Prevost v. Greneaux. machinery for its collection provided by the statute is paralyzed by the repeal. We are entitled to the benefit of a strict construction of the statute, as being not only partial and odious, even as it regards citizens of the State, but, as was held by the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana in the case of the widow and heirs of Benjamin Poydras de la Lande against the Treasurer of the State, even penal in its character. So far as statutes for the regulation of trade impose fines or create forfeitures, they are doubtless to be construed strictly as penal, and not liberally as remedial laws. Mayor v. Davis, 6 Watts and Serg., 269. Statutes levying duties or taxes upon subjects or citizens are to be construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the subjects and citizens, and their provisions are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369. No judgment can be rendered for a penalty given by a statute after the statute is repealed, although the action was commenced before the repeal. Pope v. Lewis, 4 Ala., 487. From these principles and authorities it follows, that the right of the State to claim or recover the foreign succession tax of 1842 is lost from the moment of the promulgation of the consular convention of 1853, although the tax might have been claimed and recovered, if proceedings had been instituted, perfected, and executed, before that convention. Mr. Benjamin stated the points as follows: The case is clearly within the jurisdiction of this court; and the only question is, whether the court of Louisiana has rightfully construed the treaty. Its decisions under it have been First. That wherever the rights of the heir vested after the. consular convention went into effect, the tax could not be recovered. Succession Dufour, Annual, 392. Secondly. That wherever the right of the heir vested anterior to the date of the treaty, the right of the State vested at the same time. The latter proposition is the one now in dispute. I. At what time, under the laws of Louisiana, did the rights of the State to the tax of ten per cent. vest? Fortunately, the response to this question is entirely free from difficulty, as the point had been settled by a series of adjudications long prior to the controversy in this cause. The Supreme Court of that State has held, ever since the year 1831, that, under the State statute, the rights of the heir Prevost v. Greneaux. and of the State both vested at the instant of the testator's death. Armand's Heirs v. His Executors, 8 L. R., 387; Quessart's Heirs v. Canonge, 3 L. R., 561; Succession of Oyon, 6 Rob. R., 504; Succession of Blanchard, 17 Annual, 392; Succession of Dufour, 18 Annual, 392; Succession of Deyraud, 9 Rob. R., 358. The question had arisen in Louisiana under every aspect. In the first two cases cited, the law imposing the tax had been repealed before the collection of the tax, but subsequent to the death of the party under whom the heirs claimed. The court held, that the title of the State had vested at the death, and that the tax could be collected, notwithstanding the repeal of the statute. In the two cases next cited, the law imposing the tax was passed after the testator's death, but before the heirs had received the succession. The court held, that the right of the heirs had vested in the whole of the estate at the death of the testator, and that the tax could not be collected. In the fifth case cited, the convention with France was passed before the testator's death; and the court held, that the tax could not be collected, because the heir's right vested at the death. In the sixth case, the death occurred before the passage of the convention; and the court held, that the right of the State had accrued at the death, and the tax could be collected. And the whole series of adjudications on the construction of a State statute, during a period of twenty-five years, is unbroken by a single contradicting case, or even by the dissent of a single judge. Under the rules, then, which this court has established for itself, it will take it for granted, without further inquiry or examination, that a right to one-tenth of Prevost's succession had vested in the State of Louisiana anterior to the date of the treaty in question. II. The only remaining question is, whether the treaty was intended to divest any title acquired prior to its passage. The terms of the treaty are entirely prospective, and its language appears too plain to require any reference to canons of construction. Frenchmen, after its date, are to be considered, for all the purposes of the treaty, as citizens of Louisiana. But the claim of the State would be good against its own citizens after the repeal of the taxing law, because vested prior to the repeal, as already shown by the authorities cited. Ergo, that claim is good against the Frenchman. Prevost v. Greneaux. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. It appears that a certain François Marie Prevost, an inhabitant of that State, died in the year 1848 intestate and without issue, and possessed of property to a considerable amount. He left a widow; and, as no person appeared claiming as heir of the deceased, the widow, according to the laws of the State, was put in possession of the whole of the property by the proper authorities, in December, 1851. She died in March, 1853. In January, 1854, Jean Louis Prevost, a French subject residing in France, presented himself by his agent in Louisiana as the brother and sole heir of François Marie Prevost, and established his claim by a regular judicial proceeding in court. The laws of Louisiana impose a tax of ten per cent. on the value of all property inherited in that State by any person not domiciliated there, and not being a citizen of any State orTerritory of the United States. This tax is disputed by the plaintiff in error, upon the ground that the law of Louisiana is inconsistent with the treaty or consular convention with France. This treaty was signed on the 23d of February, 1853, ratified by the United States