Long et al. v. O'Fallon.

gation that he failed to account, and it was not put in issue in the cause. But it is clear that McAllister was authorized to make the sale to secure the money and make the conveyance, and there was no obligation on the part of the purchaser to see that he accounted for the proceeds as administrator of the estate of Long. Grant v. Hooke, 13 Sergt. and Rawle, 262; 2 Des., 378; Field v. Sheiffelin, 7 John. Ch. R., 160.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. The appellants, a part of the heirs of Gabriel Long, deceased, instituted this suit in the Circuit Court against the defendant, to obtain a decree for a title to, and for an account for the rents and profits of, a parcel of land in St. Louis, Missouri.

The case made in the record is, that in 1820, Alexander McNair and wife executed a mortgage deed for the land in controversy to Gabriel Long, to secure a debt not then due. Before its payment, Long died, and Alexander McAllister was appointed to administer his estate. In 1823, this administrator obtained a decree in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, for a foreclosure of the mortgage, and an order of sale, to be executed after a limited period. This order was executed in August, 1824, by a public sale of the property to McAllister, for a small portion of the debt.

The title of McNair before this sale had entirely failed. The Spanish concession and survey, under which he claimed the land, had been surveyed and located by the officers of the land office so as to exclude this parcel, and, in consequence, it was subdivided into five fractional sections, and was subject to sale as public land. At the date of the sale by the sheriff, two of these fractions, embracing the whole tract except nine acres, were claimed by Catherine Dodge, under a patent from the United States, and the remaining sections were patented to McAllister, as a purchaser, by entry at the land office in 1828.

In September, 1822, Catherine Dodge and McNair agreed to secure the debt due to the estate of Long, by a mortgage in favor of McAllister.

The debt was divided into three unequal instalments, which were to be paid within three years by McNair; and Mrs. Dodge conveyed her two fractional sections, in mortgage, with a power of sale in the event of a default, to secure the performance of the obligation.

McNair failed to make the payments, and in 1828 Mrs. Dodge released to McAllister her equity of redemption and her claim upon him for any surplus from the mortgage, for the consideration of one dollar.

In 1828, the defendant purchased the five fractional sections

Long et al. v. O'Fallon.

from McAllister, for a fair price, and has been in the undisputed possession of the land since 1830. The defendant pleads the statute of limitations in bar of the recovery.

The opinion of the court is, that the conveyances of Mrs. Dodge to McAllister did not invest the heirs of Gabriel Long with an equitable estate, or a particular lien on the property described in them. Their primary object was to create a security, or a fund, for the payment of the debt of McNair, and to enable McAllister to dispose of the land in case of its nonpayment, at his discretion, for its discharge. The release executed in 1828 was not made to extinguish any portion of the debt, nor did it remove the obligation of McAllister to convert the security into pecuniary assets. His sale of the land was a legitimate exercise of the powers of an administrator and trustee, and his vendee was not obliged to look to the application of the purchase-money. (Tyrrell v. Morris, Dev. and Batt. Ch. R., 559.) His failure to account was a devastavit, for which he and his sureties are liable on their official bond at law; and probably, if the land had been retained by him, or any person claiming as a volunteer under him, a court of equity might have permitted the heirs to accept the property, instead of the debt due to the estate. But, in the present instance, the defendant is a purchaser in good faith, and is entitled to hold the property, exempt from the claims of the plaintiffs. (Rayner v. Pearsall, 3 John. Ch. R., 578.)

Nor can the title of the defendant to the three small fractional sections entered by McAllister at the land office, and which were purchased from him by the defendant after his patent from the United States had been issued, be successfully questioned by the plaintiffs. The éstate conveyed to Long by McNair, in mortgage, was known to be without value in 1824. McAllister did not acquire by the sheriff's deed any interest in the land, or profit from his purchase. The land was then a part of the public domain, and subject to entry at the land office, under the laws of the United States. Without considering whether there was any relation between this administrator and these heirs, which precluded the former to purchase the land for his own account, under the principles of equity, we are satisfied that the heirs are not entitled to pursue their claim against a purchaser for value, who has not been guilty of fraud or collusion.

The facts necessary to sustain the plea of the statute of limitations are proved on the part of the defendant, and no charge in the bill discloses a case of exception from its operation. (Piatt v. Vattier and others, 9 Pet., 405.)

Decree of the Circuit Court affirmed."

Baker et al. v. Nachtrieb..

ROMELIUS L. BAKER AND JACOB HENRICI, TRUSTEES OF THE HARMONY SOCIETY OF BEAVER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS, V. JOSHUA NACHTRIEB.

The Harmony Society was established upon the basis of a community of property, and one of the articles of association provided, that if any member withdrew from it, he should not claim a share in the property, but should only receive, as a donation, such sum as the society chose to give.

One of the members withdrew, and received the sum of two hundred dollars, aS & donation, for which he gave a receipt, and acknowledged that he had withdrawr. from the society, and ceased to be a member thereof.

A bill was then filed by him, claiming a share of the property, upon the ground that he had been unjustly excluded from the society by combination and covin, and evidence offered to show that he had been compelled to leave the society by violence and harsh treatment.

