H. OF R.]

Foreign Intercourse.

[MARCH. 1798.

Mr. C. then called the attention of the com- and the public at large, as to our own Governmittee to a country in Europe where history afforded a valuable lesson on the present subject. Switzerland, although in the neighborhood of European Princes, maintained no Ministers at their Courts; she neither courted their favor nor feared their power, and while this independency of conduct freed her from the disputes of Europe, Switzerland was respected by every nation.

Mr. C. said, if ever this Government should be shaken, the attack would come from the Executive and Senate, combined against the popular branch. Mr. C. wished not to be understood as wanting a confidence in the present Executive; the reverse was the fact; but if a period should arrive when a bold, intriguing, ambitious man, panting for uncontrolled sway, should work himself into the Presidential Chair, and two-thirds of the Senate be found wicked enough to favor his views-by means of the treaty-making powerthe Government of America may be overturned, and her liberties lost forever.

ment, and particularly its administration, than to produce any real good, or to avert any impending danger. And in proportion to this conviction on his mind should he feel himself at liberty to give his opinion, independently of any insinuations as to the purity or impurity of motives, which were so often the favorite theme of declamation on that floor.

Mr. C. said he might be told that the situation With this view, he said, he would endeavor to of Switzerland is dissimilar to America; that her direct such observations as he might make on the riches consisted in a few sheep feeding in her val- occasion, on a supposition that every member of leys. and a few cattle grazing on her mountains; that committee was actuated by similar motives and as to commerce, she had none. But Switzer--the good and welfare of his country; and that land had enjoyed the blessings of liberty and the differences of opinion which had taken place peace for several centuries, and where so much were merely as to the mode and manner of obhappiness dwells, the policy observed is entitled taining this great end, and were more the result to remembrance, and worthy to be pursued. of our free Government, and the independent and Gentlemen tell us that attempts are continually liberal manner in which they had a right to dismaking in this House to usurp the powers of the cuss all subjects which came before them, than Executive. He was not a witness to them. It from any improper motives. To suppose any appeared to him that they too frequently dele- thing short of this, he said, would be to suppose gated their powers. Look to the laws, and see the people themselves did not know their own inthe increase of influence and power in the hands terest, or that gentlemen had forfeited that responof the Executive. It was this he feared. The sibility which they owe to their constituents, or power of the Representatives was safely placed, have taken up opinions and principles hostile and and ought to be held sacred, for, as he had before foreign from those under which they were electremarked, their responsibility was too great to ed. He thought it much more proper to draw apprehend serious danger. conclusions from arguments themselves, that might be admitted in support of any measure, as the true way to understand its merits and know the line of conduct to be pursued, than to be seeking after motives, which can only end in conjecture, and tend to confound and embarrass, rather than elucidate. He said it was in his opinion a thing to be lamented, that for some time past, not only since he had the honor of a seat in that Legislature, but before, scarcely one subject of importance had come before it, but immediately the doctrine of confidence and the independent rights of the Executive, or some department of Government, was introduced, as though we had no Constitution at all-or, if one, that they possessed a very imperfect knowledge of it. Some gentlemen contending as though they have unlimited confidence in the Executive, and therefore willing to cede almost all power; and that the Executive has no check. On the contrary, others seem disposed not to give up that which may be necessary, or heretofore in practice; both of which were on the extreme, and ought not to be countenanced. Thus one extreme begets another. That we ought to have confidence in every department of our Government, to a certain degree, he said, was right, and what the people intended in the formation of the Constitution. It is not the officer, said he, individually, whom we ought to regard, but the office or department. Thus he would have as much confidence in one Executive as another, in one officer as another, in their official character, and if they violated the duties and trust reposed in them by the Constitution and laws, punish them accordingly.

Mr. R. WILLIAMS (of N. C.) said, although it had become very fashionable for gentlemen to apologize for delivering their opinions at this late stage of the debate, he should make none, but only say he should not have troubled the committee with any observations had it not been for the turn which the debate had taken, and the Constitutional principle which gentlemen on both sides seem to contend would be settled by the decision of this question, viz: whether that House had a right to withhold or control appropriations for foreign Ministers. He said, lest it should be thought that he meant to concede the principle, that it had not the right, he felt it a duty which he owed to his own opinion, as well as the interest of those whom he had the honor to represent, to state the reasons on which he should give his vote. From the best considerations which he had been able to give the question before the committee, he thought the proposed amendment ought not to obtain. It appeared to him to be a measure calculated in its effects, and from the manner in which it had been brought forward and argued, more to sound the disposition of that Legislature

It is not, said he, that a thing has been done this or that way, or by one or the other of the departments of Government, which proves that it

is alone right to be done that way; for there are many things which may be done by either of two of the departments of Government, and yet be constitutionally right; this, he said, showed the mutual confidence which was intended to subsist between the different departments of Government, by which they might work together with that political union and harmony, so essentially necessary to promote the general good and welfare of the country, and happiness of its citizens. He said the people had placed confidence in every department of their Government, up to which he conceived it to be his duty to act, otherwise he should violate the fundamental principles of the Government, and the Constitutional rights of the people, which he was sworn, as a citizen, and a representative, to support.

