(F) Medicinal preparations. - Manufactured by Dr. D. Jayne & Son, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., with the use of domestic tax-paid alcohol. Rate effective on and after June 8, 1931. Sworn statement of May 25, 1933, forwarded to the collectors of customs at New York, N.Y., and Philadelphia, Pa., on July 6, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) J. D. NEVIUS, Acting Commissioner of Customs. (G) Piece goods, redyed.-T.D. 44469-T of December 6, 1930, covering bleached, dyed, and/or printed piece goods produced by the Lyons Piece Dye Works, Paterson, N.J., with the use of imported piece goods in the gray or such piece goods manufactured in the United States under drawback regulations, extended to cover the redyeing of imported piece goods or piece goods woven in the United States from imported yarns. Extension effective on and after May 18, 1933. Supplemental sworn statement of June 10, 1933, forwarded to the collector of customs at New York, N.Y., on June 30, 1933. (72-20/2.) (Signed) FRANK Dow, Acting Commissioner of Customs. (H) Suitcases, sample cases, laundry mailing cases, and animal carriers. Manufactured by the Fibre Case & Novelty Co., Inc., New York, N.Y., with the use of imported pulpboard. Rate effective on articles manufactured and exported on and after June 14, 1933. T.D. 41287-P, extended by T.D. 42708-W, revoked. Sworn statement of June 14, 1933, forwarded to the collector of customs at New York, N.Y., on June 30, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) FRANK Dow, Acting Commissioner of Customs. (I) Tools (broaching). - Manufactured by the Lapointe Machine Tool Co., Hudson, Mass., with the use of high-speed steel manufactured under drawback regulations. Rate effective on or after February 10, 1933. Sworn statement of June 14, 1933, forwarded to the collector of customs at Boston, Mass., on July 6, 1933. (72-10/2). (Signed) FRANK Dow, Acting Commissioner of Customs. (J) Veils. Manufactured by S. Hollander & Sons, Inc., New York, N.Y., with the use of imported laces and veilings. Rate effective on and after May 12, 1933. T.D. 35961 revoked. Sworn statement of June 8, 1933, forwarded to the collector of customs at New York, N.Y., on June 30, 1933. (72-10-2.) (Signed) FRANK Dow, Acting Commissioner of Customs. (T.D. 46530) Currency value-Country of exportation JAMES M. SHOEMAKER CO. v. UNITED STATES For purposes of conversion of currency under section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the date on which the importing vessel last sailed from the country of exportation governs. See Dyas Corp. et al. v. United States, T.D. 43600, 56 Treas. Dec. 268, affirmed on rehearing in T.D. 43792, 57 id. 82; also Harper Co. v. United States, Abstract 13158, 58 Treas. Dec. 980. The Irish Free State is a country for tariff purposes and is therefore not a part of England when considering the country of exportation for the purpose of the conversion of currency under section 522, Tariff Act of 1930. Hence, where goods were exported from England on a vessel which later touched at ports in the Irish Free State, England is the country of exportation. It having been found that the day of exportation in this case was the day the vessel left Liverpool, England, and the attorneys having stipulated that the proclaimed rate did not vary by 5 per centum or more from the value measured by the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation, the currency of the invoice was properly converted into United States dollars at the proclaimed rate for such currency, although the vessel on which the merchandise had been laden subsequently touched at two ports within the territorial limits of the Irish Free State. United States Customs Court, Third Division Protest 586602-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York [Judgment for defendant.] (Decided July 8, 1933) Strauss & Hedges for the plaintiff. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Reuben Wilson, special attorney), for the United States. Before CLINE and EVANS, Judges EVANS, Judge: This is an action against the United States to recover money claimed to have been illegally exacted upon merchandise imported at the port of New York. Plaintiff is not dissatisfied with the classification of the merchandise but bases his claim upon the liquidation, alleging that in such liquidation the collector in converting the currency of the invoice, pounds sterling, into United States dollars, as provided for in section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1930, used the proclaimed rate for the quarter beginning July 1, 1931, viz, $4.8665, whereas he should have used the buying rate as certified by the Federal Reserve Bank on September 21, 1931, to wit, $4.165714, which varies more than 5 per centum from the proclaimed rate. The case has been submitted upon the following stipulation: It is hereby stipulated and agreed between counsel