THE LONDON MAGAZINE.. For OCTOBER, 1756. As the Militia Bill has made many Gentlemen turn their Thoughts towards the Military, who never thought in the leaft upon that Subject, until our late unfortunate Situation convinced them of its being neceflary for their own Honour and Safety, as well as for the Honour and Safety of their native Country, we shall give our Readers the following Extracts from a little Book lately published, intitled, The CADET, a Military Treatife. By an Officer, which is irfelf, indeed, but Extrafts, well chofen, from foreign Books upon that Subject. Upon the Exercife of Troops during the Time of Peace, the Author gives what follows from FOLARD'S POLYBIUS. T A B HE multitude (fays that judicious hiftorian) living in inactivity, and a repofe for fome time before untafted, are frequently guilty of irregularities, the common effect of idlenefs, which C eught not, in the leaft, to be fuffered among the troops, as being the first caufe of mutiny and fedition. D How fenfible is this maxim? How important to princes, to republicks, to minifters of ftate, and to generals of armies, who neglect difcipline, and the military exercifes? Who permit a fhameful idlenefs and inactivity to reign among the troops, in the interval of peace, where they ought rather to redouble their care and attention? Then it is, that idlenefs, negligence, and a relaxation of the military laws, are of the worst confequences, and most fatal to a ftate: For on the breaking out of a war, we should foon difcover our misfortune, and that misfor- E tune is abfolutely without remedy. The prince, who has neglected this difcipline, or the generals, who he ordains to command his armies, would too foon perceive it: They are not the fame foldiers, nor even the fame officers, they are all changOctober, 1756. ed, all different to what they were before the peace. Labour and fatigue become infupportable to them, they fee nothing but what appears new and aukward, and know nothing of the practice of camps and armies; they have forgot every thing, but the remembrance of indulgence and pleafures paft; the foldiers (lefs blameable than their officers, who have fet them the example) are incapable of fupporting the pains and hardihips of a military life: Where is our remedy? Can we every day find thofe, who are capable of rendering them otherwife than they are, and to infpire them with the love of arms? Can we every day find fuch extraordinary perfonages as a Pyrrhus, a Cæfar, or a Zifca, who, in a short time, can form and difcipline whole armies? Who, by their address, their patience, and underftanding in military affairs, can metamorphofe the fimple peafant, and effeminate mechanick, into quite different characters, I mean intrepid and obedient foldiers? These fort of prodigies are not very common, at least in the memory of any one now living. If the peace has not lafted long enough to make the old foldiers forget, that they once lived according to the laws of an exact and regular difcipline, we may recal that remembrance by practice and a re-establishment of thofe laws, by easy and gentle means: But if we have enjoyed the calm of peace for any long term of years, the old foldiers, who were the life and foul of the corps, where they were grown grey in the fervice, will be dead, or difcharged as unfit for duty, obliged to beg their bread, and curing the day, when (inftead of following a trade, which would have gained them an honeft livelihood) they accepted of one, whofe fruit is heggary, unless they have the fortune to obtain the hofpital: But this refource is not in every kingdom, and even in France not always certain ; a feigned infirmity, affilled by favour and Mmm 2 460 EXERCISE of TROOPS in PEACE. and intereft, too often ufurps the place, which was ordained for real objects only. Others, who have ferved, but towards the end of the late war, will have forgot the experience which they acquired in the military exercises, and enter into the field enervated and ignorant; the old officers will be retired or difplaced; if A any should remain, they will be efteemed, (provided the corruption does not reach them) as troublesome cenfors and difciplinarians, among the crowd of young, debauched, and effeminate officers, without application or experience. Those who love their businefs, without having had the opportunity to practise it, by having commenced officers after the war, will be fo fmall in number, that they will find themselves without power, without authority, and unknown at court; and it will be wonderful, if they efcape the raillery and cenfare of others, whole