[H. OF R.

wrong, when reason would have a contrary effect, and in that proportion do you shut the door against conviction, and put reason at defiance. But this appeared to be the design of some, particularly the member from Maryland, (Mr. CRAIK.) who said he had no hopes of a reconciliation of sentiments in that House, and that it was necessary now to make a firm and decisive stand against a party within these walls, who wished to overturn the Government; to prove which he rummaged up the votes on all the important acts of that branch of the Legislature, or laws that have passed, and at once proscribes the minorities. The member from South Carolina (Mr. HARPER) had pursued the same line of conduct, and gone on to abuse and censure private as well as public characters, and was not content to confine his objects of abuse to this country, but leaps over the Atlantic and does the same there, and attacks foreign Governments. He asked, is this what the people expect to hear in their federal Legislature? Is this what we are sent together for? Does such conduct comport with the character and genius of American liberty and independence?

Mr. W. said, having made these general remarks, he would proceed to consider the amendment, in the two-fold point of view on which it had been argued: The Constitutionality and expediency. As to the first, he had no doubt but that this House had a right to restrict or withhold appropriations for foreign Ministers, and to exercise a discretion in all such cases; but that discretion ought to be exercised so as not to be a virtual violation of the Constitution: Such as to refuse to pay the President, a Judge, or other officer necessary to constitute any of the departments of Government, or to defray the expenses of the year 1798. There were cases in which this House was morally bound to appropriate. It had been said, that that House was as much bound to appropriate for foreign intercourse as for the Judiciary. He conceived the cases quite different. The Judiciary was one of the grand departments of the Government, as much so as the Legislative or Executive, and only different in its creation and duties. The people create the Legislative and Executive, and call on them to create the Judiciary; therefore, any act by either to defeat it would be a virtual violation of the Constitution.

Mr. W. said, these were his sentiments as to confidence in the different departments of the Government; and he hoped they would not be imputed to him as one of those who was willing to ascribe implicit perfection and infallibility in the administration of the Government, or sing hallelujahs to the Executive, as some gentlemen had been pleased to say. He did not believe the rights and liberties of the people were so endangered from their own Government as to be mourned over in that manner. He believed the Government competent to render them great as a nation, and happy as a people; and the only danger which he saw and apprehended was from meddling with European and foreign politics. He said, he had very early made up his opinion as to the proposed amendment; but the arguments and principles which some gentlemen had advanced against it, had almost induced him to abandon that opinion; but when he considered it would be wrong to sacrifice an opinion which he knew to be formed on pure motives, and in which not only himself and those he had the honor to represent, but the public in general were interested, he should not suffer any arguments foreign to the merits of the question, and which had been advanced merely for the purpose of crimination, to have any influence on his mind. He said, without any intention to dictate to gentlemen what observations they ought to make on any subject brought before that House, he would say he was sorry to hear the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. NICHOLAS) take the ground which he did, because he thought it extremely impolitic, at this critical juncture of our affairs, unless the occasion was more urgent. But, he said, it had been seized on with such avidity, and commented on with such severity and crimination, as almost to make that mild which otherwise, and at first, would not have ap- If we do not choose to have them, we may repeared so, and had gone further to prove the truth fuse, and our Government may still go on. But of some observations which had been made rela- it was quite different as to Judges. There is no tive to the existence of a certain fact, which he analogy in the cases. If we had no Judiciary, our was yet disposed not to believe, than anything Government could not go on; the people would since said in support of it. He meant Executive have no tribunal to determine their rights, liberpatronage. He said it was certainly more properties, or property. The case of an appropriation to show the impropriety of any measure, by reason for a treaty was also mentioned; that, he said, and argument, than by crimination; for, in pro- differed from the present case. By the sixth arportion to the violence of the attack would the re-ticle of the Constitution, a treaty, when ratified sistance be, and the exertion to persevere, though by the President and Senate, is declared to be

He said, foreign Ministers were not necessary to constitute any one of the departments of the Government; it was as complete without as with them; they are only to be employed as may be expedient.