that the merchandise covered by the above-entitled protest arrived on the S/S Scythia on or about September 29, 1931; that the invoice covering the merchandise was consulated in England and the merchandise was laden on the S/S Scythia in Liverpool, England; that said vessel sailed from said port on September 19, 1931; that the vessel subsequently stopped at the ports of Cobh, Ireland, on September 20, 1931, and Galway, Ireland, on September 21, 1931, before proceeding to the port of New York, U.S.A., but that no cargo was laden at Cobh or Galway. It is further stipulated and agreed that the merchandise was invoiced in pounds sterling, which was converted into United States dollars on liquidation at a value of $4.8665 per pound, the proclaimed rate in T.D. 45005; that the value of the pound certified to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in T.D. 45149 for September 21, 1931, was $4.165714. It is further stipulated and agreed that the protest may be submitted on this stipulation and that, subject to the approval of the court, thirty days may be allowed to plaintiff for filing of brief and thirty days to defendant for reply. It is further stipulated and agreed that the ports of Cobh (Queenstown) and Galway are both situated in the Irish Free State and are entirely without the confines of England. For convenience of reference we copy said section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1930: SEC. 522. CONVERSION OF CURRENCY. (a) VALUE OF FOREIGN COIN PROCLAIMED BY SECRETARY OF TREASURY. - Section 25 of the Act of August 27, 1894, entitled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes," as amended, is reenacted without change as follows: SEC. 25. That the value of foreign coin as expressed in the money of account of the United States shall be that of the pure metal of such coin of standard value; and the values of the standard coins in circulation of the various nations of the world shall be estimated quarterly by the Director of the Mint and be proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury quarterly on the 1st day of January, April, July, and October in each year. (b) PROCLAIMED VALUE BASIS OF CONVERSION. -For the purpose of the assessment and collection of duties upon merchandise imported into the United States on or after the day of the enactment of this Act, wherever it is necessary to convert foreign currency into currency of the United States, such conversion, except as provided in subdivision (c), shall be made at the values proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions of section 25 of such Act of August 27, 1894, as amended, for the quarter in which the merchandise was exported. (c) MARKET RATE WHEN NO PROCLAMATION. - If no such value has been proclaimed, or if the value so proclaimed varies by 5 per centum or more from a value measured by the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation, conversion shall be made at a value measured by such buying rate. If the date of exportation falls upon a Sunday or holiday, then the buying rate at noon on the last preceding business day shall be used. For the purposes of this subdivision such buying rate shall be the buying rate for cable transfers payable in the foreign currency so to be converted; and shall be determined by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and certified daily to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall make it public at such times and to such extent as he deems necessary. In ascertaining such buying rate such Federal reserve bank may in its discretion (1) take into consideration the last ascertainable transactions and quotations, whether direct or through exchange of other currencies, and (2) if there is no market buying rate for such cable transfers, calculate such rate from actual transactions and quotations in demand or time bills of exchange. The issue involved is, What was the day of exportation? Plaintiff's counsel concedes that if the court finds it to be September 19, the day the ship sailed from Liverpool, the collector's liquidation is correct, but if the court decides that the day of exportation was September 21, the day said vessel sailed from Galway, Ireland, the liquidation is illegal. In order to decide this question we must have reference first to the decisions of this court construing the phrase "day of exportation" as it appears in the tariff acts. It has been held that this is the date the importing vessel sails from the last port of a country. See B. H. Dyas Corp. v. United States, T.D. 43600, 56 Treas. Dec. 268, affirmed on rehearing in T.D. 43792, 57 Treas. Dec. 82. In that case the importing vessel sailed from Havre, France, stopped at Antwerp, Belgium, and then called at Bordeaux, France, before proceeding on its voyage to the United States. The court held that the date of exportation, for purposes of conversion of currency under