the jewelry departments of retail department stores. His testimony then continued as follows: Q. Do you import or manufacture anything like collective exhibit 1, which I show you?-A. I have not imported anything in pearls. Q. Anything similar in design?-A. Yes, sir. Q. In what material?-A. In glass. Q. Answering the same purpose except being glass?-A. I would say yes. Q. Have you seen articles like this mounted? -A. I have never seen pearls. Q. But glass, or elephants, dogs, and cats, and that same shape as collective exhibit 1?-A. Yes, sir; or similar shapes. Q. Do you know how they are mounted? -A. They are usually mounted with a wire and a ring. Q. Have you ever imported articles with the wire put through? A. Yes; and some without. Q. And they are known in the trade as what?-A. They are known as charms or pendants. That is my knowledge of them. for mounting, to hang on necklaces or bracelets. * * * * Q. Would you say that is a piece of jewelry unfinished? I have only used them * * * He further testified in order that these articles may be used as pendants to a bracelet or necklace "there is to be a wire and a ring attached", and when the wire is put through the article and the ring attached "it is ready to be attached", and "it is a part of the article that it is going to be attached to"; that "there is nothing more to be done to that article after the ring is put through and the wire." On cross-examination he testified that exhibit 1 is not used in the same manner that beads are used, "because you would not hang a round bead on the end-a bead would not be an ornament exclusively. A round bead would not be an ornament." He further testified he had seen beads in the form of pendants, and "mounted on a wire and hung down at the intersections of a necklace" in the same way that exhibit 1 would be used, and also like illustrative exhibit A. Then he was asked on cross-examination X Q. So you can't say from examining exhibit 1 that they are parts of any article, can you? and he answered, "No, I can't." Mr. Abramson testified for the defendant that he is a jewelry and novelty importer; that "we assemble in our organization" and "sell at wholesale to retail stores and department stores" "throughout the country"; that his sales are to the jewelry departments of department stores and to retail jewelry stores; that he imports merchandise similar to exhibit 1, but "not this material. Made of galalith, glass, and so forth." In response to the court's question, he testified he had not imported articles like exhibit 1, but similar in shape, being in the form of animals, such as elephants and dogs; that he mounted such himself and assembled them; that he had never seen articles like exhibit 1 mounted, and "as a matter of fact I have not seen that item (exhibit 1) at all." The foregoing is the substance of the evidence in this case. In Oval Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 62 Treas. Dec. 563, T.D. 46008, the samples were small articles in the shape of elephants, composed of red glass in imitation of coral, each article being pierced with a hole through which it could be strung. We held such dutiable under the provision in paragraph 1503 of the Tariff Act of 1930, covering "all other beads in imitation of precious or semiprecious stones, of all kinds and shapes, of whatever material composed", at 45 per centum ad valorem. In that case we set out dictionary definitions of beads and cited a number of authorities holding articles to be beads which did not conform to the dictionary definitions. Some of the articles held by these authorities to be beads were the following: Glass bars drilled and glass ornaments drilled. These glass bars were from 1 inch to 11⁄2 inches in length, pierced with holes and used for making so-called dog-collar necklaces. American Bead Co. v. United States, 22 Treas. Dec. 628, affirmed in 3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 509, 515, T.D. 33166. A flat star-shaped bead of blue glass, somewhat resembling in appearance and size a forget-me-not flower. A hole was pierced through the middle of this bead, at a point where the pistil of the flower would be. Bernard v. United States, 46 Treas. Dec. 176, affirmed in 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 164, T.D. 41024. A jet pendant somewhat in the shape of an elongated pyramid with the apex removed, making it flat on top as well as on the bottom. and having four sides with beveled edges. It was pierced. Stern v, United States, Abstract 15786, 59 Treas. Dec. 1659. We have the following cases, in addition to the above, holding articles to be beads which were not of the conventional globular, cylindrical, or oval shape: "Fancifully shaped beads." Blacher Bros. v. United States, Abstract 8733, 55 Treas. Dec. 1155. "Pear or drop-shaped articles of gilded glass pierced longitudinally with a small hole." Stern v. United States, Abstract 8691, 55 Treas. Dec. 1148. Elliptical articles with pointed ends and rounded edges, having a hole pierced lengthwise. There was a design on each of the flat sides molded or cut therein. Rex Importing Co. v. United States, Abstract 12216, 57 Treas. Dec. 1279. On the whole, from the testimony of plaintiff's witness, our examination of the samples, and the above authorities, we believe that the articles represented by exhibit 1 are beads. As imported this merchandise is not jewelry. Common knowledge supports this conclusion. By itself it cannot be made into an article of jewelry. To do so requires the assistance of other materials or articles. Therefore, it is not unfinished jewelry. This is clearly indicated by illustrative exhibits A and B. Are they parts of jewelry? To become parts of jewelry they must be attached to or made parts of an admitted article of jewelry, such as a necklace. Originally, in their imported condition, they are beads. They may be attached to a watch fob, a bracelet, or a charm, not as a part thereof, in a general sense, but as an adornment on a watch fob or charm. The defendant's witness, Levi, testified that a pendant is not a piece of unfinished jewelry, and that to fasten exhibit 1 to a bracelet or a necklace as a pendant requires the attachment of a wire and ring. When he was asked whether, when the wire and ring are attached to exhibit 1, that article in itself was complete, he answered: "It is a part of the article." That does not constitute exhibit 1 unfinished jewelry or in itself parts of jewelry. Many watch charms have pendants of little hard wood or brass articles, or such things as elk's teeth or tiger claws. That does not indicate that such pendants or attachments are jewelry or parts thereof, finished or unfinished. A part of a thing is something that fits into an article and is suitable as a part. A gold finger ring may be strung on a necklace. That does not make it part of the necklace. It is not designed for such purpose. It does not dovetail into the