are to be given their ordinary meaning unless the context shows that they are differently used. Child Labor Tax Case, supra, 36. If the tax imposed had been five cents instead of fifteen cents per pound, no one, probably, would have thought of challenging its constitutionality or of suggesting that under the guise of imposing a tax another and different power had in fact been exercised. If a contrary conclusion were reached in the present case, it could rest upon nothing more than the single premise that the amount of the tax is so excessive that it will bring about the destruction of appellant's business, a premise which, standing alone, this court heretofore has uniformly rejected as furnishing no juridical ground for striking down a taxing act. As we have already seen, it was definitely rejected in the Veazie Bank case, where it was urged that the tax was "so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to destroy the franchise of the bank "; in the McCray case, where it was said that the discretion of Congress could not be controlled or limited by the courts because the latter might deem the incidence of the tax oppressive or even destructive; in the Alaska Fish case, from which we have just quoted; and in the Child Labor Tax Case, where it was held that the intent of Congress must be derived from the language of the act, and that a prohibition instead of a tax was intended might not be inferred solely from its heavy burden. From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. Those decisions, as the foregoing discussion discloses, rule the present case. Decree affirmed. 292 U.S. Opinion of the Court. MINNICH v. GARDNER ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 669. Argued March 15, 16, 1934. Decided April 2, 1934. 1. If the object of a judgment creditor in having an execution levied on goods of the debtor is merely to obtain a lien, the lien will be postponed in favor of subsequent purchasers and execution creditors; but, a subsequent direction to the sheriff to proceed with the the sale has the effect of reviving the priority of the lien as against all other liens or rights acquired after such direction. P. 50. 2. This is the general rule and the rule in Pennsylvania. P. 51. 3. Petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed seventeen months after levy of execution on personal property of the bankrupt, and nine days after the execution creditor had directed the sheriff to sell. Held, that the lien of the creditor was good. P. 52. 66 F. (2d) 561, reversed. CERTIORARI, 291 U.S. 654, to review the affirmance of an order denying preference to an execution creditor's lien on a fund resulting from a sale of the goods by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. The order overruled an allowance of the priority by the referee. Mr. John A. Minnich, pro se. Mr. A. E. Kountz, with whom Messrs. Clarence A. Fry and J. Colvin Wright were on the brief, for respondents. MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, on March 21, 1929, recovered two judgments in a Pennsylvania state court against the King Motor Company, the larger one being for something over $6,000. March 26 following, execution was issued thereon, and on March 27 the sheriff levied under the execution upon the personal property of the motor company, endorsing his 48 Opinion of the Court. levy upon the writ. On April 15 the sheriff returned goods on hand not sold." Subsequently, on various dates, a writ, an alias writ, and pluries writs of venditioni exponas were issued, upon each of which the sheriff made return to the effect that goods on hand were not sold or writ not executed for want of time. On August 21, 1930, nearly seventeen months after the levy of execution, petitioner directed the sheriff in writing that he must advertise all the goods taken under the original levy and sell them immediately. On the same day the sheriff advertised the goods for sale to be held August 29 following. August 25 a Pennsylvania state court of equity appointed a receiver for the King Motor Company and ordered a stay of the execution until final determination of the matter. August 30 an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the motor company, upon which an adjudication of bankruptcy was made on September 19. All the personal property of the motor company having been sold by the trustee, it was agreed that $1,776.17, being fifty per cent, of the proceeds of such sale, represented the value of the goods levied upon in behalf of petitioner on March 27, 1929, and included in the trustee's sale. The referee in bankruptcy, after deducting for the costs which would have been incurred if the goods had been sold by the sheriff, awarded that sum to petitioner. The referee found, among other things, that petitioner had issued the writ of execution with an intention to collect his money, which he never relinquished or interrupted; that he had no intention to refrain from exacting payment or helping the debtor to hinder other creditors; that the indulgence was good business policy when it is considered that petitioner realized less than one-third of the amount called for by the execution. The referee concluded that petitioner had acted in good faith. On review the federal district court, sitting in bankruptcy, held that petitioner had no valid lien against the Opinion of the Court. 292 U.S. fund and was not entitled to any distribution ahead of certain priority wage claims. The circuit court of appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner had made his levy solely for the purpose of acquiring a lien without a genuine intention of proceeding promptly for the collection of his debt, that he had not met the test of good faith, and, therefore, had failed to establish his lien upon the fund. 66 F. (2d) 561. Conceding that petitioner intended not to proceed promptly for the collection of his debt, and that his levy was made solely for the purpose of acquiring a lien, we think the conclusion drawn therefrom by the lower court that he had failed to establish his lien upon the fund-does not follow, since it fails to give effect to the positive order of the petitioner, made nine days before the bankruptcy proceedings were begun, directing the sheriff to proceed at once under the original levy to advertise for sale and sell the goods. The effect of the intention and purpose ascribed to petitioner would be to destroy the priority of the lien obtained by his levy and thereby expose him to the risk of having his execution postponed in favor of purchasers and subsequent execution creditors. It, nevertheless, would continue good against the judgment debtor and all others not acquiring rights or liens. This, undoubtedly, is the general rule (e.g., In re Zeis, 245 Fed. 737, 739; In re Schwab Printing Co., 59 F. (2d) 726, 728; Keel v. Larkin, 72 Ala. 493, 502-503), and is fully recognized by the Pennsylvania decisions. Kent, Santee & Co.'s Appeal, 87 Pa. 165, 167; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 85 Pa. 317, 322; Mentz v. Hamman, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 150, 153; Fletcher's Appeal, 17 Leg. Int. (Phila. 1860) 300. In Eberle v. Mayer, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 366, it was held that an order given by an execution creditor to stay proceedings on his execution until further directions was a waiver of his priority in favor of a second execution received by the sheriff during the pendency of the stay. By such order, it was said (p. 369), "the plaintiff's execution must be considered as dormant, and constructively fraudulent, as against the subsequent execution." The general rule is equally well established that in the absence of any intervening rights or liens a direction to the sheriff to proceed with the sale has the effect of reviving the rights obtained by the original levy, that is to say, of reviving not the lien, but the priority of the lien as against all other liens and rights acquired after such direction. In re Zeis, supra; In re Schwab Printing Co., supra; Miller v. Kosch, 74 Hun (N.Y.) 50, 52; 26 N.Y.S. 183; Sweetser v. Matson, 153 Ill. 568, 584; 39 N.E. 1086. We are of opinion that this general rule obtains in Pennsylvania. It was recognized as applicable to a Pennsylvania judgment as early as 1811 in Berry v. Smith, 3 Wash.C.C. 60, Fed. Cas. No. 1359. The judgment considered in that case had been rendered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and a fieri facias had issued with direction to the sheriff not to levy it until further instructions. A few days later the sheriff was directed to proceed with the levy. It was held that a second execution levied in the meantime, if pursued, would take preference, but otherwise if the second execution were issued after the countermand. Mr. Justice Washington, delivering the opinion, said: "The order of suspension deprives the act of the officer, in pursuance of it, of all its force and effect, until it is restored by a countermand; and if, in the meantime, a second execution is taken out and levied, the former must be postponed;-not so, if the second execution issues subsequent to such countermand; and upon this distinction, the decision of the case of Huber v. Schnell, [1 Browne, 16] in the common pleas of this state, seems to be entirely correct." In Freeburger's Appeal, 40 Pa. 244, it was held that an execution issued only for the purpose of a lien will be postponed to a subsequent execution issued in good faith. It |