section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1922, was the date on which the vessel left Bordeaux, that is, the last port of the country of exportation. To the same effect is the case of F. F. G. Harper Co. v. United States, Abstract 13158, 58 Treas. Dec. 980. That being the law, what was the "country" from which the importing vessel in this case sailed? An answer to that question involves a decision as to whether the Irish Free State, at a port of which the vessel made its last call before proceeding to the United States, is a part of the "country" known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or is a separate country. An early decision of the Supreme Court, which has been held to be the leading case on the subject, construed the word "country" as used in the tariff act then in force, as follows: * * * the word "country" in the revenue laws of the United States has always been construed to embrace all the possessions of a foreign state, however widely separated, which are subject to the same supreme executive and legislative control. Stairs v. Peaslee, 18 How. 521, 15 L. ed. 474. That case was cited and followed in the Jackson case, T.D. 12145, G.A. 1007, wherein the court, speaking through General Appraiser Somerville, said: It is true that since the rendition of that decision, in the year 1855, the political relations of the Dominion of Canada have undergone a signal change. * * * The executive government and authority of and over Canada continues, however, to be vested in the Queen of Great Britain, and Canada remains an integral part of that country, not, however, altogether sovereign or independent in its legislative and judicial relations to the mother country. The legislation runs in the name of "Her Majesty the Queen, by the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons," and appeals lie in some instances from the decisions of the Canadian courts to the privy counsel. While there may be some doubt on this question, we can not clearly see that this new status of Canada renders inapplicable the decision made in Stairs v. Peaslee, The principle of this decision has been formulated into a regulation by the Treasury Department, and has been followed in customs practice for nearly thirty years. (Treas. Reg. 1884, art. 499.) That case was decided in the latter part of the year 1891. In 1921 the Court of Customs Appeals, now the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, decided the case of Maier, Morton & Browne v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. Appls. 115, T.D. 38753. There the court, after discussing the case of Stairs v. Peaslee and the Jackson case, supra, reached an opposite conclusion. We quote the language of the court: We think, however, that since the foregoing decisions were announced Congress has clearly indicated its intention that in so far as relates to customs relations between this country and Canada, the latter shall be regarded as a "country," and consequently be included within the application of that word as used in paragraph R, supra. In support of that conclusion the court cited the "Act to promote reciprocal trade relations with the Dominion of Canada, and for other purposes," U.S. Stat. L., volume 37, page 4, and stated that it was "a matter of public record that this legislation followed upon tentative agreements reached by negotiations carried on directly by representatives of Canada and the United States, and that in various public documents in relation thereto Canada was referred to as a 'nation' and as a 'government." It also cited the case of American Express Co. et al. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. Appls. 146, T.D. 33434, wherein the court said: But it is now assumed by counsel for the Government that Canada is an autonomy with which a treaty was made, and that the court will not pause to inquire as to the municipal government of such autonomy. It is assumed that it is a nation for treaty purpose, and this may well be assumed, as this Government has itself so treated it. Undoubtedly the court in the Maier, Morton & Browne case had in mind the principle that the master rule of statutory construction is to interpret the statute so as to carry out the legislative intent. Markell v. United States, 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 518, T.D. 43239; United States v. Oregon, etc., 164 U.S. 526, 539; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 213; United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354. So far as the legislative intent was shown it was that Canada was to be considered a country for customs purposes. So far as we are able to discover Congress has never enacted a reciprocal trade agreement between the Irish Free State and this country similar to the act above cited. But it does appear that multilateral treaties have been negotiated to which both the United States and the Irish Free State have been signators. These treaties |