conduct is fo different from their own: I do not speak this as a thing that may, but what infallibly must happen. hinder us to form our camps in the fummer feafon, where the general officers themfelves exercife their troops, in the grand Maneuvres of war? That is to fay, in the distribution and employment of their different Arms, which the foldiers, no more than the officers, can learn but by exercise ; we should form, by this method, experienced foldiers, excellent officers, and generals capable of the com. mand of armies. By often changing their ground, they would, in effect, be instructed in the extent and distribution of the camp, and in the general movements; by this means we should arrive at the grand and mateBrial articles of the military fcience, and form the + Coup d'œil; instead of which, at the commencement of a war, the greatest part do not know what they are about, and look upon themselves as tranfported into a new world; they then know the truth of this maxim, that repofe is not more the share of those who C command, than of thofe who obey. It is not lefs pernicious to one than the other; the foldiers and officers, who have paffed their time jovially in garrifon, and without any care for their business, find themselves as awkward as their general at the beginning of the campaign, and as they have been but very modeDrately exercifed, and paffed their time in a fhameful idlenefs during the peace, their diflike foon breaks out, they obey with great repugnance, fo much the fervice difpleafes them, and appears intolerable; altho' in the preceding war, honour and custom made them find that very service eafy and fupportable. Two thirds of our generals, heretofore experienced, but now weakened by age, will not be in a condition to ferve; many of the others, abforbed by pleasures, luxury, and eafe, with very fmall experience, without application, and with talents not extraordinary, fhall march into the field, at the head of an army compofed of fuch officers and fuch foldiers, to fight against troops, who, perhaps, have been lefs neglected, and confequently more exercifed; one may eafily judge what is to be expected from fuch a conduct. This regards all the states of Europe, who at this time enjoy the pleasures of a profound peace, and whofe troops in garrifon pafs their time in tranquillity E and repofe, more or lefs, according to the merit of their officers. It is with peace and war, as with life. and death; the more we advance in peace, the nearer we approach to war : We fhould be mistaken, if, amufing ourselves with the prefent, which may not be of long duration, without regarding the hereafter which threatens us, we should neglect the opportunity which would put us in a fituation, never to be furprized, nor to be afraid of any thing. From whence comes it that we neglect fo much the method of the ancients? I do not mean to lie always encamped, they could not do otherwife, as they had but few fortified towns, to keep their fubjects in their duty: Eat what should Arms is a French expreffion, to fignify the dragoons, artillery, irregulars, &c. F All this ought to make us comprehend, how important it is, not only to exercife our troops in the manual exercife, and fmall evolutions, but alfo in the great; which cannot be done, but in the open plain, and by forming camps in the different provinces of the kingdom, for the inftruction of officers and foldiers, and particularly of our generals, who will then be mafters of the tactick. What do our troops do in our provinces during a long peace? Why should we leave them, falling into a fcandalous idlenefs, to enervate themfelves, and corrupt the towns where they are quartered? Moft of our great roads are in the winter time impaffable; we want canals for the communication of our great rivers ; we cannot approach them in certain places for different qualities of corps, fuch as borse, foot, A quickness in difcovering a country proper for camping, by its fruation in regard to plains, mountains, rivers, pales, defiles, fecurity of the comp, conveniency of convoys, covering our own, or diflreffing the enemy's country j and many Jar circumftances, fuch as wood, water, forage, Ee, Et. 1756. BATTLE in BOHEMIA. for want of bridges and causeways, but by long and round-about ways, which is of detriment to commerce, augments the charge of carriages, and by a neceffary confequence, the price of merchandize. A Why do not we imitate the Romans? Auguftus, Trajan, Adrian, kept above an hundred and feventy thousand men on foot, in the time of peace: Did they leave them idle in garrifon? No, they knew