Toward Competition in Local TelephonyAmerican Enterprise Institute, 1994 - 169 páginas The authors examine how telecommunications regulation can be designed to adapt automatically as the market for local service becomes increasingly competitive. They address how regulators can protect consumers against cross-subsidy, predatory pricing and price discrimination. |
Contenido
Introduction | 1 |
Actual and Prospective Competition in Local Telephony | 7 |
vi | 20 |
Price Floors for Final Products | 61 |
Price Ceilings for Final Products | 77 |
The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors | 93 |
viii | 117 |
The Special Problem of IntraLATA Toll Competition | 125 |
Conclusion | 136 |
The Political Economy of Adoption | 142 |
References | 149 |
159 | |
165 | |
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Términos y frases comunes
arena AT&T average-incremental cost Baumol behavior bifurcation rule cable television calculation CC Dkt competitive market competitive-market model competitive-market standard competitors consumers contestable market contribution cost of capital cross-subsidy customers demand deregulation earnings economic efficiency economic regulation economies of scope economists efficient component-pricing rule efficient supplier elasticity entrant entry equilibrium exchange carrier final product forgone incentive incremental cost incumbent incurred industry input interconnection interexchange carriers intraLATA toll landlord LEC's local exchange carriers marginal cost natural monopoly opportunity cost optimal output Pareto perfect competition perfectly contestable market permitted pertinent Policy predatory pricing price caps price ceilings price floors principles public interest railroad Ramsey analysis Ramsey pricing Ramsey theory RBOC regulated firm regulation and antitrust Resident Scholar revenues rivals scale economies stand-alone cost standard for regulation supply Telecom telecommunications telephone service tenant theory tion trackage rights transport unregulated welfare wireless