(B) Cough drops. - Manufactured by the United Candy Co., Boston, Mass., with the use of refined sugar and a medicinal preparation produced under drawback regulations.

Rate effective on product manufactured on or after August 4, 1933, and exported on or after August 26, 1933.

Sworn statement of October 11, 1933, forwarded to collector of customs, New York, N.Y., November 21, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) JAMES H. MOYLE, Commissioner of Customs.

(C) Fruit, canned. -T.D. 46658-K, covering canned fruit produced by Calistan Packers, Inc., Modesto, Calif., under section 313 (a), extended to cover canned fruit produced under section 313 (b). Extension effective on canned fruit produced and exported on or after June 25; 1933.

Supplemental sworn statement of October 10, 1933, forwarded to collector of customs, San Francisco, Calif., November 18, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) JAMES H. MOYLE, Commissioner of Customs.

(D) Fur skins and fur-skin plates, bleached.-Produced by Shuster & Gaio, Inc., Brooklyn, N.Y., with the use of imported fur skins and fur-skin plates.

Owner's sworn statements required.

Rate effective on or after September 14, 1933.

Sworn statement of October 23, 1933, forwarded to collector of customs, New York, N.Y., November 20, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) JAMES H. MOYLE, Commissioner of Customs.

(E) Sugars, noncaking pulverized and confectioner's XXXX.— Manufactured, respectively, with the use of refined sugar produced under drawback regulations and domestic cornstarch, and with the use of such sugar and domestic tricalcium phosphate, by the Revere Sugar Refinery, Boston, Mass.

Rate effective on or after August 14, 1933.

Sworn statement of October 3, 1933, forwarded to collector of customs, Boston, Mass., November 18, 1933. (72-10/2.) (Signed) JAMES H. MOYLE, Commissioner of Customs.

(T.D. 46769)

Customs Regulations Amended-Liquors in Baggage

Article 415, Customs Regulations of 1931, amended to provide for the treatment

of liquor in passengers' baggage

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,

To Collector of Customs and Others Concerned:

Washington, D.C.

Article 415 of the Customs Regulations of 1931, relating to the treatment of cigars, cigarettes, smoking tobacco and foodstuffs in passengers' baggage, is hereby amended by inserting the letter "a" in parentheses before the word "Fifty" in the first line, and by adding a new paragraph designated (6) reading as follows:

(b) One quart or less of distilled spirits, or one quart or less of wine, or one quart or less of beer or ale, when brought in by bona fide adult nonresident passengers, if not for sale, may be passed free of duty and internal-revenue tax. Distilled spirits, wines, beer and ale may be included within the one hundred dollar exemption allowed returning residents. Internal-revenue tax should be assessed on distilled spirits in excess of one quart and wines in excess of one quart, although included within the exemption from duty.

JAMES H. MOYLE, Commissioner of Customs.

Approved December 6, 1933:

H. MORGENTHAU, Jr.,

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

(T.D. 46770)

Sheep dip

BANK LINE TRANSPORT & TRADING Co. v. UNITED STATES

When Congress provides for the free entry of a product by name, and the name implies a certain use to which such product is put, it is necessary for an importer of such product, in order to bring it within the terms of the paragraph, to show by commercial proof that the imported article was the product which Congress had in mind at the time the tariff act was written.

Little's Improved Fluid Dip, not shown to be either commercially or commonly known as sheep dip in the markets of the United States, or so used, is not entitled to free entry under paragraph 1759 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protest 480572-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of Los Angeles [Judgment for defendant.]

(Decided November 17, 1933)

Harper & Harper (Abraham Gottfried of counsel) for plaintiff. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Philip Stein, special attorney), for the United States.

Before CLINE, Evans, and KEEFE, Judges; EVANS, J., not participating KEEFE, Judge: This is a suit against the United States arising at the port of Los Angeles, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon certain merchandise invoiced as "Fluid Sheep Dip." Duty was assessed thereon by the collector at the rate of 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1558 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as a nonenumerated manufactured article. The plaintiff claims the merchandise is entitled to free entry under the eo nomine provision in paragraph 1759 for "Sheep dip."

At the trial it was testified that the merchandise is "Little's Improved Fluid Dip" and is sheep dip; that it was sold by the importer as sheep dip and had always been known as sheep dip; that the merchandise is imported in drums and tins of various sizes, and that each container bears a label showing the name of the product and its use. One of the labels was offered and admitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 1."

On cross-examination the witness testified that the merchandise was sold by him to wholesale druggists and jobbers of chemicals and hardware and also to general stores, but the article was not followed into consumption and the witness did not know to whom his customers sold it, or under what name, or for what purpose.

The label discloses that the article is a fluid dip made specially to dip sheep, and special directions showing how to make the bath and to dip the sheep are given thereon. No other use for the product is shown upon the label.

The question at issue is whether the merchandise herein comes within the common meaning of the tariff term "sheep dip," provided for in paragraph 1759, or is more specifically provided for as a nonenumerated manufactured article in paragraph 1558.

