21. A frame building erected
within such ten days is not enjoinable.
Ib.

22. The law in force at the time
of the passage of the improvement or-
dinance, governs with respect to the
manner of assessment and the rights
and liabilities of the owners of abutt-
ing property; this rule is not affected
by the fact that the owners of the
abutting property petitioned for the
improvement. Shehan v. Cincinnati.

198

23. An ordinance providing for
the construction of a sidewalk upon
one side only of a street under sec.
2332, Rev. Stat., and assessing the
charge on owners of the lots or lands
abutting on both sides of such street,
and which makes no provision or al-
lotment for space for a sidewalk on
the other side, is unreasonable and in
conflict with the manifest intent and
meaning of this section of the statutes,
and is therefore void. Mills v. Nor-
wood.
416
MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES-

1. The right of a member of a
charitable, benevolent, beneficial and
social organization, to any aid and as-
sistance furnished by the same, is lost
by the termination of his member-
ship, which may be forfeited by mis-
conduct. Hershiser v. Williams.

76

3. By becoming a member of
such organization one does not ac-
quire a severable right to any of its
property, but merely the right of a
member so long as he remains a mem-
ber.
Ib.
4. Whether it is unmasonic con-
duct for a member of a masonic lodge,
being a society not for profit, to be-
come a member of the Cerneau bodies
of the Ancient Accepted Scottish Rite,
is one into which a court will not in-
quire, but is left entirely to such lodge
or society.
Ib.

5. A masonic lodge organized
for charitable, benevolent, beneficial
and social purposes, being bound to
aid and assist its members and aid
their widows and orphans, is a society
not for profit but for masonic pur-
poses.
Ib.
6. Such lodge having power to
expel its members for unmasonic con-

duct, and to determine what consti
tutes such misconduct can not be re-
strained by a court from proceeding
to expel a member or members for
any alleged irregularity by the lodge
or its officers in the exercise of its
power of expulsion.
Ib.

7. The beneficiary to whom a
member of a mutual benevolent order
has his death certificate payable, has
no vested interest therein when the
laws of the order reserve a right to
the member to change the direction
of the fund. Thesing v. Supreme
Lodge K. of A.
88

8. Rules and regulations of the
order prescribing the method of
changing the beneficiary, or imposing
conditions on the right to change, are
made for the benefit of the order, and
not of the beneficiary, and the order
does not guarantee or promise him
that it will enforce or will not abro-
gate such rules.

Ib.
9. A new certificate to another
beneficiary, made at a members re-
quest without the original benefic-
iary's consent although the former
rules required such consent, will
supersede the original certificate. Ib.

10. The policy of mutual assess-
ment associations agreeing upon loss
to pay the member a fund collected
by assessment upon all members not
exceeding $200, is to be construed as
implying a promise to levy such as-
sessment, and the assured need not
seek specific performance, but may
sue at law for the breach of such
promise. Hall v. Live Stock Assn.

145

11. A petition on such policy
counting on a promise to pay the
amount on loss is demurrable. The
proper averment of breach of the con-
tract is for the neglect or refusal to
levy the assessment.
Ib.

12. Query, whether plaintiff may
not recover the maximum amount
without averring or proving what an
assessment would have yielded. Ib.

13. If a member of a mutual
benefit order whose children are
named as beneficiaries of his death
certificate, stops paying dues and as-
sessments, separates from his family
and is finally divorced, and the wife
for years and until his death keeps up
the dues and assessments for the chil-
dren's sake, the member has thereby
lost all right to change the beneficia-
ries, and the children are entitled to
the fund at his death. Tudor v.
Tudor.
422

NEGLIGENCE-

1. A person is guilty of contrib-
utory negligence in boarding a rapidly

NEGLIGENCE-Continued.
moving car, without signaling it to
stop. Brooks v. Mt. Auburn Cable Co.
746

2. Such person is guilty of con-
tributory negligence, after getting
upon the running board of the car, in
not entering at the door ncarest him.
Ib.

