1800.

By the COURT: Let the rule be entered on the same terms, as in the case of Williamson v. Kincaid.

These preliminary objections to the writ being obviated, and the depositions being returned, to prove the value of the land (which was sufficient to sustain the writ of error), Dallas argued for a reversal of the decree of the Circuit Court on two grounds: (3) 1st. On the merits; and, 2d. On the want of a description of the parties, so as to give a federal jurisdiction.

1st. On the merits. The hearing on the bill and answer, operates as a tacit admission of the facts stated in the answer; which is not contradicted in any respect; and which establishes Daniel Course's purchase of the land in question, as a fair and valid transaction. Hind. Pr. Ch. 416, 7. 289. 441. The widow Course was not a party to the original bill; and cannot, therefore, be bound by the decree in that case. The defendants to the origi nal bill are not parties to the supplemental bill; for, process is only prayed and issued against the widow. Yet, the decrees in the original suit are referred to as exhibits, though not filed, in the supplemental suit; and in the supplemental suit a decree is pronounced against the defendants in the original suit as well as against the widow, who is the sole defendant. Besides, the question is emphatically a question of assets to pay a debt, for which partnership property was first responsible; and the personal estates of the debtors before their real estates. Yet, no account is given of the partnership fund; and neither the minor heirs, nor other legal representatives of Daniel Course, are made parties to the suit, though their interest is expressly stated in the answer. Hind. Pr. Ch. 2. 8. 10. 420. 283, 4. Mitf. 39. 145.

2d. On the want of description. The only descriptive addition to the name of Elizabeth Course, throughout the record, is that she is the "widow of Daniel Course, deceased;" not stating that either he, or she, was a citizen of the state of Georgia. 3 Dall. 382. Bingham v. Cabot. 4 Dall. Mossman v. Higginson. Turner v. The Bank of North America. Turner v. Enrille. It would be extravagant to infer citizenship from mere residence, nor can it be successfully urged, that because the parties to the original bill (which, by the by, is not attached to the writ of error) were well described, this Court has jurisdiction on the supplemental bill, against a new party, not described, not pledged by any joint contract, and not connected in privity, or interest, with the defendants to the original bill. Mitf. 31.

Ingersoll, for the defendant in error, answered: 1st. On the merits. The decree of the Circuit Court was not pronounced simply

(3) The case was argued, on these grounds, at Washington, after the removal of the seat of government; but, with this intimation, it is though most convenient to continue the report under the term, in which it commenced.

on

on the supplemental bill and answer; but on the decrees in the original suit, which liquidated and fixed the quantum of the debt; the conveyance to Daniel Course; and the tax laws of the state of Georgia. The conveyance was charged to be a fraudulent, pretended, deed, which was a matter of fact; 3 Dall. 321. and it was ascertained (not merely by the inadequate consideration, but) by reference to the tax laws, which did not authorise the sale at the time, when it took place, nor, at any time, if there were personal assets; and, consequently, the Court was bound to regard it as a nullity. (4) The objection, on the score of parties, cannot prevail, against the decree, that virtually finds the conveyance to be fraudulent; and, therefore, that no one claiming under it could derive a title, or interest, in the land. Besides, the widow Course is the tenant in possession of the premises, and the natural object of the supplemental bill; she must be presumed to have given notice to all proper persons; and, after all, if the objection has weight, it is sufficient to answer, that no one will be bound by the decree, to whom, on principles of law and equity, it does not extend.

2d. On the want of description. It is not necessary to describe the parties in the supplemental suit, which is merely an incident of the original bill, and must be brought in the same Court. The citizenship, however, of the plaintiff in error, does sufficiently appear, by reasonable presumption and necessary implication. It has never been decided, that the very term citizens and aliens, must be used in the d scription; but, if the description fairly imports, that one party to the suit is an alien, and the other party a citizen; or that the parties are citizens of different states; the Court will assert its jurisdiction. Then, the purchase and possession of real estate announce the character of citizen; since aliens cannot purchase and hold real estate in Georgia; and the long residence of Daniel Course, the purchaser, and his family, in the state, is a circumstance strongly corroborative. If the widow is sufficiently described, to show that she was a citizen of Georgia; there can be no doubt that the complainants are sufficiently described as aliens.

By the COURT: Having examined the record in the case of Bingham v. Cabot, we are satisfied, that the decision there, must govern upon the present occasion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to form, or to deliver any opinion upon the merits of the cause. Let the decree of the Circuit Court be reversed.

(4) When Ingersoll was about to read the statutes of Georgia, Dallas observed that they were not recited on the record; and that it might be a question, whether their existence ought not to have been established, as a fast, in the Court below. But the COURT said there could be no ground to refuse the reading of a law of any of the states. It appeared, however, that, on the point of time, Ingersoll referred to the statute for the tax of a different year, from that in which the sale was made.

1800.

Priestman, Plaintiff in Error, versus The United States.

error from the Circuit Court, for the Pennsylvania district.

ing terms:

"Be it remembered, that on this 16th day of January, one "thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, into the District "Court of the United States for the Pennsylvania district, in "his proper person comes William Rawle attorney for the said "United States for the district aforesaid, who for the said "United States, in this behalf prosecutes and for the said United "States gives the court here to understand and be informed that "between the first day of November last past and the exhibition "of this bill two hundred and three silver watches, three gold "watches, two enamelled watches, two metal watches, two hunt"ing watches, and seven pinchbeck watches, being articles of "foreign manufacture and liable to the payment of duties im"posed by the laws of the United States and being together of "the value of eight hundred dollars and more were transported "from the state of Maryland across the state of Delaware, to "the district of Pennsylvania without a permit from the collec"tor of any district in the said state of Maryland, for that purpose first had and obtained.

