The limitation over to Mary Walker is upon an indefinite failure of issue, and is therefore void. Moody vs. Walker, 3 Ark. 189, 198; Patterson vs. Ellis, 11 Wend. 272, 292; Biggs vs. Bensley, 1 Bro. C. C. 190; Exel vs. Wallace, 1 Ves. 117, 120; Barlow vs. Salter, 17 Ves. 481, 482; Elton vs. Eason, 19 Ves. 80; Blagrove vs. Hancock, 16 Sim. 276; Miller vs. Macomb, 26 Wend. 229; Doe vs. Ellis, 9 East. 382; Glen vs. Strothoff, 2 Bro. C. C. 27; Butterfield vs. Butterfield, 1 Ves. 134; 4 Kent. 273, 281, 282. And, even if the clause of limitation over of John M. Walker's share, in the event of his death without bodily heirs, could have restricted an interest in lands from an absolute to an entailed estate, it would not so operate on personal property, it always having been the law that such words as confer an estate tail in lands, pass the whole interest in personal property. Chandless vs. Price, 3 Ves. 101; Crooke vs. De Vandes, 9 Ves. 203; Foley vs. Burnett, 1 Bro. C. C. 284, 285; Maulding vs. Scott, 13 Ark. 91.

And whenever a testator has given away his whole interest, he cannot give any more. Any attempt at further control of the thing given, is repugnant to the gift, and therefore void. Flanders vs. Clark, 1 Ves. 10; Bradley vs. Peixotlo, 3 Ves. 325; Jackson vs. Bull, 10 Johns. 20.

But this will not abate the first, the absolute gift; that, of course, remains good. Blease vs. Burgh, 2 Beavan 226; Ring ts. Hardwick, ib. 359; Hulme vs. Hulme, 3 Sim. 650; Green vs. Harvey, 1 Hare 431.

However fruitless it may be to speculate upon the intention of testators in using words which courts hold mean an indefinite failure of issue, the remarks of Chancellor Kent are applicable in this case, as it seems to have been the plain meaning of James Walker to provide for John M. Walker and his bodily heirs, and that until such heirs had ceased to exist, however remote that time might be, Mary Walker, the daughter, and her bodily heirs, were not to enjoy John M. Walker's share of his estate. Anderson vs. Jackson, 16 Johns. 400, 401; 4 Kent

274. Also, Pleydell vs. Pleydell, 1 P. W. 750. But whatever may have been James Walker's intention, it cannot prevail over the law.

Mr. Justice COMPTON delivered the opinion of the Court. James Walker died, in the early part of 1852, leaving a wife, Mary Walker; a daughter, Mary Walker, then wife of Alexander S. Walker; a son, John M. Walker, and a grand-daughter, Emily Sophronia Walker, only surviving child of Crawford Walker, a deceased son of James Walker.

A short time before his death, James Walker made a will, in which, after appointing Alexander S. Walker and Mary Walker the wife of the testator, executor and executrix, he devised his entire estate as follows:

"Second. I give and bequeath to my grand-daughter, Emily Sophronia Walker, minor heir of my son, Crawford Walker, deceased, certain negroes, slaves for life, which slaves are severally named and described in a certain deed of gift made by me, and bearing date of 13th day of July, A. D. 1849, and which deed of gift is now duly recorded in the recorder's office of said county of White, in Record Book D, pages 96, 97, 98, 99.

"3. To my executrix and executor, I give full power and authority to sell and convey certain tracts of land now owned by me, to-wit: The one lying on the Arkansas river, in the county of Pulaski, and State aforesaid, containing 456 acres, or thereabouts; one lying in said county of White, and State aforesaid, and being about three miles south, or south-west, from the town of Searcy, containing 240 acres, commonly known as the branch or spring land; the other is one-half the interest in the undivided north half of section 12, in township 7, north of the base line, in range 7, west of the fifth principal meridian; and in the event of the death of my wife, the said Mary Walker, who is the executrix herein named, previous to effecting the sale of the said tracts of land above named, I give my execu tor, Alexander S. Walker, full power and authority to sell and

convey the same, and after the same is so sold, the proceeds thereof to be equally divided between my said wife and Alexander S. Walker, and my son, John M. Walker; or in the event of the death of my said wife, previous to said sale being effected, then the proceeds thereof to be equally divided between Alexander S. Walker and John M. Walker, each to share and share alike.

