"The question as to whether a transfer is made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud depends upon whether the act done is a bona fide transaction. Loveland on Bankruptcy, 391; Cadogan v. Kennet, 2 Cowper, 435; Lansing Boiler and Engine Works v. Ryerson, supra. An intent to defraud is the test of the right to avoid a transfer under section 67e."

In dealing with this question this court said, in Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516:

"There is no finding that in parting with the possession of the property the mortagor had any purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his creditors or any of them. Without a finding to the effect that there was an intent to defraud, there was no invalid transfer of the property under the provisions of section 67e, of the bankruptcy law."

That it is essential to show actual fraud in order to invalidate conveyances under § 67e, is the view of the textwriters upon this subject. Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.), 476; Collier on Bankruptcy (6th ed.), 562; 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, § 1498.

We do not agree, if such is to be held the effect of the third conclusion of law in the finding of the Court of Appeals, that the giving of the mortgage and its effect upon other creditors could not be considered as an item of evidence in determining the question of fraud. What we hold is that to constitute a conveyance voidable under § 67e, actual fraud must be shown.

How, then, stands the case at bar? As we have already said, we must decide this case upon the facts found in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and it is therein found that in making the mortgage in question, Armstrong had no intention to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. In view of the finding of the Circuit Court of Appeals, it may be that Armstrong, though including in the conveyance a large amount of his property, acted in good faith, with a view to preserving his estate and enabling him to meet his indebtedness. Such conveyances were valid at the common law and under the statute from which this feature of the law was taken, and, while Congress in the

bankruptcy act strikes down preferential conveyances which come within its terms where the party preferred has good reasons to believe that a preference is intended, it has not declared voidable merely preferential conveyances made in good faith and in which the grantee, as is found in this case, was ignorant of the insolvency of the grantor, and had no reason to believe that a preference was intended. Nor do we think the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding that inasmuch as the estate was ample for that purpose, Arts was entitled to interest on his mortgage debt. Finding no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the same is

Affirmed.

COMMERCIAL MUTUAL ACCIDENT COMPANY v.

DAVIS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 114. Argued March 15, 16, 1909.—Decided April 5, 1909.

Where the defendant makes no appearance in the state court or in the Circuit Court except for the purpose of raising the question of jurisdiction and removing the case to the Federal court, such proceedings do not amount to a general appearance.

A State may require a foreign insurance corporation not having any regular office in the State to make its agents who have authority to settle losses in the State competent to receive notice of actions concerning such losses.

In order for a state court to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation having neither property nor agent within a State it is essential for the corporation to be doing business in the State. An insurance company with outstanding policies in a State on which it collects premiums and adjusts losses held, in this case, to be doing business within that State, so as to render it liable to an action, and that service, according to the law of the State, on a doctor sent to investigate the loss and having power to adjust the same is sufficient to give the state court jurisdiction.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

213 U.S.

While service of process on one induced by artifice or fraud to come within the jurisdiction of the court will be set aside, this court will not reverse the finding of the trial court that there was no such fraud where, as in this case, there is testimony supporting it.

Under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, this court has jurisdiction to review cases certified in which the question of jurisdiction is alone involved and under the power conferred by that statute can reverse the court below, when clearly wrong, even upon questions of fact.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr Jules C. Rosenberger, with whom Mr. James C. Jones and Mr. Kersey Coates Reed were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

It is essential to support the jurisdiction of the court to render a personal judgment against a foreign corporation: That at the time of service of the summons the corporation was engaged in business in the State; that the person upon whom service was had stood in a representative character to the company, that his employment was general, not special, and that his duties were not limited to those of a subordinate employé nor to a particular transaction; and that such person was not lured or enticed into the State, or authority conferred upon him through any trick or device employed by the plaintiff. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350; Frawley v. Penn. Casualty Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 259; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 522; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100; Conley v. Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406; Geer v. Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428; Remington v. Railroad Co., 198 U. S. 95.

The defendant was not and is not doing business in this State. Isolated or sporadic transactions, taking place between a foreign corporation and citizens of a State are not a doing or carrying on of business within that State, even where the transaction is of such a character as to constitute a part of the ordinary business of the corporation. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; Frawley v. Ins. Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 264, and cases

213 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

cited; Louden Machinery Co. v. Amer. Iron Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 1008; Romaine v. Ins. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 751; Hazeltine v. Ins. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 743; St. Louis Wire Co. v. Consol. Wire Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 802; United States v. Telephone Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 37, 41; Carpenter v. Air Brake Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 434; 19 Cyc. 1268.

Much more so is this true where, as in this case, the business transacted was wholly by mail which does not constitute a doing of business in the State. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Marine Ins. Co. v. St. L. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 643; Hazeltine v. Ins. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 743; Romaine v. Ins Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 751; Cæsar v. Cahill, 83 Fed. Rep. 403; East Bldg. & Loan v. Bedford, 88 Fed. Rep. 7; Neal v. New O. Assn., 100 Tennessee, 607; Frawley v. Penna. Cas. Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 259.

Where the agency of the person served is casual or temporary or confined to a particular purpose, he cannot be held, in law, an agent to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602; Louden Mach. Co. v. Amer. Iron Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 1008, per McPherson, J., disapproving Houston v. Filer Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 757; Mex. Central Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194; Maxwell v. Railroad Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 286; Frawley v. Pa. Casualty Co., 124 Fed Rep. 265; Wall v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 95 Fed. Rep. 398.

If a person is induced by artifice to come within the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of having process served upon him and process is there served, it is such an abuse that the court will, on motion, set the process aside. Fitzgerald Const. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Frawley v. Penna. Casualty Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 259; Louden Mach. Co. v. Amer. Iron Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 1008; Cavanaugh v. Manhattan Transit Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 818.

The sheriff's return does not show a valid service under the local statute under which it was attempted to be made, § 7992, Rev. Stat. Mo., 1899, which provides that service may be made upon any person "who adjusts or settles a loss or pays the same

Argument for Defendant in Error.

213 U.S.

for such insurance corporation, or in any manner aids or assists in doing either." No loss was adjusted, settled or paid in the State. This loss having never been adjusted, settled or paid, it cannot be said that he has in any manner "aided" or "assisted" in so doing, as "assist" necessarily means that the act attempted has been effected. Hurst v. State, 79 Alabama, 55, 57.

The Federal courts in determining their jurisdiction are not bound by any local statute or decision, but will determine on principles of general jurisprudence whether the company is doing business in the State and whether the person served is such an agent as is truly representative of the corporation. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100; Spratley v. Ins. Co., 172 U. S. 602; Frawley v. Pa. Casualty Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 259, and cases cited.

Mr. William C. Scarritt, with whom Mr. Elliott H. Jones and Mr. Edward L. Scarritt were on the brief, for defendant in error: The finding of the lower court that the plaintiff in error was doing business in the State of Missouri, and that there was no fraudulent enticement of defendant below into this State, and that due service of the process upon the defendant had been made, is, upon this record, conclusive upon this court. Russell v. Ely, 2 Black, 575, 580; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593; United States v. Copper Queen Mining Co., 185 U. S. 495, 497; Jeffries v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 U. S. 305; Hyde v. Booraem, 16 Pet. 169, 176; Parks v. Turner, 12 How. 39, 43; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226, 241; Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237, 253; Cooper v. Omohundro, 19 Wall. 65, 69; Mann v. Rock Island Bank, 11 Wall. 650, 652.

The general finding of the court in favor of the service is fully supported by the proof.

The return of the officer as to the service of the summons, and the finding of the court in its judgment as to the facts of that service are at least prima facie evidence of the facts so recited.