the characteristic American separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The United States has never granted to any territory organized by act of Congress complete self-government, and Porto Rico is no exception to the rule. Indeed, though the act confers a considerable measure of self-government, for reasons deemed sufficient by Congress, it stops short of the power usually conferred upon territories within the continent. This organic act has the provision common to most, if not all, our territories, whether fully incorporated into the United States or not, that Congress may, if it deem advisable, annul all laws enacted by the local legislative assembly. Subject to these limitations, a body politic, under the name of The People of Porto Rico, with a citizenship of its own, is created (87); existing laws, not in conflict with the applicable laws of the United States, are continued in force until altered, amended or repealed by the legislative assembly or by Congress (88); public property acquired by the United States from Spain is placed under the control of the local government, and the legislative assembly is given power to legislate with respect to it (§ 13); the legislative authority is given "power by due enactment to amend, alter, modify or repeal any law or ordinance, civil or criminal, continued in force by this act" (§ 15); the Governor is enjoined faithfully to execute the laws, and given to that end the applicable powers of a Governor of a Territory of the United States (§ 17); the legislative assembly of Porto Rico is constituted (§ 27); and the scope of the legislative power is fully described in § 32, as follows:

"That the legislative authority herein provided shall extend to all matters of a legislative character not locally inapplicable, including power to create, consolidate, and reorganize the municipalities, so far as may be necessary, and to provide and repeal laws and ordinances therefor; and also the power to alter, amend, modify, and repeal any and all laws and ordinances of every character now in force in Porto Rico, or any municipality or district thereof, not inconsistent with the provisions hereof: Provided, however, That all grants of franchises, rights,

and privileges or concessions of a public or quasi-public nature shall be made by the executive council, with the approval of the governor, and all franchises granted in Porto Rico shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power to annul or modify the same."

In the form of government, which is typically American, the creation and control of corporations is exclusively a legislative function. We are of opinion that the effect of the organic act is to intrust that function, so far as it relates to a corporation of the kind under consideration, whose essential qualities need not be repeated, to the government of Porto Rico; and that such a corporation is now, if a citizen of any country, a citizen of Porto Rico. We need not consider whether the corporation has more than a de facto existence, subject to the will of the Porto Rican legislature. It follows that the court below had no jurisdiction of this cause.

The decree is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, with instructions to dismiss the bill, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction.

EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES v. BROWN.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 74. Argued January 13, 14, 1909.-Decided March 1, 1909.

A life insurance company which has several hundred thousand policyholders is in its nature a public institution, and where there is no apprehension as to its solvency, a court of equity will consider all the facts as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of a receivership or accounting before granting relief of that nature in the suit of an individual policyholder even if jurisdiction to grant such relief exists.

The fact that stockholders claim the surplus of an insurance company and the officers of the company do not actively deny the claim gives no ground for a receivership at the suit of a policyholder claiming that the surplus belongs to the policyholders.

A demurrer only admits facts well pleaded in the pleading demurred to; it does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law or the correctness of his opinions as to future results.

The construction of a general act and a charter granted thereunder pertain to the state court just as if the charter were granted by a special act; and in a suit by the holder of a policy, executed at the home office, the meaning and construction of the charter as held by the state court will be binding on the Federal courts, and, in the absence of any Federal question, the construction of the contract by the state court will be of most persuasive influence even if not of binding force. The wrongdoing of former officers of an insurance company, and their continuance in power, in the absence of any trust relation, gives no jurisdiction for an accounting in equity in a suit in which the company is the only defendant as between a simple debtor and creditor. The Equitable Life Assurance Society is not a trustee of its policyholders under its charter and policies as the same have been construed by the highest courts of the State of New York.

As the charter and contract have been construed by the highest court of New York, a policyholder in the Equitable Life Assurance Society can only participate in the surplus of the society according to the terms of the policy; and a discretion rests with the officers of the society as to what amount of surplus shall be retained and distributed, and when the distribution shall be made.