3. Such person is not a passen-
ger while upon the running board,
and is not entitled to the highest de-
gree of care from the company, to
avoid injuring him.
Ib.

4. The failure to stop an electric
car on seeing that a horse is taking
fright at it, does not render the com-
pany liable, unless the failure to stop
the car is attributable only to a wanton
or malicious disregard for the safety
of the driver of the horse. Chapman
v. Zanesville St. Ry. Co.
449

6. Liability of employer for in-
jury to an employee. Smith v. Powell
Co.
528
NEW TRIAL-

1. When a mistake in a verdict
is clearly proven, it is the duty of the
court to set it aside and order a new
trial. Wertz v. Railroad Co. 872

2. Where the principal petition-
er in a ditch case, on solicitation from
the jury, returning fatigued from their
view gave them something to eat, and
liquor to one who was unwell, there
being no intent to influence the jury,
is not sufficient to avoid the verdict.
Marsh v. Commissioners.

442

3. Jurors saying that they have
made up their minds when it is pro-
posed to view the premises a second
time, will be deemed to mean only
that they are satisfied with the one
view, and will not be deemed to diso-
bey the court's injunctions not to
make up their minds, and will not
constitute such misconduct as will
justify the setting aside of the verdict.
Ib.
4. Where the juror's miscon-
duct consists of declarations and ut-
terances of opinions about matters on
trial, made outside of court during the
pendency of the trial, and where this
action implies a strong disposition for
or against one side or the other, be
the evidence what it may, a verdict in
accordance with such prejudice will
be set aside. State v. Carter.
NOTICE-

123

1. The notice under sec. 4457, to
be given interested parties in a county
ditch, should contain a description of
the route as located by the commis-
sioners. Marsh v. Clark Co. Com'rs.

290.

1. The members of the board of
review in cities of the first grade, first
class are required to take and sub-
scribe to an oath before entering upon
their duties, which oath is filed with
the clerk of the court appointing
them. N. C. Harmony Lodge v. Hag-
erty.
595.
2. No further oath is required
of the members to enable them to dis-
charge any of the duties of their office.
Ib.

3. By reason of various acts, the
administrative board of Cincinnati
was frequently changed and was called
successively the board of public af-
fairs, the board of public improve
ments, the board of city affairs, the
board of public improvements, and
the board of administration. Hafer
v. Cincinnati.

625.

4. The board of city affairs was
declared unconstitutional, and the
board of public improvements, which
the board of city affairs had succeeded,
became in turn, by reason of such de-
cision, the successor of the board of
city affairs.
Ib.

5. The board of administration,
upon its creation was declared the suc-
cessor of the board of public improve-
ments.
Ib.

6. During the existence of the
board of city affairs an act was passed
authorizing said board or their succes
sors to issue bonds for the improve-
ment of a certain street in said city;
but that board failed to exercise such
power. Held, that each was the suc-
cessor of the one which preceded it,
and the power to issue the bonds
passed to the board of administration.

Ib.

7. Although what was popularly
known as "The New Charter Bill" for
Cincinnati was passed and took effect

on March 26, 1891, yet the board of
legislation, as provided therein, did
not succeed the council of said city
until April 15, 1891; and the board of
administration did not succeed the
board of public improvements until
May 4, 1891. Cinninnati v. Cin. Edi-
son Elec. Co.
315

8. The city council retained all
its several powers and duties until the
board of legislation was elected and
qualified; and the board of public im-
provements retained all its several
powers and duties until the board of
administration was appointed and
qualified.

PARTIES-

Ib.

2. A parol partition of real es-
tate, if originally fair, is binding,
when there has been long acquies-
cence and acts of confirmation on the
part of the parties making the parti-
tion. Dockterman v. Elder.
506
3. A wife is dowable only in the
portion assigned to her husband in
the partition.
Ib.
PARTNERSHIPS-

1. An infant may rescind a part-
nership of which he is a member.
Lyghtel v. Collins.
161
2. If he does, he can only re-
cover his capital, less what he has re-
ceived from the firm, and all partner-
ship creditors must be first paid, and
he cannot recover any allowance for
services in the absence of express
stipulations.

