjoys, and France, by her treaty with us, has given up. In these two points it is the scope and object of the amendment to recommend that the two nations should be placed on the same footing. Hence the amendment is to be considered under two points of view; first, the recommendation itself; and secondly, the thing recommended.

As to the recommendation itself, I ask, is it Constitutional? is it useful? is it politic?

With respect to its constitutionality, everybody knows that the power of negotiation is given wholly to the President by the Constitution, and that of making treaties to the President and Senate. Can the House of Representatives control or direct that power? Can it instruct the President in matters which the Constitution has entrusted solely and exclusively to his judgment? Shall it undertake to instruct him? will he be bound to obey those instructions? Should he think fit to pursue a different course, will the House be justified by the Constitution and their duty in withholding supplies, and in leaving the country without defence? Do gentlemen foresee the dilemma which they are preparing for themselves and for the House; a dilemma in which they must choose between pride and duty, between supporting the Executive in measures adopted against their advice, and leaving the country defenceless, at the mercy of all who may choose to assail it? What possible effect can this interference have, but to lay the foundations of a schism between the different departments of Government?

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done injuries, we shall be willing, on conviction, to redress them." Can there be a spirit more conciliatory; or would gentlemen wish to see the negotiations conducted on other principles?

Is it to give information to the Executive, to point out the course which the public good requires to be taken? But do gentlemen imagine that the Executive is ignorant of the public interest, or less acquainted with it than the House? Is it not notorious that bodies of this kind are always unfit for negotiation? Have not the people declared it, by placing that power in the hands of the President? Can gentlemen suppose that the House possesses, or can possess, all the information necessary, in forming an opinion about what ought to be given, and what ought to be required, in a negotiation with another nation? Can the House foresee all that may happen, to render this offer inexpedient, or useless, or unnecessary, to justify other offers, or to make demands necessary, instead of offers of any kind? What will become of the power of negotiation in the Executive, if the House is first to instruct him, and afterwards to censure him?

Some gentlemen have seemed to think that this amendment would give weight to the negotiation abroad; would strengthen the hands of the Executive, and place him on higher ground. But how is this effect to be produced? By showing, it is answered, that, in making this offer, all the branches of Government are united, and that the ground thus taken will be firmly supported. But must it not be perfectly evident that the best way of giving this impression is, to pursue a conduct and hold a language which will evince a perfect confidence in the Executive, and a determination to support him with the whole force and resources of the country? Then it is, that the offers of the Executive will come with weight, when they come with evidence of union in the Government, and of mutual confidence among the various departments.

Some gentlemen have supported this amendment on the ground that it will give confidence to the people of this country in the Executive: and one gentleman from Virginia (Mr. NICHOLAS) has gone so far as to say, that the people of this country will not support the Government unless its measures are right. Admitting this opinion to be true, (and I am inclined to think it may be,) still it will remain to be inquired, by what means and on what standard the people would form their opinion of the propriety and wisdom of the measures pursued by their Government. Not certainly from the declarations of that gentleman or his friends; because there has not been one measure adopted by the Government since its formation which they have not opposed in the House and out of it, on which they have not set the stamp of their most decided censure; and yet, sir, we have seen all these measures supported and approved of by the people. We have seen the late President, who was in a peculiar manner the author of them, under whose auspices they were adopted and established, in spite of the most violent and persevering opposition from these very

[MAY, 1797.

gentlemen-we have seen him surrounded with applause, with gratitude, and with thanks, from every quarter of the Union; we have seen the wisdom and firmness of his administration made one very principal ground of these thanks and applauses; and even in a former House of Representatives, where the principles of these gentlemen did so greatly preponderate, when they moved to strike out of an address to this great man a clause expressly approving his administration, as wise, firm, and greatly beneficial to his country, the motion was overruled by a very large majority; and when the address itself, containing this obnoxious clause, was put to the vote, it passed with only twelve nays. Yet gentlemen talk to us, as if they were the standard by which the people would measure the conduct of Government! Sir, the people are not truly estimated by those gentlemen. They are not the blind, ignorant herd which those gentlemen take them to be. They will do in future what they have always done heretofore-they will judge of the measures of Government by the measures themselves, and by the just confidence which they have long placed in those whom they have appointed to administer it; not by the opinions or invectives of this or that set of men, either on this floor or out of doors. Gentlemen ought to be admonished, by the frequent and always unsuccessful appeals which they have made to the people, to give up at length this vain chimera of being able to rule public opinion, with which they have so long suffered themselves to be deluded.

I hold, sir, in my hand a paper from that very quarter where gentlemen probably suppose, and not without appearance of reason, that their labors in the vineyard of opposition have been crowned with most success. It is an address from Mecklenburg county, in Virginia, to their Representative on this floor, and contains sentiments so just, so truly patriotic, and so applicable to the point of confidence in Government, that I cannot help reading it to the committee, though I am sensible it must have already attracted the notice of every individual. [Mr. H. then read the address.]