While wrongdoing, waste, and misapplication of funds reducing the surplus of an insurance company before distribution, might give ground of action to a policyholder, it would not necessarily, where there is no allegation of insolvency, give ground for equitable action. Where the bill avers solvency of defendant at present, a prediction of insolvency in the future on account of inability to meet claims of policyholders by reason of mismanagement is a mere conclusion of law and not a fact which is admitted by demurrer or on which a court can grant equitable relief.

Where a suit for accounting by a policyholder against an insurance company as sole defendant avers that the stockholders claim to own the surplus, no decree can be made as to such ownership without the presence of the stockholders as parties.

Equity does not now take jurisdiction in cases of fraud where the relief

properly obtainable on that ground can be obtained in a court of

law, and where, so far as necessary, discovery may be obtained as well as in equity. Rev. Stat., § 724; United States v. Bitter Root Co., 200 U. S. 451.

A complainant who can obtain all the relief to which he is entitled in a single suit cannot invoke the interference of a court of equity on the ground that defendant may be saved a multiplicity of suits against it by others situated similarly to himself.

151 Fed. Rep. 1, reversed.

THIS case comes here on writ of certiorari, which brings up the record from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversing the decree of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, which sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the plaintiff's bill and dismissed the same. The opinion of the Circuit Court is reported in 142 Fed. Rep. 835, and that of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 151 Fed. Rep. 1.

The bill was filed against the defendant (the petitioner above named) some time in August, 1905, and is one of extreme length, and makes allegations in great detail relating to the conduct of the business of the defendant by its board of directors and by its officers and agents for many years prior to the filing of the bill. It will not be necessary to repeat all of them in order to understand the case as made. The following facts, among many others of a similar nature, appear in the bill:

The complainant is a citizen of the State of Maryland and brings this suit in behalf of himself, as well as all the policyholders and annuitants of the company defendant, who may choose to come in and join therein; the defendant is a citizen of the State of New York and an inhabitant of the Southern District thereof.

The defendant was incorporated in May, 1859, under a general law of the State of New York, passed June 24, 1853, providing for the incorporation of life and health insurance companies. In accordance with this act there was filed by the incorporators a declaration, in the nature of a charter, from which it appears that the capital of the defendant was $100,000 in cash, divided into 1,000 shares of $100 each, and the corpo

rate powers of the company were vested in a board of directors. The insurance business was to be conducted upon the mutual plan. The holders of the capital stock were, by the declaration, to have the right "to receive a semi-annual dividend on the stock so held by them, not to exceed three and one-half per cent of the same; such dividends to be paid at the times and in the manner designated by said directors of the company. The earnings and receipts of said company, over and above the dividends, losses and expenses, shall be accumulated."

The officers were to strike a balance every five years from December 31, 1859, which was to exhibit its assets and liabilities and also the net surplus, after deducting a sufficient amount to cover all outstanding risks and other obligations. Each policyholder was to be credited with an equitable share of the surplus, which was to be applied to the purchase of an additional amount of insurance for each policyholder, or, if any policyholder should so direct, such equitable share of the surplus should be applied in his case to the purchase of an annuity.

The complainant took out a policy in the company on the twenty-eighth of December, 1867, for $25,000, in the form of an ordinary life policy, which was subsequently, and on the twelfth of January, 1876, changed to another ordinary life policy, payable to his wife upon his death, and if his wife were not then living, then to the children of complainant, and if there were no children, then to the complainant's executors, administrators or assigns. The policy was also issued and accepted upon certain conditions printed on its back, which were accepted as a part of the contract, among which provisions is the following: "6. This policy, during its continuance, shall be entitled to participate in the distribution of the surplus of this society, by way of increase to the amount insured, according to such principles and methods as may, from time to time, be adopted by this society for such distribution, which principles and methods are hereby ratified and accepted by and for every person who shall have or claim any interest under this contract, but the society may, at any time before a forfeiture, upon the request