Toward Competition in Local Telephony
The authors examine how telecommunications regulation can be designed to adapt automatically as the market for local service becomes increasingly competitive. They address how regulators can protect consumers against cross-subsidy, predatory pricing and price discrimination.
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Actual and Prospective Competition in Local Telephony
Price Floors for Final Products
Price Ceilings for Final Products
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antitrust arena AT&T average-incremental cost Baumol behavior cable television calculation combinations common costs common fixed costs competitive market competitive-market model competitive-market standard competitors constraints consumer contribution cost of capital cross-subsidy customers deregulation differential pricing earnings economic efficiency economic regulation economists effective efficient component-pricing rule elasticity of demand entails entrant entry equal equilibrium exchange carriers final product firm's products firm's total floors and ceilings incentive incremental cost incumbent industry innovation input interconnection interexchange carriers intraLATA toll landlord local exchange carriers local loop marginal cost natural monopoly opportunity cost optimal output Pareto percent perfect competition perfectly contestable market permitted pertinent Policy predatory pricing price caps price ceilings price floors profit public interest railroad Ramsey analysis Ramsey prices Ramsey theory RBOCs regulated firm regulatory agencies Resident Scholar rivals scale economies subset supply Telecom telecommunications telephone service tion total cost unit welfare wireless
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Designing Incentive Regulation for the Telecommunications Industry
David E. Sappington,Dennis L. Weisman
Vista previa limitada - 1996