And the attorney aforesaid prosecuting as aforesaid further gives the Court to understand and be informed that the said "goods wares and merchandizes so as aforesaid transported to

the

CASES RULED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT, &c.

29

"the district of Pennsylvania were not within twenty-four hours 1800. "after the arrival thereof in the said district of Pennsylvania "reported to the collector of the said district of Pennsylvania "by the owner or consignee thereof or by any other person "whatever.

"Whereby and by force of the acts of the congress of the said "United States the said 203 silver watches, 3 gold watches, 2 "enamelled watches, 2 metal watches, 2 hunting watches, and 7 "pinchbeck watches, have become forfeited to the said United "States and for the causes aforesaid have been seized by Sharp 66 Delany, esquire, collector of the said district of Pennsylvania, "and are now in the custody of the marshal, &c. Wherefore the "said attorney prosecuting as aforesaid prays the advice of the "Court upon the premises, and due process, &c. &c."

This information was founded on the act of congress, entitled "An act for enrolling and licensing ships, or vessels, to be em"ployed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating "the same;" 2 vol. 168. and, particularly, upon the 19th section of the act, which is in these words:

"Sec. 19. And be it further enacted, That it shall and may "be lawful for the collector of the district of Pennsylvania, to 66 grant permits for the transportation of goods, wares or mer"chandize of foreign growth or manufacture, across the state of "New-Jersey, to the district of New-York, or across the state of "Delaware, to any district in the state of Maryland or Virginia; "and for the collector of the district of New-York, to grant like "permits for the transportation across the state of New-Jersey; "and for the collector of any district of Maryland or Virginia, to 66 grant like permits for the transportation across the state of Dela66 ware, to the district of Pennsylvania: Provided, That every such 66 permit shall express the name of the owner, or person sending "such goods, and of the person or persons, to whom such goods "shall be consigned, with the marks, numbers and description of the packages, whether bale, box, chest, or otherwise, and the kind "of goods contained therein, and the date, when granted; and "the owner or person sending such goods, shall swear or affirm, "that they were legally imported, and the duties thereupon paid or secured: And provided also, That the owner or consignee of "all such goods, wares and merchandize, shall, within twenty"four hours after the arrival thereof, at the place to which they were permitted to be transported, report the same, to the col"lector of the district where they shall so arrive, and shall deli"ver up the permit accompanying the same, and if the owner or consignee aforesaid, shall neglect or refuse to make due entry "of such goods within the time, and in the manner, herein di"rected, all such goods, wares and merchandize shall be subject "to forfeiture; and if the permit granted shall not be given up,

.66

66

66

1800.

"within the time limited for making the said report, the person "or persons to whom it was granted, neglecting or refusing to "deliver it up, shall forfeit fifty dollars for every twenty-four "hours it shall be withheld afterwards: Provided, That where "the goods, wares and merchandize, to be transported in manner "aforesaid, shall be of less value than eight hundred dollars, the "said oath and permit shall not be deemed necessary, nor shall "the owner or consignee be obliged to make report to the col"lector of the district where the said goods, wares and merchan"dize shall arrive."

William Priestman, the plaintiff in error, filed a claim for the watches, setting forth "that he had paid the duties upon them, and that he did not transport them from the district of Maryland, across the state of Delaware, into the district of Pennsylvania." The attorney of the district having filed a general replication to the claim, a case was made for the opinion of the Court, in which the material facts were stated, as follows:

66

"That the watches in question were of the value of 3,899 "dollars. That they were imported into the district of Maryland, " and the duties thercon paid, or secured, according to law. That "they were afterwards carried by the claimant, or his agent, "from the district of Maryland, across the state of Delaware, "to the state of Pennsylvania, to wit, to the city of Philadelphia, "without any licence, or permit, so to do, first had and obtained "from the collector of the port of Baltimore; and that no notice was given to the collector of the port of Philadelphia. That the "watches were publicly offered for sale, next door to the custom"house, in the city of Philadelphia with a number of other arti"cles; and were afterwards seized as forfeited. That the watches "did not belong to the master, owner, or any mariner of the ship, "or vessel, in which they were imported from beyond sea into "Baltimore; nor was the claimant captain, owner, or mariner, of "the packet-boat, in which they were brought from Baltimore to "French-town, or from Newcastle to Philadelphia.”

The case was argued before the District Judge, in December 1798, and a decree of condemnation pronounced; which was affirmed upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court, in April term 1800; (1) and, thereupon, the cause was removed into this Court;

and

(1) The Circuit Court was composed of CHASE, Justice, and PETERS, District Judge. The presiding Judge, in delivering the opinion of the Court, made the following observations:

CHASE, Justice. By the rules, which are laid down in England for the construction of statutes, and the latitude which has been indulged in their application, the British Judges have assumed a legislative power; and on the pretence of judicial exposition, have, in fact, made a great portion of the statute law of the kingdom. Of those rules of construction, none can be more dangerous, than that, which distinguishing between the intent, and the words, of

the