The evidence upon this subject related to a time antecedent to the date of the receipt. There was no charge in the bill impeaching the receipt, or the settlement made at its date.

Held, that under the contract, the settlement was conclusive, unless impeached by the bill.

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania, sitting as a court of equity.

It was a bill filed by Nachtrieb, under the circumstances mentioned in the opinion of the court.

The Circuit Court, atter having referred the case to a master to state an account, decreed that the trustees should pay to Nachtrieb the sum of $3,890; from which decree the trustees appealed to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Stanberry and Mr. Loomis for the appellants, and by Mr. Stanton for the appellee.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. The appellee, who describes himself as a member in the common and joint-stock association for mutual benefit and advantage, and for the mutual acquisition and enjoyment of property, called the "Harmony Society," filed a bill in the Circuit Court against the appellants, as the trustees and managers of its business and estate. The object of the bill is to obtain for the plaintiff a decree for an account of the share to which he is entitled in the property of the society, or compensation for his labor and service during the time he was a member.

In 1819 he became associated with George Rapp and others, in the Harmony Society in Indiana, and remained with them there, or at Economy, in Beaver county, Pennsylvania, till 1846. He devoted his time, skill, attention, and care, during that period, to the increase of the wealth and the promotion of the interest of the society.

Baker et al. v. Nachtrieb.

These facts are admitted in the pleadings of either party. The bill avers, that in 1846, the plaintiff being then forty-eight years old, and worn out with years and labor for said association, was wrongfully and unjustly excluded from it, and deprived of any share in its property, benefits, or advantages, by the combination and covin of George Rapp and his associates; that at the time of his exclusion he was entitled to a large sum of money, which those persons unjustly and illegally appropri ated to their own use; that George Rapp was the leader and trustee of the association, invested with the title to its property; and that, since his death, the defendants have acquired the control and management of its business and affairs, and the possession of its effects. The plaintiff calls for the production of the articles of association, which from time to time have regulated this society, and prays for an account and distribution of its property, or a compensation for his labor.

The defendants produce a series of articles, by which the association has been governed since its organization in 1805. They admit, that from small beginnings the society have become independent in their circumstances, being the owners of lands ample for the supply of their subsistence, warm and comfortable houses for the members, and engines and machinery to diminish and cheapen their labors. They affirm that the plaintiff participated in all the individual, social, and religious benefits which were enjoyed by his fellows, under their contract, until he became possessed by a spirit of discontent and disaffection, a short time before his membership terminated. They deny that the plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from the association, or deprived of a share or participation in the property and effects, by the combination or covin of George Rapp and his associates; but assert, that voluntarily, and of his own accord, he separated himself from the society. They deny that he had a title to any compensation for labor and service while he was a member, other than that which was expended for his support, maintenance, and instruction, and that which he derived during the time from the spiritual and social advantages he enjoyed. To support this averment, they epitomize the history of the Harmony Society, and the agreements which, from time to time, have been the basis of its organization.

The society was composed at first of Germans, who emigrated to the United States in 1805, under the leadership of George Rapp. The members were associated and combined by the common belief that the government of the patriarchal age, united to the community of property, adopted in the days of the Apostles, would conduce to promote their temporal and

Baker et al. v. Nachtrieb.

eternal happiness. The founders of the society surrendered all their property to the association, for the common benefit. The society was settled originally in Pennsylvania, was removed in 1814 and 1815 to Indiana, and again in 1825 to Economy, in Pennsylvania.

The organic law of the society, in regard to their property, is contained in two sections of the articles of association, adopted in 1827 by the associates, of whom the plaintiff was one. They are as follows: "All the property of the society, real, personal, and mixed, in law or equity, and howsoever contributed and acquired, shall be deemed, now and forever, joint and indivisible stock; each individual is to be considered to have finally and irrevocably parted with all his former contributions, whether in land, goods, money, or labor, and the same rule shall apply to all future contributions, whatever they may be.

"Should any individual withdraw from the society, or depart this life, neither he, in the one case, nor his representatives, in the latter, shall be entitled to demand an account of said contributions, whether in land, goods, money, or labor; or to claim anything from the society as matter of right. But it shall be left altogether to the discretion of the superintendent to decide whether any, and, if any, what allowance shall be made to such member, or his representatives, as a donation."

The defendants, admitting, as we have seen, that the plaintiff, until 1846, was a contented member of the association, answer and say, that during that year he became disaffected; used violent threats against the associates; made repeated declarations of his intentions to leave the society, and in that year fulfilled his design by a voluntary withdrawal and separation from the society, receiving at the same time from George Rapp two hundred dollars as a donation. They exhibit, as a part of the answer, a writing, signed. by the plaintiff, to the following effect:

"To-day I have withdrawn myself from the Harmony Society, and ceased to be a member thereof; I have also received of George Rapp two hundred dollars as a donation, agreeably JOSHUA NACHTRIEB:

to contract.

"ECONOMY, June 18, 1846."

This statement of the pleadings shows that no issue was made in them upon the merit of the doctrines, social or religious, which form the basis of this association; nor any question in reference to the religious instruction and ministration, or the domestic economy or physical discipline which their leader and the other managers have adopted and enforced.