stated by the Court of Customs Appeals in the case of Schade v. United States, 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 465, T.D. 35002, as follows:

It is a general term, and the rule long established in tariff interpretation is that where a general term is used in the law without qualification it must, in the absence of a contrary commercial custom, be applied in its broadest significance, including every kind and class of merchandise properly referable thereto, either directly or as a species the genus of which is embraced within the particular tariff nomenclature. United States v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 158; T.D. 31211); United States v. Salomon (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 246; T.D. 31277); Schoellkopf, Hartford & MacLagen, Ltd. v. United States (71 Fed. 694).

The record in the case at bar establishes that the cloves were the articles imported herein; that they were shipped in containers in the form of grass matting bales; that there were no other containers thereof; and that each bale was marked "Z'bar" at the time of importation, which in our opinion was not a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements. Citing American Burtonizing Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 652, T.D. 41489, wherein the Court of Customs Appeals held that a mere "hint" at the country of origin is not sufficient. Under the facts established by the record herein, the plain and unambiguous terms of section 304 (b) provide for the assessment of 10 per centum marking duty on the importation here involved, and the protest is overruled. Judgment will be rendered for the defendant.

(T.D. 46698) Personal effects

R. M. DEANESLY v. UNITED STATES

Regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury in respect to the exemption from duty of merchandise, not exceeding $100 in value, acquired abroad by returning residents of the United, States under paragraph 1798 of the Tariff Act of 1930, promulgated under the general authority given by Congress in section 498 to prescribe rules and regulations for the declaration and entry of baggage, were promulgated as an aid to the passenger as well as to the customs officials in identifying such articles as expeditiously as possible, and are held to be regulative or administrative only and not intended as conditions precedent to the right of exemption from duty.

Residents of the United States returning from abroad having baggage follow them within a month from their arrival in this country are entitled to an exemption from duty thereon under the provisions of paragraph 1798 of the Tariff Act of 1930, upon satisfactory proof of their right to such exemption, notwithstanding regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury to the effect that such exemption should be allowed only if declaration of all articles acquired abroad is made to the United States customs officer at the time the returning resident enters the United States or to the United States customs officer in a foreign country just before such return.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protest 543603-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of San Francisco

[Judgment for plaintiff.]

(Decided October 19, 1933)

Lawrence & Baldwin (Martin T. Baldwin and George R. Tuttle of counsel) for the plaintiff.

Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Thomas J. Canty, special attorney), for the United States.

Before CLINE, Evans, and KEEFE, Judges

KEEFE, Judge: This is a suit against the United States, arising at the port of San Francisco, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon two invoices of personal and household effects of the plaintiff. An exemption of $28 was allowed upon the effects accompanying the plaintiff when he returned to the United States, arriving September 27, 1930, but the collector assessed duty at various appropriate rates upon that part of his baggage which was entered on October 16 and 27, 1930. The plaintiff claims that his baggage covered by these two entries is entitled to exemption from duty under paragraph 1798 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

At the trial of this case the plaintiff testified that he was a resident of the United States prior to his arrival in September 1930; that he had merchandise which was to follow him from England consisting of miscellaneous house furnishings and some wedding presents which had been given to himself and his wife at the time of their marriage in England shortly before they sailed; and that when he filed his declaration he was not advised by the customs inspector that he would have also to declare at that time any baggage which was to follow him. On cross-examination the plaintiff said that he was not a citizen of the United States, and no further questions were asked.

The effects entered October 16, 1930, consist of a clock, valued at $4, silver-plated hollow ware valued at $20, cut glass valued at $20, 14 pieces of decorated china valued at $3, and manufactures of wood valued at $2. The effects which were entered on October 27, 1930, consist of manufactures of wood valued at $9.61, pieces of decorated china tableware valued at $30, and hand-woven rugs, 44 square feet, valued at $40, making a total valuation of $128.

The articles in question are all household effects. The only portion of paragraph 1798 which exempts from duty household effects acquired abroad reads as follows:

* * *

PAR. 1798. Provided further, That up to but not exceeding $100 in value of articles acquired abroad by such residents of the United States for personal or household use or as souvenirs or curios, but not bought on commission or intended for sale, shall be admitted free of duty:

* *

*

The collector in his letter of transmittal states that the merchandise mentioned in the entries was liquidated dutiable for the reason that there was no evidence on baggage declaration no. 111486 to show that other trunks or packages containing additional merchandise acquired on the same trip were to follow, and consequently there was no compliance with T.D. 44215 and T.D. 45193.

Under the administrative provisions, title IV, part III, of the Tariff Act of 1930, there are provided in section 498 certain general regulations governing entry of merchandise, reading in part as follows:

SEC. 498. ENTRY UNDER REGULATIONS.

(a) AUTHORIZED FOR CERTAIN MERCHANDISE. - The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations for the declaration and entry of

(6) Articles carried on the person or contained in the baggage of a person arriving in the United States;

(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL PROVISIONS. - The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to include in such rules and regulations any of the provisions of section 484 or 485 of this Act (relating, respectively, to entry and to declaration of merchandise generally).