The plaintiff contends that the product herein does fall within the common meaning of the term "sheep dip" under the dictionary definitions, citing as authority the definition in Webster's New International Dictionary, 1930 edition, which reads as follows:

Dip 9. d. To immerse (as a sheep or hog) in an antiseptic or parasiticidal solution, as for the cure of the itch.

The plaintiff contends that it would naturally follow that an antiseptic solution prepared and sold for the dipping of sheep falls within the tariff classification for "sheep dip."

The Government contends that there is no proof that the merchandise in question is used as sheep dip.

The plaintiff cited in support of his contention the case of Pierson & Co. v. United States, T.D. 31799. The court held in that case that the term "sheep dip" in paragraph 669 of the Tariff Act of 1909, the correlative paragraph to that in the 1930 act, being without words of limitation or qualification, embraced all compounds or preparations known as sheep dip, including such as are derived from coal tar, irrespective of the fact that they may be used for other purposes. In reaching the conclusion that the merchandise was in fact sheep dip, the court said in that case:

* there was abundant evidence adduced at the hearing of the cases to prove that the merchandise was in fact sheep dip and so commercially known. In the case at bar there is no evidence of the commercial designation of the product imported. In fact, counsel for the plaintiff asserted

at the trial that he was not trying to prove by commercial designation that the imported article is sheep dip.

When Congress provides for the free entry of a product by name, and the name implies a certain use to which such product is put, it is necessary for an importer of such product, in order to bring it within the terms of the paragraph, to show by commercial proof that the imported article was the product which Congress had in mind at the time the tariff act was written.

In the case of American Express Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 275, T.D. 38680, the Court of Customs Appeals said that co nomine provisions have always been regarded as especially inviting proof of commercial designation, and that the Supreme Court has so often said in substance that the object of the law, raising revenue duties, is to classify substances according to the general usage and known denomination of trade; that the descriptions of articles in tariff statutes refer to those adopted in trade; that it would be dangerous to adopt any other classification; and that the first and most important thing to be ascertained and which governs in the construction of the tariff laws, when an article is therein mentioned, is its commercial designation which must always be applied "unless Congress has clearly manifested a contrary intention."

There seems to be no reason why this rule should not apply in the case at bar. There is nothing in the text of paragraph 1759, nor in the act as a whole, nor in its legislative history, which appears to indicate that any departure from the ordinary rule of commercial meaning was in the legislative mind in drafting or passing this paragraph. In our opinion the words of paragraph 1759-Sheep dip-are subject to proof of commercial designation. In naming "Sheep dip" in paragraph 1759 Congress provided for a certain disinfectant which is commonly used as a dip for sheep to rid them of certain pests. Proof should be produced to show that the imported product is bought and sold and used in the United States for the purpose of a sheep dip. The plaintiff relies largely upon the label, exhibit 1, to support his contention. Whether a particular article is designated by one name or another in the country of origin, or whether it is a simple or a mixed substance, is of no importance. Congress applies its attention to the description of articles as they derive their appellations in our own market, in our domestic as well as our foreign traffic, and attempts no other classification than that derived from the actual business of human life, and the language adopted by Congress, particularly in the denomination of articles, should be construed according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 147; 200 Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 428.

In the case of Merck & Co. v. United States, 6 Ct. Cust. Appls. 32, T.D. 35274, involving the classification of certain creolin, claimed free as sheep dip under paragraph 669 of the Tariff Act of 1909, the court said:

For all that appears from the evidence there may be some article which is chiefly used as a sheep dip, and as it does not appear that creolin is either commercially or commonly known as a sheep dip, or that it has ever been officially recognized by the Government as a sheep dip, or that it is chiefly used as a sheep dip, we think that the presumption of correctness attaching to the collector's decision has not been overcome.

We may well apply the holding in the Merck case, supra, to the case at bar. The plaintiff herein has failed to show that the imported product is either commercially or commonly known as sheep dip in the United States, or that it is used as a sheep dip. For the reasons stated judgment will be rendered in favor of the defendant.

(T.D. 46771)

Powder boxes of ornamented china and metal work

LANS CURIOSITY SHOP v. UNITED STATES

Powder boxes made of decorated china and further decorated with a superadded ornamentation of bronze filigree work, not plated with platinum, gold, or silver, or colored with gold lacquer, and being composed in chief value of metal, are dutiable at the rate of 45 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 397 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as articles not specially provided for, composed wholly or in chief value of metal, rather than at the rate of 70 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 212 of said act as articles composed wholly or in chief value of china, decorated, or manufactures in chief value of china, decorated.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protest 577558-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York [Judgment for plaintiff.]

(Decided November 24, 1933)

Strauss & Hedges (Fred J. Carter and Allan R. Brown of counsel) for the plaintiff.

Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Reuben Wilson, special attorney), for the United States.

Before CLINE, Evans, and KEEFE, Judges; EVANS, J., not participating KEEFE, Judge: This is a suit against the United States arising at the port of New York, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon certain powder boxes composed of ornamented china and metal work. Duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 70 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 212 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The plaintiff claims the merchandise