article as it is not fitted for such purpose. We are satisfied that these little animals as imported are not jewelry or parts thereof. Nor does the use to which they are put render them jewelry, either finished or unfinished. The weight of the testimony indicates they are beads and dutiable under paragraph 1503. These are mother-of-pearl beads. There is nothing to indicate that they resemble any precious or semiprecious stone or pearls. It is not our province to guess at what they may imitate. The record is our guide. We cannot supply testimony, and we cannot exercise our individual judgment. United States v. Burley, 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 401, 403, T.D. 34938. As was said in Krusi v. United States, 1 id. 168, 169, T.D. 31213: It would seem, however, that when the facts upon which proper classification depend are patent to the eye of the expert only and the board has no record evidence before it as to the nature, kind, and character of the goods, it cannot classify them solely on its own expert knowledge and experience, and a finding based exclusively on such expert knowledge and experience would be without evidence to support it. We, therefore, cannot classify these beads as imitations of precious or semiprecious stones or pearls without evidence to show that they are, and the record is silent on this point. In United States v. International Forwarding Co., 12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 530, T.D. 40733, at page 532, the court said: There is no finding below and no testimony tending to show that the motherof-pearl beads of which these necklaces are made are beads in imitation of pearl beads or in imitation of beads made of precious or semiprecious stones, and we are not able of our own knowledge to say that they are in imitation of either, On this view of the case we hold the merchandise dutiable under paragraph 1503 of the act of 1930 as beads at 35 per centum ad valorem. Judgment will be rendered accordingly. (T.D. 46745) Live animals-Validity of regulations The regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury in respect to the free entry of pure-bred animals under paragraph 1506 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which permits an importer of purebred stock to file a bond to produce a certificate of pure breeding, issued by the Department of Agriculture within six months from the time of entry rather than to produce it at the time of entry, is a reasonable and valid regulation and incident to his duties of office. Duty was properly assessed by the collector at 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 714 of the Tariff Act of 1922 upon a pure-bred horse for which the certificate of pure breeding was not furnished within the bonded period. United States Customs Court, Third Division Protest 544814-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of Milwaukee [Judgment for defendant.] (Decided November 14, 1933) Wallace & Ryan (James R. Ryan of counsel) for the plaintiff. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (John F. Kavanagh, special attorney), for the United States. Before CLINE, EVANS, and KEEFE, Judges; EVANS, J., not participating KEEFE, Judge: This is a suit against the United States, arising at the port of Milwaukee, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon a certain thoroughbred mare, named Louise M, imported for breeding purposes. Duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 714, Tariff Act of 1922, as horses valued at more than $150 per head. The plaintiff claims the mare is entitled to exemption from duty under paragraph 1506 as an animal imported by a citizen of the United States specially for breeding purposes. The pertinent portion of paragraph 1506 of the Tariff Act of 1922 reads: PAR. 1506. Any animal imported by a citizen of the United States specially for breeding purposes shall be admitted free, whether intended to be used by the importer himself or for sale for such purposes, except black or silver foxes: Provided, That no such animal shall be admitted free unless pure bred of a recognized breed and duly registered in a book of record recognized by the Secretary of Agriculture for that breed: Provided, further, That the certificate of such record and pedigree of such animal shall be produced and submitted to the Department of Agriculture, duly authenticated by the proper custodian of such book of record, together with an affidavit of the owner, agent, or importer that the animal imported is the identical animal described in said certificate of record and pedigree. The Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe such regulations as may be required for determining the purity of breeding and the identity of such animal: And provided further, That the collectors of customs shall require a certificate from the Department of Agriculture stating that such animal is pure bred of a recognized breed and duly registered in a book of record recognized by the Secretary of Agriculture for that breed. The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe such additional regulations as may be required for the strict enforcement of this provision. At the trial evidence was produced to show that the entry in question was dated December 11, 1929, and that the certificate of pure breeding was not furnished on the mare in question until December 7, 1931, practically 2 years after entry. The plaintiff contends that the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury specifying a time in which a certificate of pure breeding may be filed are void as establishing a statute of limitations. The right of the Secretary of the Treasury to accept a bond is conceded by the plaintiff. It is provided in paragraph 1506 that no animal shall be admitted free unless pure-bred of a recognized breed and duly registered in a book of record recognized by the Secretary of Agriculture for that breed. It is further provided that the collectors of customs shall require a certificate from the Department of Agriculture stating that such animal is pure-bred of a recognized breed and duly registered in a book of record before being admitted free. As far back as November 11, 1903, the Secretary of the Treasury recognized that it worked a hardship upon the importers of pure-bred animals to produce this certificate of pure breeding upon entry and accordingly amended the regulations in that respect so that in case the certificate could not be filed upon entry the importer was given an opportunity to produce a voluntary bond in double the amount of the estimated duties. The Secretary of the Treasury interposed as a condition to the bond that the requisite certificate shall be produced within 6 months, subject to extension for a like period on application to the Department. Such bond was to be cancelled only upon production of a pedigree certificate conforming substantially to the regu 966-34-VOL 6436 |