This paper, sir, affords a most consoling and honorable contrast to the speeches which have lately been heard on this floor. It contains sentiments which I have no doubt are reverberated from the hearts of every American in every part of the Union, and which prove how far the people, even that part of them on which these gentlemen have most particularly relied, are from sharing with them in their want of affection for the Government, and of confidence in its measures. There is nothing in this address to prove that the people in that part of the Union will refuse to support the Government, unless those gentlemen should inform them that its measures were right.

I also consider the recommendation contained in this amendment as extremely impolitic. Is it good policy to show the enemy your eagerness to treat, your eagerness to make concessions? Is it good policy to show to France that you have no

MAY, 1797.]

confidence in the Executive, in his wisdom, his information, his patriotic intentions, that you think it necessary to instruct and direct him? Is it good policy to send the Executive trammelled to France; to send him in a situation, where he must either yield to a part of her demands, or go against the recommendations of this House? Is this the way to give weight to his negotiations, or to lessen her demands? Is it true, that there is in this House a majority who do not confide in the Executive? I repeat the question, and I address it not to those gentlemen whose constant employment it has been for eight years past, in the House and out of it, to oppose the Executive and every measure which he was understood to favor, to declare their distrust of him, and endeavor to weaken that confidence so justly reposed in him by the people. I address not myself to these: I address myself to those gentlemen, and some such there no doubt are, who, entertaining just ideas of the Constitution, and reposing full confidence in the Executive, may, nevertheless, be inclined to favor this recommendation, because they think it a harmless thing. I could ask these gentlemen, whether there is a majority in this House who do not think the Executive worthy of confidence in the performance of his Constitutional functions? I could ask them whether they are willing to make this declaration, if they do not believe it? I could ask them whether, admitting it to be true, it would be prudent to tell France so? I would ask them what, beside such a declaration, France can see in this amendment? I answer, and they must, I think, join me in the answer, that she can see nothing else. She will see in it a proof and confirmation of her present opinion, that we are a divided people; that the people are divided from the Government, and the Government divided within itself. This will encourage her to press and heighten her demands; for, seeing us, as she will think, divided, she will remember one part of the Scripture, while she forgets all the rest, that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." As I believe this recommendation to be unconstitutional, useless, and highly impolitic, I can never give my vote in its favor.

I will now ask gentlemen, who may think the recommendation not improper, whether the measure recommended is entitled to their support? Why should it be entitled to support? Either because it is necessary, or because it is useful; because it is demanded by justice, or recommended by good policy?

If the measure were really necessary, or useful, surely the Executive is as well apprized of that necessity and utility, as well qualified to judge about it, as the House of Representatives: and the thing will be as well done by him alone, and will have as much effect, as if the House were to join in it: the claims of justice can be as completely satisfied in one case as in the other; the ends of policy as completely attained. Though I myself have very little reliance on the usefulness of the measure, and no conviction of its necessity, still I, for one, am perfectly willing that it should be tried by the Executive, and perfectly

[H. OF R.

willing that it should be effected, if the Executive think fit. Neither have I any doubt that it will be tried. The very debate in this House will inform the Executive of the propriety of trying it; and I have no doubt, moreover, that the Executive is disposed to make the attempt, to offer these advantages to France. I know nothing directly of the opinion of the Executive, but I know that those who are about the Executive have this opinion, and are disposed to make this offer to France; not perhaps in the unqualified and unconditional manner recommended by some gentlemen, but on terms consistent with the honor and interests of this country, and with which the public, when it comes to be informed of them, will be satisfied. I, therefore, even if I thought this measure not only useful but necessary, should still leave it most willingly to the President. But as there are gentlemen in the House, who may be inclined to favor the recommendation, from an opinion that the measure recommended is necessary or useful, I will address some considerations to them, by which they may, perhaps, be induced to doubt whether it is either the one or the other.

First, I ask them, how this measure, this concession to France, can be necessary? Do gentlemen contend that this country is too weak to defend her rights; that it must yield to the demands of a foreign Power, merely because those demands are made? I have not so understood them. Supple as their language has been, and submissive as their course of policy seems calculated to become, they have not yet bent thus low. But they have contended that this concession is necessary, because it is right; because justice requires it. And how does justice require it? Because, according to them, having yielded these rights to England by our treaty with her, impartial justice requires that we should yield them also to France.

This argument rests on the ground that Britain does not possess these rights by the law of nations, which point gentlemen have taken much pains, and made many elaborate dissertations, to establish. I shall not follow them through this long diplomatic discussion, which is much better suited to the Department of State, and has there been handled in a very masterly and satisfactory manner. I believe, that when the official paper on this subject, lately published from the Department of State, shall be read and compared with the speeches of gentlemen, very little doubt will remain on the point. I have another reason, too, for avoiding a dispute on the law of nations. Gentlemen seem disposed to treat the law, and the writers on it, with as little respect as the one and the other have received from the nation whose cause they advocate. One Minister of that nation, in this country, has declared those writers to be no better than worm-eaten volumes, whose contents he was happy to have forgotten. Another, at Genoa, declared that the French had taken up arms for the express purpose of subverting the law of nations. After this I should be almost afraid to cite writers on the law of nations, lest I should be told, "that they are worm-eaten

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volumes." There is, however, one authority on this point, which perhaps may be acknowledged, and which I will therefore adduce. It is the marine code of France herself; from which it appears, that by the law of nations, and her own laws founded upon it, enemies' goods are liable to capture, in neutral ships.