Ib.

3. Unsecured creditors will be
allowed to intervene to contest the
validity of preferences set up in an
equitable proceeding brought by one
member of an insolvent firm against
the other member for dissolution, ap-
pointment of a receiver, sale of assets
and distribution of proceeds. Bell v.
Miller.

163

4. The administrator of a de-
ceased partner can not maintain an
action at law, against the surviving
partner, to recover money loaned to
the firm by the intestate while he was
a member of such firm. Weidig v.
Moore
83

PAYMENT-

A payment of the Dow tax un-
der protest to escape addition of a
penalty, by a person not liable to the
tax, is not voluntary, and can be re-
covered back. Van Nest v. Brooks. 228

1. It is the spirit as well as the
language of the code that all plead-
ings shall be liberally construed, with
a view to substantial justice between
the parties. Hotel Co. v. Trust and
Safe Deposit Co.
255

2. It is a sufficient allegation
of the execution and delivery of cer-
tain bonds when it is averred that
they were issued and also that they
were secured by certain mortgages
then outstanding.
Ib.

3. The allegation of presenta-
tion and offer to surrender of such
bonds and coupons is unnecessary un-
less made so under the conditions of
their issue, and the averment of a fail-
ure to pay is a sufficient averment of
a breach.
Ib.

4. Where plaintiff, a corpora-
tion, describes itself as such in the
caption of the petition, but in the
body there is no averment of corpo-
rate capacity to sue, it is good as
against a demurrer. Cin. Gas L. &
Coke Co. v. Dodds.
759

5. Allegations of general indebt-
edness on a contract are not a substi-
tute for the necessary code allegations
of performance. Antonelle v. Hus-

7. A petition which sets out
facts showing a liability of certain de-
fendants as stockholders in an insol-
vent corporation, for unpaid stock,
and also facts which show an individual
liability, in addition, under a statute,
states two distinct causes of action.
Turnbull v. Salt Co.
19

8. Where there are two or more
counts in a pleading, separately stated
and numbered, and no reference is
made by either to matter in any other,
on demurrer to one count, it must
stand or fall by its own averments,
and can not be helped or hurt by facts
in another court, however sufficient to
that end in themselves.
Ib.

9. In an action to recover rent,
defendant for a first defense alleged
that there was no legal or valid con-
sideration for the lease. For a second
defense he alleged that he was enti-
tled to an accounting under the terms
of said lease. By way of cross peti-

PLEADINGS-Continued.

Sales on commission-Employer
has right to reject sales to persons not
financially good without being liable
for commissions. Althouse v. Baum.
205

PROPERTY RIGHTS-

A party has a right to the law-
ful use and enjoyment of his own
property, and a liability arises only
when it is shown that such right was
exercised negligently, unskillfully or
maliciously. Flieham v. Railroad Co.
543
RAILROADS-

1. A city has no power to com-
pel a railroad company to maintain
safety gates, under sec. 2500a, Rev.
Stat., at street crossings, other than
those where there is a switching and
coupling of cars. State v. Heubach,

679

4. A general permit by a city to
railroad to put in switch tracks from
connection tracks to property of ad-
jacent proprietors, applies to property
on another street.
Ib.

5. The word "adjacent" does
not necessarily mean "abutting" or
"adjoining" but means "lying near."
Ib.

6. An adjacent land owner can
not maintain an action at law for con-
sequential damages from the operation
of its cars unless he can show a neg-
ligent exercise by the railway com-
pany of its legal rights. Flieham v.
Railroad Co.

543

7. Any annoyance incident to
the running of the cars on the road
with reasonable care is damnum
absque injuria.
Ib.

8. Under the provisions of sec.
3283, Rev. Stat., a railroad company
will be held responsible for any special
injury or depreciation to property
which may result from the occupancy
of any street or road.

