large size, valued at 1,000 lire each; and that plaintiff relies upon the claim for classification thereof under paragraph 1449.

The importer testified that he had studied art and design for two years at the University of Belle Arti in Rome, but is not a sculptor; that he has been dealing in art goods for five years, and at the time he purchased the articles here in controversy he was the United States agent for the works of the sculptor who produced these figures. He introduced as exhibit 1 a bronze figure of a child, which the court inspected and granted permission for it to be withdrawn and a photograph substituted therefor. The photograph was received in evidence as illustrative exhibit A. Another photograph was received in evidence as illustrative exhibit B, the importer testifying that these two photographs represent the two articles here in controversy; that, although the invoice groups these two figures under one description, they are not alike, one being figure 73 and the other 77; that the sample produced as exhibit 1 and represented by illustrative exhibit A is figure 73, about 26 inches in height; and that the one represented by illustrative exhibit B is figure 77, about 20 inches in height. We note these item numbers do not appear on the invoice. Exhibit 1 is a bronze figure of a child leaning over an urn which it holds in its hands, the urn being piped for running water. Illustrative exhibit B is a photograph of a figure of a child bending forward with his head turned to gaze up at a goose which he is holding on the back of his neck. The importer testified that both of these figures are made of genuine bronze; that in his opinion they are works of art; that he purchased them from the professional sculptor who produced them, D. Gabrielli, whose reputation is widely known in Italy; that each of these pieces is signed by the said sculptor; and that all of this sculptor's figures are protected in Italy by copyright. In answer to the question as to whether these statues have any utilitarian purpose, the importer replied that they are piped for use in connection with fountains. As sculptures which are articles of utility are expressly excepted from the provisions of paragraph 1704, we believe such piping excludes these articles from classification under that paragraph. No evidence having been introduced to support the claim in the protest for classification under paragraph 1707, we shall consider only the claim relied upon at the trial, for classification as works of art not specially provided for, under paragraph 1449.

Upon consideration of the unrebutted testimony introducted by plaintiff, and an inspection of the sample figure 77, received in evidence as exhibit 1, we find it to be a work of the free fine arts, dutiable at 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1449 as claimed. With respect to figure 73, which is exhibited for inspection only in the form of a photograph, we find that since the uncontradicted testimony of a duly qualified witness establishes this article to be a copyrighted

production of a professional sculptor of wide reputation, and as the photograph discloses unusual beauty of lines and expression, the weight of the evidence supports a finding that this figure also is a work of the free fine arts within the meaning of paragraph 1449 as claimed. For the reasons stated herein, the protest is sustained as to the two bronze cherubs described in the second item on the invoice herein as "Nr. 2 Bronze cherubs, Large Size, Antique Green Pat. Lit. 1000. each," and the collector of customs will reliquidate, taking duty thereon at 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1449, Tariff Act of 1922. In all other respects the protest is overruled. Judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff to the extent indicated herein.

(T.D. 46507)

Animals driven across the border and returned

COMPANIA INDUSTRIAL JABONERA DEL PACIFICO, S. C. L. v. UNITED STATES

Certain cattle were imported from Mexico and duty paid thereon. At the expiration of two months they were driven across the border into Mexico by the owner and turned into a pasture where they were allowed to graze about a month. At the end of that time they were taken to corrals and fed upon cottonseed meal and alfalfa hulls. Held, that upon their return to the United States within eight months they were dutiable under the provisions of paragraph 701 of the Tariff Act of 1922, rather than exempt from duty under paragraph 1506 of the same act, upon a finding that the purpose for which they were driven across the border was not shown to have been for temporary pasturage only.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protest 502526-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of Los Angeles [Judgment for defendant.]

(Decided June 28, 1933)

Zach Lamar Cobb for the plaintiff.

Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Thomas J. Canty and Philip Stein, special attorneys), for the United States.

Before CLINE and EVANS, Judges

EVANS, Judge: This is a suit against the United States to recover duties claimed to have been unlawfully exacted upon an importation of 29 head of steers through the port of Calexico, Calif. The collector of customs at the port of entry assessed duty thereon under the provisions of paragraph 701 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which, insofar as pertinent, is in the following language:

PAR. 701. Cattle, weighing less than one thousand and fifty pounds each, 11⁄2 cents per pound; weighing one thousand and fifty pounds each or more, 2 cents per pound;

Plaintiff claims the cattle to be free of duty under paragraph 1506 of the same act the provisions of which, insofar as pertinent hereto, we quote as follows:

* * * cattle, sheep, and other domestic animals straying across the boundary line into any foreign country, or driven across such boundary line by the owner for temporary pasturage purposes only, together with their offspring, shall be dutiable unless brought back to the United States within eight months, in which case they shall be free of duty, under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury: * * *

Under authority thereof the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated article 230, Customs Regulations of 1923, which, as amended in T.D. 40740 reads:

Upon driving such animals across the boundary for pasturage purposes, the owner must file with the collector of customs a descriptive list stating the number of animals, their sex, age, and marks or brands, together with a written statement that the animals therein described are being taken abroad for temporary pasturage purposes only.