better; experience had taught them, that the caufe of all the infurrections, which had troubled the repose of the empire, was owing to the want of employment in the foldier; they took care to employ them, and to that care, we owe the great roads, of which we fee B the magnificent remains, in the different provinces, as alfo the bridges, the caufeways, and the triumphal arches, which fill fubfift either in whole or in part; which ought to excite princes to draw the advantages which their troops, in time of peace, are at leifure to furnish. And in his chapter upon Exercife, he gives us the following extract from marhal Puyfegur. Let us reflect a little to what we ought to reduce the manual exercife, that the battalion fhould perform nothing but what is effential: The principal object of the manual exercife ought to be this, viz. To inform the foldier how to load in the 461 Auffig, and confifted only of 25,000 men, because the king had been obliged to leave the main body of his troops in the neighbourhood of Pirna, in order to keep the Saxon camp blocked up. The king upon his arrival, refolved to march forward. He formed a vanguard of eight battalions, ten fquadrons of dragoons, and eight of Huflars. He put himself at the head of this body, and marched to Tournitz, and ordered his army to follow him in two columns, the one by the way of Profcobot, and the other by the fame way his vanguard had taken. From Tournitz he marched with his van 10wards Welmina, where he arrived that evening an hour before fun-fet. There he faw the Auftrian army with its right wing at Lowofchutz, and its left towards the Egra. That very evening the king himself occupied with fix battalions, a hollow, and fome rifing grounds, which commanded Lowofchutz, and which he refolved to make ufe of the next day, in order to march out against the Auftrians. The army arrived in the night at Welmina, where the king only formed his battalions behind one another, and the fquadrons in the fame manner, which remained all night in this pofition; the king himself fetting up all night, and having no other covering but his cloak, before a little fire, at the head of his D troops. On the first of October, at break of day, he took with him his principal general officers, and thewed them the ground which he intended to occupy with his army, viz. the infantry forming the first line, to occupy two high hills, at the bottom betwixt them; fome battalions to form the fecond line; and the third to be compofed of the whole cavalry. C moft expeditious way. Secondly, To From the LONDON GAZETTE. Berlin, October 9. We have just received the following authentick Relation of the F Action at Lowofchutz on the first Inftant, between bis Majesty's Army and that of the Auftrians. N the 28th of September, the king Olet cut from his camp at Sedlitz, and joined his army in Bohemia, which And the king made all poffible dispatch in duly ftrengthening the wings of his army upon thefe hills: The infantry at the right poffeffed themselves of their poft, and took all their precautions in order to fecure it effectually; whilft the left was forming, it fell immediately into an engagement with the enemy's pandours, croatians, and grenadiers, who were pofted in vineyards, inclosed with ftone walls. We advanced up in this manner, till we came to the declivity of the hills towards the enemy, from whence we faw the town of Lowofchutz filled with a great body of infantry, and a large battery of 12 pieces of cannon before it, and the cavalry formed chequerwife, and in a line between Lowofchutz and Lieut. gen. Oglethorpe, who learned the art of war under the great Eugene, and in concert with the famous veldt marshal Keith, and who underftands difcipline as well as any general offser in Europe, gave frequent prizes, to the foldiers of bis,regiment, to shoot for at a mark: Fou regiments ever abounded avitb better marksmen, and bow it came to be disbanded, let shofe beads reveal, who have fince loft us our fuperiority in America. The writer of this note venture to affirm. that Oglethorpe's regiment would have been of more ferrvice in that part af 462 AUSTRIANS defeated. and the village of Sanfchitz. There being a thick fog, this was all that could be perceived. The king fent to reconnoitre, and the reports confirmed all that had been judged of the enemy's pofition. After the king had found, that the battalions were poffeffed of that hollow, in the manner he had ordered it, he thought that the first thing to be done, was to drive back the enemy's cavalry, which flood in his front. And with this view he ordered his own