H. OF R.]

Foreign Intercourse.

[MARCH, 1798.

the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in tract appropriations; they say there is always a every State bound thereby. Here a law may be tendency in the popular branch of the Governmade independent of this branch of the Legisla- ment to encroach on the Executive. To prove ture, except as to the first act, that of appropria- which they go into Europe; England and France tion to enable the President to form a treaty, are particularly mentioned. He thought there which the Constitution gives this House a dis- was no necessity; nor was it policy to quote excretion in; and having made the appropriation, amples from those countries, to know how to adit had exercised all the power given by the Con- minister our own Government. As to England, stitution, unless a treaty should be made to carry he said, the people have no power or liberty but on or declare war, which expressly belongs to what has been dealt out to them by mere acts of this House. But all these were extreme cases, sovereign grace and prerogative mercy, but their and ought not to be supposed, because it was im- Government is different. As to France, it is and possible to give power that might not be abused. has been for ten years in a state of revolution. He said, after a treaty was ratified, he then He said the sources of power, and the means of thought the obligations of that House to appro- obtaining it in this country and England, were priate might be assimilated to that for a Judge. quite different. Here it was in the people; there To show more clearly that that House was mo- in the Crown. Here power was freely given to rally bound to appropriate for a treaty Constitu- the Executive by the people; there it was taken tionally made, he would state a case. Suppose a from them by usurpation, which keeps up a contreaty made, which required no money to carry stant jealousy between the governing and the it into effect, or did not require any for several governed; the one constantly on its guard, under years; how was that House to check its opera-a conviction of being in possession of what it has tion, or prevent the Judges from being bound by it, as by the Constitution they are? Or will gentlemen say, this House can only check such as require money, and not those which require none; and that after a treaty has been in operation for several years, this House can stop it? This certainly would be the effect of such a construction of the Constitution.

But it is said, for this House to refuse to appropriate for Ministers, when appointed, would be to check the other departments of Government. It might as well be said the other departments have no right to check this. Such a construction goes to do away the intended checks of the departments of Government on each other, and tends to destroy all confidence and render them independent in all their acts. He said our Government ought not to be construed as though one department was intended to destroy the other, but to aid and check it. The member from Delaware, (Mr. BAYARD,) in advocating the principle of the Executive's selecting men of certain politics to office, had talked of administering the Government by conscience; he believed such would be a new-fangled Administration; he thought the Constitution ought to be the conscience of every administrator of the Government. Mr. W. said, the bill, without the proposed amendment, was the same in principle as that first passed in the year 1790, and continued ever since; though there had been an increase of money granted, the principle was the same; where Ministers should be sent, and their grade was left to the Executive, the check which that House reserved to itself was as to the quantum of appropriation, which he thought would ever prove a sufficient one against abuse, for the Executive could make use of no more money than was given him. He said, this was one of the things which might be done either by this House, or given to the President, as was most expedient. It had been heretofore left to him, and he saw no reason for a change at this time. But some gentlemen seem very unwilling to allow that this House has the power to con

no right to; whilst the other is taking all advantages to regain what was forced from it. In this country no such jealousy exists, because all power is with the people, except what they have freely given up. He said, this principle would hold good in private life; for if the property or liberty of an individual was forced from him, he would never be contented at seeing another, or the one who had taken it from him, enjoy it, but would be constantly striving to get it back. These remarks he meant to apply as well to those who seemed to fear Executive power, as to those who feared the powers of that House. The member from New Jersey, (Mr. IMLAY,) as well as some others, had said this branch of the Government ought not to check the Executive. Mr. W. said, that this was not a correct opinion; to prove which he read a clause from Mr. Adams's defence of the American Constitution, which says, "That each of the three branches of the Government must be, in its turn, both master and servant, governing and being governed by turns." He said, although he had no great partiality for the politics contained in that author, yet he read it in order to show that even those who contended for a much stronger Executive than ours did not deny that each branch was to be a check on the other.

Mr. W. said, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARPER) charged all those who advocate the powers of the House as being ignorant of the effects of the measures they advocate, and compares their speeches to those of Fox and Sheridan in the English Parliament. The gentleman ought to recollect that with as much propriety might his be compared to those of Pitt & Co. And is that an Administration which he would wish to take place in this country?—a system which had kept the nation one-half of its time involved in war-which had drenched the world with blood; a system which had involved the nation in a debt which all the world could scarcely pay, and which had reduced one-half of the people to a state of poverty and want, whilst it raised the other to a state of luxury and dissipation.