Opinion of the Court. 292 U.S. a rate suggests an inflation of the base on which the rate has been computed. It is a strain on credulity to argue that the appellant, when putting into effect a new schedule of charges, was satisfied with one productive of so meagre a return. The same surprise is excited when we consider what it claims as to the fair value of the gas delivered at the gates. All that the affiliated seller asks is 45 cents per thousand cubic feet, yet according to the appellant's figures nearly 7 cents more, or a price of about 52 cents, is necessary to protect the seller against the wrong of confiscation. The argument proves too much: the valuations are discredited by the teachings of experience. Men do not transact business without protest at confiscatory rates, at all events in the absence of extraordinary circumstances making submission to the loss expedient. If such circumstances exist, the appellant has not proved them. Nothing in the record lays the basis for a belief that the natural gas business in Ohio is unable to pay its way. That being so, what the public utility has done belies what it has said. We shall hardly go astray if we prefer the test of conduct. Upon the submission of the cause the appellant made a motion to amend its assignments of error, which motion is now granted. The decree of the Supreme Court of Ohio, affirming the order of the Public Utilities Commission, does not impair any privileges or immunities secured to the appellant by the Constitution of the United States, and must therefore be Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER and MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER concur in the result. Statement of the Case. PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO v. MISSISSIPPI. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DECLARATION. No., original. Argued March 5, 1934.-Decided May 21, 1934. 1. This Court has no jurisdiction of a suit brought by a foreign State against a State of the Union without her consent. Pp. 320, 330. 2. The need for such consent, though not expressed in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution, is clearly to be implied. P. 321. 3. Clause 2 of § 2, Art. III, of the Constitution, merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred by Clause 1, and deals with cases in which resort may be had to the original jurisdiction of this Court in the exercise of the judicial power as previously given. P. 321. 4. Neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause 1, § 2, Art. III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that in all controversies of the sort described in Clause 1, and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent. P. 321. 5. Behind the words of these constitutional provisions are the essential postulates that the controversies shall be found to be of a justiciable character and that the States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Constitution. P. 322. 6. There has been such a surrender of immunity as respects suits in this Court brought by one State of the Union against another, or by the United States against a State; but not as respects (1) suits against a State brought by citizens of another State or citizens of a foreign State (expressly barred by the Eleventh Amendment); or (2) suits against a State of the Union by its own citizens or by federal corporations; or (3) suits against a State of the Union by foreign States. P. 328. 7. In construing the constitutional provision with respect to suits by foreign States, consideration is given to the thought that such suits may involve questions of national concern. P. 331. Leave to file denied. HEARING upon the application of the Principality of Monaco for leave to bring in this Court an action against Mississippi to recover the principal and interest of cer Argument for Monaco. 292 U.S. tain bonds issued by that State. Mississippi made her return to a rule to show cause why the leave should not be granted. Messrs. Frederic R. Coudert and Dean Emery, with whom Messrs. Ethelbert Warfield, Frederic R. Kellogg, and Howard Thayer Kingsbury were on the brief, for the Principality of Monaco. Jurisdiction to entertain this action and render judgment is vested in this Court by the provisions of Art. III, § 2 of the Federal Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment does not affect this jurisdiction. In addition to the express provision of the Constitution vesting original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in cases such as the one at bar, this Court has fully upheld the right of foreign States and foreign sovereigns to bring actions in the United States courts. Colombia v. Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524; Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522; The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164. In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, Chief Justice Marshall, considering the Eleventh Amendment, said, at p. 406: "It does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases: and in these a State may still be sued." The Supreme Court, having jurisdiction, can not refuse to exercise it. Fisher v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 248, 259; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 384; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522, 526. The jurisdiction of this Court over the controversy is fully supported by United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211; Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1; 238 U.S. 202; 241 U.S. 531; South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286. 313 Argument for Monaco. The plaintiff is a foreign State within the meaning of § 2 of Art. III of the Constitution. The consent of Mississippi is not necessary to give this Court jurisdiction. Here we have a point that has been raised in this Court from the days of the argument in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, down through the decisions in Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1; 238 U.S. 202; 241 U.S. 531. That there has been a difference of opinion as to what the Constitution should have provided there is no doubt. The quotations from Madison, Marshall and others in the debates in the Virginia Convention held prior to the ratification of the Constitution have been urged time and time again. Despite this fact, however, the Constitution provides that the judicial power shall extend to controversies between a State and foreign States, and that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over such controversies. The decisions of the Supreme Court fully sustain the point that the word "controversies" includes all disputes of a civil nature. The cases further sustain the point that just as the States have given up the right to coin money, the right to make treaties, the right to enter into diplomatic relations, so they have given up the right to be free from suits in the specific cases provided for in the Constitution. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46. That one of the States of the Union may be sued in the Supreme Court by a foreign State was expressly laid down. as indisputable by both the prevailing and the dissenting opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1 Pet. 1. While it is true under the normal circumstances of sovereignty that those who deal in the bonds and obligations of a sovereign State must rely altogether on the sense of justice and good faith of the State, it is also true that those who deal with States of the United States have the further assurance granted by the Constitution and en Argument for Mississippi. 292 U.S. forceable by the Supreme Court of the United States that a State of the United States will not pass legislation impairing the obligation of contracts made by it. This is so, whether the attempted impairment is by an act of legislature or by constitutional amendment. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650; Fisk v. Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131. See also, Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174; Columbia Ry. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236; Houston & Texas Central Ry. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66. It is difficult to find a more definite form of "impairment of contract " than the Mississippi repudiation. Mr. J. A. Lauderdale, Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, and Mr. Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, with whom Mr. W. W. Pierce, Assistant Attorney General, was on the brief, for Mississippi. Without consent the State can not be sued. The compact of the States in the Constitution imposed no duties and conferred no rights upon any foreign nation. A sovereign can not be sued without his consent. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 80; 3 Elliott's Debates, pp. 533, 555, 556; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436; Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, 20 How. 530; Webster, opinion to Varning Bros. & Co., Oct. 16, 1839, Vol. 6, p. 537; Crouch v. Credit Fancier, 8 Q.B. 374; Hamilton, Report 1795, Annals of Congress, 1793–1795, 3d Cong., p. 1635; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1; Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 783; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 53; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 741; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 569; Mar |