Sir, it appears from Valin, vol. ii. page 250, that, on the 21st of October, 1744, the King of France published a regulation, "concerning prizes made at sea, and the navigation of neutral vessels in time of war." The first, second, third and fourth articles specify all the cases in which neutral ships in time of war may sail free from molestation. Then comes the fifth article, which is in these words: "If in any of the cases specified in the first, second, third and fourth articles of this regulation, there shall be found on board of the said neutral ships, to whatsoever nation they may belong, merchandise or effects, the property of His Majesty's enemies, such merchandise or effects shall be good prize, even though they be not the production of the enemies' country: but the ships shall be released." This regulation continued in force till the 26th of July, 1778, when the King of France, having engaged in the American war, (for the Treaty of Alliance was early in February, 1778.) found it his interest to relax from the principle, in hopes of prevailing on England to do so too. Accordingly on that day he published a regulation, by the first article of which, enemies' property, on board of neutral ships, is declared to be safe from capture by French armed vessels. The article, however, contains the following clause: "But His Majesty retains to himself a right to revoke the permission contained in the present article, should the enemy Powers fail to grant a similar permission within six months from the date hereof."

Hence it is clear, that France not only has asserted and long exercised this right, which she charges us with having conceded to England, but even possesses it at the present moment, and may exercise it, if she thinks fit, without violating the law of nations; she being only restrained in those cases, in which, as in ours, she has renounced it by treaties. All this appears from her own laws and public acts; for her relinquishment of this right in July 1778, having been merely conditional and dependent on a similar relinquishment by England, which has never taken place, may be at any moment revoked, and indeed has been; for, notwithstanding all her clamors against the English for exercising this right, it is very well known that she has constantly exercised it herself from the beginning of the present war.

It may, therefore, be expected that we shall not hereafter be told, by either France or her advocates, that the right to take enemies' goods in neutral vessels is not a right given by the law of

nations.

It has, however, been contended that the law of nations, in this respect, has been altered by the Convention of the Armed Neutrality. I will not stop to refute this position, which has been so often and so completely exposed; still less will I

[May, 1797.

undertake to prove what is in itself so perfectly obvious, that the Convention of the Armed Neutrality, being no more than a treaty, is confined, like all other treaties, to the parties who agree to it, and can in no manner affect the general rights of other States, under the general law of nations; but I will remark, that this objection about the armed_neutrality, comes with a very bad grace from France; because France, when requested to accede to this Convention of the Armed Neutrality, expressly declined it. She declined it under pretence, that its principles were already established by her regulation of July, 1778. This regulation, however, as has been seen, was temporary and conditional, and left France at full liberty to adhere to the law of nations, or adopt the principles of the armed neutrality, as she might afterwards find convenient. She afterwards did refuse to accede, as appears by the authority of Mr. Gibbon; in one of whose letters to Lord Sheffield, dated September 11th, 1785, and published in the first volume of his miscellaneous works, page 6, there is found this passage: "The other day the French Ambassador mentioned, that the Empress of Russia had proposed to ratify the principles of the armed neutrality by a definitive treaty; but that the French had declared that they would neither propose nor accept an article so disagreeable to England."

This, sir, is a good comment on their former proceedings with respect to this right; and proves that they never meant to renounce it, though they were willing, for a short time and for a particular purpose, to suspend its exercise. It is true, that France afterwards, in the years 1786 and 1787, made a treaty with Russia, in which this right was finally relinquished. The same thing is done in her treaty with England in 1786. But her having so long retained it, and her very agreement at last to give it up, proves most incontestably that she believes herself to possess it, under the general law of nations.

A dispute has arisen, whether the Convention of the Armed Neutrality is permanent in its nature, or merely confined to the duration of the American war. I have been of the latter opinion myself, on the construction of the instrument itself, and of the acts which have grown out of it; and I shall not enter again into the discussion, which I believe to be wholly immaterial; because, whether this convention be permanent or tempory, still it is no more than a treaty, and can have no effect on the general law of nations. I will, however, correct a mistake into which a gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GALLATIN) has fallen on this subject. In order to prove that the Convention of the Armed Neutrality was permanent in its nature, that gentleman has asserted that Portugal acceded to it after the war. But the gentleman has forgot the dates. The accession of Portugal was signed at Petersburg, July, 1782, and ratified at Lisbon, September, 1782. The ratifications were exchanged on the 21st of January, 1783; whereas the provisional articles of peace were not signed till November 30th, 1782. The armistice for suspending hostilities took