Ib.

9. The same rule of compensa-
tion for such injuries will apply to the
owner of the property "near to” such
street or road as to the owner of prop-
erty abutting thereon.

Ib.

10. As a general rule no one has
any special private property or in-
terest in the public highway other or
different from the general public. Ib.

4. A railway company will not
be answerable in damages for prop-
erly running its cars across such street
or public highway to an abutting prop-
erty owner who may have suffered only
such inconvenience or damages as may
be common to all who have occasion
to use such street or public highway.
Ib.
RECEIVERS-

A court of equity will generally,
though not always, in deciding the
rights of labor claimants, in the ad-
ministration of receiverships, be
guided and controlled by the analogies
to the law relating to insolvent debt-
Akron Iron Co. v. Whitely Co.

ors.

REFERENCE-

192

1. The trial provided by sec.
5213, before a referee should be fol-
lowed by all the incidents, as far as
possible, as a trial by the oourt. Glass
-Edsall Paper Co. v. Telegram Pub.
Co.
899
2. The referee should give
notice to the parties of the time and
place of taking testimony.
Ib.

3. The absence of such notice is
such an irregularity as would author-
ize the court to vacate or modify its
own judgment or order whereby the

Ib.

report is confirmed after the term at
which the same is made.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-

1. A pew in a church is real es-
tate, and hence, cannot be levied on by
a constable and the rate will be en-
436
joined. Deutsch v. Stone.

2. The nature of property can-
not be changed by agreement of par-
ties.
Ib.

3. The pecuniary rights of the
members to any of the association's
funds and property, so far as by its dis-
cipline, they depend upon his church
relationship or status, depend upon
the decision of the proper church ju-
diciary, which is as conclusive, when
assailed in the civil tribunals, as any
other judgment. Sampsell v. Escher,

351

4. If the judgment of the church
judicatory comes in question in a civil
court, the merits of the issues cannot
Ib.
be inquired into.

5. Such judgments will not be
affected by informalities, and can only
be impeached for want of jurisdiction,
or fraud working a patent and gross
Ib.
deprivation of justice.

6. A provision that if the bishop
is accused of immoral conduct three
elders shall examine him, does not
require them to go to him in person,
if he has previously refused to submit
to the examination.
Ib.

7. Where the discipline provides
that if the elders believe him guilty
they shall call a trial conference; and
they do call a trial conference and re-
port that the charges are so serious
and well founded as to require
thorough investigation, this will let in
oral proof to show that they were act-
ually of such opinion.
Ib.

8. A discharge of the examining
committee being plead as depriving
the trial conference of jurisdiction:
Held, such examination is merely pre-
liminary to a trial, and a discharge
thereon is not a bar to another exami-
nation, or to a trial, either by legal an-
alogy or the practice of the church
judicatories.

Ib.

9. This is a defense which
should have been plead at the trial con-
ference, and which cannot be inter-
posed now.

Ib.

10. If members of the trial con-
ference were disqualified, or preju-
diced, they should have been chal-
Ib.
lenged at the trial.

11. If this is not done, and the
failure so to do is not caused by fraud
or violence, it is now too late to raise
the objection in this hearing.

Ib.

12. A finding of the trial con-
ference that charges were sufficiently

941

ROADS-

821

1. Where a change in the grade
of a road is made by the county under
a special act which made no provision
for compensation for damages done,
and none having been assessed or pro-
vided for, an injured abutting owner
can sue the county in the common
pleas, originally. Rief v. Commis-
455
sioners.

2. Plaintiff has a right to have
his compensation assessed by a jury,
and there being no authority in the
act for such proceeding, he is not com-
pelled to submit it to the commission-
ers, and does not waive his rights by
Ib.
failure to do so.

3. Not being compelled to sub-
mit his claim to the commissioners,
the jurisdiction of the common pleas
is original, and not appellate,

Ib