Upon the return of such animals within eight months formal entry will be required and there shall be filed therewith a declaration in the following form:

The facts as they appear in the record are that these steers originated in Mexico, and were imported by a Mr. House, who testified as a witness for the plaintiff. Upon importation duty was paid on the cattle by Mr. House and they remained in this country for about two months during which time they were pastured on such pasturage as could be had for them. At the end of that period they were taken back to Mexico and turned into a pasture of what was described as "dry cotton and alfalfa mixed", that is "cotton that had been picked over and cotton stalks standing in the field”. At the end of a month they were taken to corrals in the town of Mexicali and there fed meal and alfalfa hulls-cottonseed meal. The alfalfa was in the form of baled hay and was put in mangers in the corrals or wherever they were and was fed to the cattle together with the hulls and cake. Mr. House testified that during the time the cattle were in the United States they increased in weight and also that they increased in weight during the period that they were taken back to Mexico.

The question before us for decision is whether under this state of facts these cattle were entitled to exemption from duty under the paragraph in question. Congress has used the expression "for temporary pasturage purposes only". We have consulted dictionary definitions as to the meaning of the word pasturage. We find that the Standard Dictionary defines it as follows:

Pasturage: 1. Grass and small herbage on which cattle feed.

The Century Dictionary gives the following definition: Pasturage: 2. Grazing ground: land appropriated to grazing. 3. Grass on which cattle or flocks feed.

In the light of these definitions we construe the expression used in said paragraph 1506 to mean cattle driven across the border for temporary grazing purposes. The record discloses that these cattle were turned into a pasture when they were driven into Mexico but that at the end of a month they were taken to corrals and there fed cottonseed meal from mangers.

The exemption granted by the paragraph to cattle upon their return to this country is limited to those which stray across the border or are driven across for pasturage purposes and returned within a specified time. This contemplates, as we view it, that such cattle as have been driven across for grazing purposes shall be returned after that purpose has been accomplished. Being a provision which grants a privilege any doubt in the construction or interpretation thereof must be resolved in favor of the Government. Swan & Finch v. United States, 190 U.S. 143, 146; Hannibal, etc., R.R. Co. v. Packet Co., 125 U.S. 260, 271.

The importer or owner in this case has not brought himself within the limitation fixed in the paragraph. For that reason his claim must be overruled.

In the view we take of the issue it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the Government attorney as to whether it has been shown that these were the identical cattle which had been previously imported.

Judgment will be rendered for defendant. It is so ordered.

(T.D. 46508)

Rags-Paper stock

BELGAM CORP. et al. v. UNITED STATES

The fact that cotton rags had been washed wholly or in part, and had been subjected to so-called processing which consisted of washing and the removal of such foreign matter as buttons and hooks and eyes as well as the opening of such tubular rags as were contained in the importations, held not sufficient to remove the same from the designation of paper stock as contemplated by paragraph 1651, Tariff Act of 1922, upon a finding that at and immediately prior to the passage of that act similar rags were commonly known and dealt in as paper stock.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protests 420959-G, etc., against the decisions of the collectors of customs at the ports of Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Galveston, and New York

[Judgment for plaintiffs.]

(Decided June 29, 1933)

Tompkins & Tompkins (J. Stuart Tompkins of counsel) and Walden & Webster (Jacob L. Klingaman of counsel) for the plaintiffs.

Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (John F. Kavanagh, special attorney), for the United States.

Before CLINE and EVANS, Judges

EVANS, Judge: This is a suit against the United States arising over the action of the collector of customs in assessing importations of rags at 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1459 of the Tariff Act of 1922. Together with the present suit there have been combined a great number of other causes of suit, a schedule of which is attached hereto. In the initial cause of suit, the rags were separated under customs supervision, and 60 per centum thereof were held dutiable as stated above, the remaining portion being admitted free of duty. Other of these importations were assessed for duty at 10 per centum under paragraph 1457 of the Tariff Act of 1922 as "waste, not specially provided for."

The protest in the initial case claims that all the merchandise involved in these various importations should be held to be free of duty under paragraph 1651 of said tariff act as paper stock rags, or under paragraph 1601 of said tariff act as old junk, or under paragraph 1560 as cotton waste, or, if dutiable at all, at 5 per centum under paragraph 901 of said tariff act as cotton waste, advanced or manufactured.

According to the evidence developed and the statements contained in the briefs filed on behalf of the importers, the claim upon which the controversy rests is that these rags should have been classified as paper stock under paragraph 1651, supra. That paragraph reads as follows:

PAR. 1651. Rag pulp; paper stock, crude, of every description, including all grasses, fibers, rags, waste, including jute, hemp and flax waste, shavings, clippings, old paper, rope ends, waste rope, and waste bagging, and all other waste not specially provided for, including old gunny cloth, and old gunny bags, used chiefly for paper making, and no longer suitable for bags.

The Government asserts that the importation is an article manufactured in whole or in part, not specially provided for, and therefore dutiable under paragraph 1459, which reads as follows:

PAR. 1459. That there shall be levied, collected, and paid on the importation of all * * * articles manufactured, in whole or in part, not specially provided for, a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem.

The Government has not urged that the commodity be classified as waste under paragraph 1457.

Every importation involved herein consists of cotton rags imported from Japan. According to the testimony, some of these importations were segregated and in other "instances" they were not segregated.