"4th. The remainder of my estate, both real, personal and mixed, I give and bequeath to my wife, Mary Walker, during her life. Nevertheless, that the slaves which I have placed in the care of, and under the control of Alexander S. Walker and Mary, his wife, which are described as follows, to-wit: Rachel, aged about 50 years; Dick, a man, aged about 30; Ann, his wife, aged about 22; Louis, a boy, aged about 3 years; Jacob' aged about 1 year; Frank, aged about 17 years; Clara, aged about 16 years; Robert, aged about 24 years; Henry, aged 12 years; and Rachel, a girl, aged about 10 years, shall be, and remain, in possession of the said Alexander Walker and Mary, his wife; and that they have all the benefit arising from the labor of said slaves, until there shall be a general division of my said estate, which is hereinafter mentioned, at which time they shall revert back, be and constitute a part and parcel of said estate.

"5th. That the balance of my slaves shall remain upon the plantation upon which I now reside, during the lifetime of my wife, Mary Walker; or in the event of her death, then to remain upon said plantation until my son, John M. Walker, shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, at which period they, with the balance of my estate, to descend in equal shares to the said John M. Walker, and to my daughter, Mary Walker, and her bodily heirs; and in the event of the death of the said John M. Walker, without bodily heirs, his entire interest in my said estate to descend to the said Mary Walker and her bodily heirs.

"6th. And at the death of the said Mary Walker, her entire interest in said slaves to descend to her bodily heirs, with an equal and child's part to her husband, Alexander S. Walker,

(provided he survives her,) during his natural life; and at the death of the said Alexander S. Walker, said slaves to descend in equal shares to the bodily heirs of the said Alexander S. and Mary Walker, his wife. In testimony," etc.

The writing referred to in the second item of the will, as a deed of gift, was a declaration on the part of James Walker, that certain slaves, therein mentioned, had been loaned to Crawford Walker, then dead, and it covenanted that he would stand seized of, and hold them in trust for Louisa Walker, the widow of Crawford Walker, and for Emily Sophronia Walker, the child of Crawford and Louisa Walker. Upon the death of Louisa Walker, and the death of Emily Sophronia Walker, without lawful issue, the slaves named were to revert to James Walker; and it was the revertionary interest only which the will gave to Emily Sophronia Walker-all previous and other interest having passed out of James Walker by the instrument referred to, which was dated the 13th day of July, 1849.

In April, 1852, which was but a short time after the death of James Walker, Mary Walker, his wife, died; and in April, 1854, John M. Walker, the son, died, lacking some months of being twenty-one years of age.

Upon these facts, Emily Sophronia Walker, a minor, by her mother and next friend, Louisa Walker, filed her bill on the chancery side of the White circuit court, in which she claimed that, after deducting the lands mentioned in the third item of the will, one-half of the whole estate of James Walker, upon the death of Mary Walker, his wife, passed to John M. Walker, as his absolute property; and that upon his death, as aforementioned, without having been married, and without a will, onehalf of his property vested in his sister, Mary Walker, and the other half in herself, she being the only child of Crawford Walker, a deceased brother of John M. Walker; or else, that as to the residue of James Walker's estate, after taking out the three tracts of land mentioned in the second item of the will, he, the said James Walker died intestate, in which event she claimed one-third such residuary estate; and upon the death

of John M. Walker, one-half of his third, making one-half of the whole residuary estate. But in this event she conceded her liability to bring into the general distributable fund, the slaves described in the instrument referred to in the second item of the will, and offered to do so.

Pending the suit, Louisa Walker, the next friend of the plain tiff, died, and she the plaintiff, married Pichegru T. Quarles, and he and his wife were admitted to prosecute the suit as plaintiffs. Alexander S. Walker also died, and the suit abated as to him, Mary Walker, his widow, married Thomas Watkins, who appeared to the suit and was made a defendant. Mary Watkins then died, leaving her husband and two infant children, Alexander S. Walker, by her husband Alexander Walker, and Mary J. Watkins, by her last husband, Thomas Watkins. These infants were made parties to the suit, and defended by their guardian ad litem, Thomas Watkins. Shortly afterwards, the infant, Alexander S. Walker, died, leaving his half sister, Mary J. Watkins, his only heir. Mary J. Watkins, the other infant, then died, leaving her father, Thomas Watkins, her only heir. The suit was thenceforward prosecuted against Thomas Watkins, as sole defendant, he, as such heir at law and distributee, having succeeded to all the rights and interests of the deceased infants, so far as concerned the personal property claimed by the bill. As to the real estate, it was agreed between the parties that the whole of it, upon the death of the infants, vested in the plaintiff, Emily Sopronia Quarles, leaving the personal property as the only subject matter of controversy.

On the final hearing, the court below was of opinion that the residuary bequest to John M. Walker, the son, and Mary Walker, the daughter, never vested-John M. Walker, having died. under the age of twenty-one-and that upon the death of Mary Walker, the wife, and of John M. Walker, the son, the whole. estate of James Walker, real and personal, except the three tracts of land mentioned in the third item of the will, was descernible and distributable as though he had died intestate; and decreed accordingly.