Under the authority of the above-quoted section certain regulations governing the entry of baggage of persons arriving in this country were promulgated and published in the TREASURY DECISIONS. T.D. 44215 consists of amended baggage regulations approved by the Acting Secretary of the Treasury August 25, 1930, and effective 30 days thereafter, or 3 days after the arrival of the plaintiff, and among other things provides that

If no exemption has been granted at the border port or seaport or by a customs officer in foreign territory, or if exemption was allowed for articles valued at less than $100, the exemption or the remainder of the amount allowable may be applied to articles acquired abroad during the same trip but not accompanying the passenger on his return. Such exemption should be allowed only if declaration of all articles acquired abroad is made to the United States customs officer at the time returning resident enters the United States, or to the United States customs officer in a foreign country, just before such return to the United States. Customs officers should be careful to bring this requirement to the attention of returning residents, and should see that the declarations show the articles which accompany the passengers and those which are intended for subsequent delivery or shipment in bond to another port.

T.D. 45193, approved October 20, 1931, modified T.D. 44215 in respect to the above-quoted portion, as follows:

*

*

*

Collectors of customs having jurisdiction over ports through which passengers arrive in the United States are requested to instruct inspectors and other officers concerned that every effort should be made to insure compliance with the procedure outlined in T.D. 44215, both for the convenience of the passenger in claiming the exemption and as a protection to the revenue.

If, however, claim for such exemption on articles not accompanying the passenger or articles forwarded in bond shall be presented without the production of a certified copy of the baggage declaration required by T.D. 44215, the collector at the port where such exemption is claimed is authorized to investigate the reasons for failure to produce such document, the facts surrounding the arrival of the claimant in the United States, and all the other conditions upon which the allowance of the exemption depends, and if he is satisfied from the facts developed that the exemption is properly allowable and applicable to the merchandise in question, he is authorized to permit its release without the assessment of duty and without reference of the matter to the bureau. T.D. 44215 is hereby modified accordingly.

It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff had not this new requirement brought to his attention by the customs inspector at the time he filed his declaration, as per instructions to customs officials in the amended regulations.

That part of paragraph 1798 providing for the $100 exemption from duty upon goods imported as baggage by returning residents of the United States does not specifically authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to make mandatory regulations governing the entry of such merchandise so that compliance therewith would act as a condition precedent to the right to exemption granted by Congress. Any regulations attending the invoicing or entry of merchandise issued under the general authority granted under section 498, or under section 624, reading

*

*

*

In addition to the specific powers conferred by this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,

are deemed and held regulative or administrative merely and not conditions precedent to the right of exemption from duty. Lentini v. United States, T.D. 43599; United States v. Morris European & American Express Co., 3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 147, T.D. 32386.

It has been held by the courts, Blewett v. United States, T.D. 41871, that in order to establish the right to exemption from duty under the language of the proviso contained in paragraph 1798, it is necessary to show

(1) That the plaintiff was a resident of the United States returning from abroad, citizenship is immaterial;

and

(2) That the articles acquired abroad were for personal or household use;

(3) That such articles were not bought on commission or intended for sale. This provision of the tariff act exempting from duty personal effects acquired abroad up to $100 in value has been construed to include such portions of baggage which did not accompany the passenger upon the return trip, Wyman v. United States, T.D. 23631, G.A. 5109, and it has been the continued practice of the Department and the holding of the courts that such articles when acquired may be deemed a part of the passenger's baggage. In view of such judicial construction without any change in the law in succeeding tariff acts, the baggage of a passenger includes that which follows him within a reasonable time after his arrival the same as though actually so written within the act, and reenactment of the same language is a legislative sanction of such construction. United States v. McGraw Wool Co., 19 С.С.Р.А. 205, T.D. 45296; United States v. Frank, 15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 97, T.D. 42184.

Indeed, the language of the amended regulations clearly shows that it was not the intent of the Secretary of the Treasury to change the judicial construction of the provision in question, but rather the regulations were promulgated for the purpose of facilitating the identity of such baggage when entered after the arrival of the returning resident. The regulations further provided that the customs officers should bring this requirement to the attention of the returning residents and see that the declarations show the articles which accompany the passengers as well as those articles which are intended for subsequent delivery or shipment in bond to another port. It was also provided that if a claim for exemption be presented on articles not accompanying the passenger without the certified copy of the baggage declaration filed on entry showing the articles not accompanying the passenger, the collector could investigate, and, if satisfied that the exemption claimed was applicable to the merchandise, he was authorized to permit its release without the payment of duty. It is shown in this case that the returning resident was not advised by the customs officer of the new regulations concerning baggage, nor is there any evidence of investigation made by the collector at the port of San Francisco of the conditions upon which the allowance of the exemption depended.

Inasmuch as the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, set forth in T.D. 44215 and T.D. 45193, in respect to the baggage of returning residents of the United States are clearly shown by the language thereof not to be intended as mandatory but rather to be regulative, and were promulgated as an aid to the returning resident as well as to the customs officials in identifying such articles as expeditiously as possible, we hold that "the facts surrounding the arrival of the claimant in the United States and all other conditions upon which the allowance of the exemption depends" are subject to judicial inquiry on protest before this court. In the circumstances, however, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether section 498 confers authority upon the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate mandatory regulations in respect to the entry of the merchandise therein specified.

As the evidence presented clearly entitles the plaintiff to the exemption claimed, judgment will be entered directing the collector to reliquidate the entries, refunding the duty taken upon that portion of the articles in question which would come within the remainder of the $100 exemption clause in paragraph 1798 of the Tariff Act of 1930.