on the 1st of April, 1853, exchanged on the 11th of August, 1858, and proclaimed by the President on the 12th of August, 1853. The 7th article of this treaty, so far as concerns this case, is in the following words: "In all the States of the Union whose laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as the said laws shall remain in force, Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal and real property by the same title and in the same manner as the citizens of the United States. They shall be free to dispose of it as they may please, either gratuitously or for value received, by donation, testament, or otherwise, just as those citizens themselves; and in no case shall they be subjected to taxes on transfers, inheritance, or any others, different from those paid by the latter, or to taxes which shall not be equally imposed.” Proceedings were instituted in the State courts by the plaintiff in error to try this question, which were ultimately brought before the Supreme Court of the State. And that court decided that the right to the tax was complete, and vested in the State upon the death of François Marie Prevost, and was not affected by the treaty with France subsequently made. . Prevost v. Greneauz. The We can see no valid objection to this judgment. plaintiff in error, in his petition to be recognised as heir, claimed title to all the separate property of François M. Prevost and his widow, then in the hands of the curator, and of all his portion of the community property, and of all the fruits and revenues of his succession from the day of the death of his brother. And, in adjudicating upon this claim, the court recognised the rights of the appellant, as set forth in his petition, and decided that he became entitled to the property, as heir, immediately upon the death of Fr. M. Prevost. Now, if the property vested in him at that time, it could vest only in the manner, upon the conditions authorized by the laws of the State. And, by the laws of the State, as they then stood, it vested in him, subject to a tax of ten per cent., payable to the State. And certainly a treaty, subsequently made by the United States with France, could not divest rights of property already vested in the State, even if the words of the treaty had imported such an intention. But the words of the article, which we have already set forth, early apply to cases happening afterwards-not to cases where the party appeared, after the treaty, to assert his rights, but to cases where the right afterwards accrued. And so it was decided by the Supreme Court of the State, and, we think, right ly. The constitutionality of the law is not disputed, that point having been settled in this court in the case of Mayer v. Grima, 8 How., 490. In affirming this judgment, it is proper to say that the obligation of the treaty and its operation in the State, after it was made, depend upon the laws of Louisiana. The treaty does not claim for the United States the right of controlling the succession of real or personal property in a State. And its operation is expressly limited to the States of the Union whose laws permit it, so long and to the same extent as those laws shall remain in force." And, as there is no act of the Legislature of Louisiana repealing this law and accepting the provisions of the treaty, so as to secure to her citizens similar rights in France, this court might feel some difficulty in saying that it was repealed by this treaty, if the State court had not so expounded its own law, and held that Louisiana was one of the States in which the proposed arrangements of the treaty were to be carried into effect. Upon the whole, we think there is no error in the judg ment of the State court, and it must therefore be affirmed. Morgan v. Curtenius, et al. BENJAMIN F. MORGAN, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. ALFRED G. CURTENIUS AND JOHN L. GRISWOLD. Where there appears to be an omission in the record of an important paper, which may be necessary for a correct decision of the case of the defendant in error, who has no counsel in court, the court will, of its own motion, order the case to be continued and a certiorari to be issued to bring up the missing paper. THIS case stood upon the trial docket, coming from the State of Illinois. It was submitted on a printed argument by Mr. Washburne for the plaintiff in error, no counsel appearing for the defendant. Whereupon, upon an inspection of the record, the court expressed the following opinion: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. Upon examining the transcript of the record filed in this case, we find that it is imperfect, and that a paper has been omitted which may be important to the decision of the matter in controversy between the parties. The bill of exceptions upon which the cause is brought before this court, after stating that the defendants read in evidence the deed from Bogardas, to Underhill, under which they claim title, proceeds in the following words: "The defendants next offered in evidence to the jury a certificate of the register of the land office at Quincy, dated which is in the words and figures following, to wit." But the certificate thus referred to is not inserted in the exception, nor its contents stated in any part of the transcript. And as this paper was offered in evidence by the defendants, it must have been deemed material to their defence; and the court think it would not be just to them to proceed to final jud nent, without having this paper before us. And as the defendants have no counsel appearing in their behalf in this court, the court of its own motion order the case to be continued, and a certiorari issued in the usual form to the Circuit Court, directing it to supply the omission above mentioned, and return a full and correct transcript to this court, on or before the first day of the next term. Order. Upon an inspection of the record of this cause, it appearing to the court here that the bill of exceptions states that "the defendants offered in evidence to the jury a certificate of the |