cavalry to advance, formed them before his first line of infantry, and immediately attacked the enemy's, which was broke; but, as the enemy had placed, behind their cavalry in hollow places and ditches, a great body of infantry with feveral pieces of cannon, our cavalry, thro' the brisknefs of their attack, found themfelves expofed to the fire of this cannon and of the infantry, which obliged them to return and form again under the protection of our infantry and cannon, without the Auftrian cavalry daring to pursue them. After they had formed again, they returned to the charge; then neither the fire of 60 pieces of the enemy's cannon, nor that of their infantry, which lay in thofe hollow places, nor the ditches, which they had in their front, could prevent them from totally defeating the whole Auftrian cavalry, and from forcing the infantry, which was pofted in thofe ditches. After this charge was over, the king ordered his cavalry up to the hill again behind his infantry, where he drew them up. The enemy's army was 60,000 men ftrong; and, notwithstanding fuch fuperiority, our infantry forced inclofed vineyards, and ftone houfes; and from feven in the morning till three in the af-" ternoon, they fuftained the fire of the cannon and of the infantry, and efpeA cially the attack of Lowofchutz, which lafled, without any intermiffion, till the enemy was drove out of it. Major Muller, of the artillery, behaved to admiration. The major generals of cavalry, Luderitz and Oertz are killed, as well as col. Holzendorff of the Gens d'Arms. General Quadt, of the infantry, is allo killed. The lofs of the enemy is comB puted to amount to between 6 or 7000 men, killed and wounded. We have taken 500 prisoners, amongst whom is prince Lobkowitz; five pieces of cannen, and three pair of colours, are fallen into our hands, and we have loft, in all, 2000 men, killed and wounded. Bruffels, Oct. 15. A courier is arrived Chere from Vienna, with marfhal Brown's relation to their Imperial majesties, of the battle of the firft of October. In the mean time the cannonading fill continued, and the enemy made all poffible efforts to flank the left of our infantry. The king perceived the neceffity E of fupporting it, and ordered the battalions of the first line to turn to the left; the battalions of the fecond line filled up the intervals, which had been occafioned by this motion; fo that the cavalry form. ed the fecond line, which fupported the infantry. The 30th of September, the king of Pruffia marched in the night, at the head cf 40,000 men, towards the Imperial army. Marhal Brown being informed of it, caufed the vineyards and avenues to be occupied by more than 1cco croats on each fide, and from thence began to fire about two o'clock in the morning. At break of day the Pruffian army was feen thro' the narrow paffes of Welmina, where they formed themselves on the hills to the right, on the left, and in the bottom of Lowofchutz, and the battle began at feven o'clock, when the fog cleared up. The fire on both fides was very brifk, and the Pruffian cannonade fuch, that every one agreed they had never heard any thing like it ; notwithAanding which, the Imperial troops performed prodigies of valour, by fuftaining the fire of the artillery with the greatest firmness, and by repulfing the enemy's attacks feveral times. The Pruffians find At the fame time, the whole left of the infantry, marching on gradually, wheeled Fing their efforts vain, began to throw about, attacked the town of Lowefchutz red-hot balls into the village of Lowofchutz, and fet fire to it; our infantry thus finding themfelves between the fire of the village and the enemy's attack, were obliged to quit the eminence on the right of the village, to form themselves in the plain; after which the fire flackened, and ceafed entirely at three o'clock in the afternoon. His Pruffian raajefty retired behind the field of battle, upon which marihal Brown remained the whole night; but finding the next day that they were in want of water, his excellency returned 1756. Previous RESOLUTION of the DUTCH. returned to the camp at Budin on the fecond, and the Pruffians had not yet taken poffeffion of the village of Lowofchutz. The Imperial cavalry performed wonders, driving back that part of the enemy twice, fo that they did not dare appear again, and were obliged to retire behind their infantry. The numbers of the killed and wounded on the part of the Imperialists do not amount to 2000 men; of the officers of diftinction gen. Radicati and col. Szentilani are killed, gen. prince Lobkowitz is Wounded and taken prifoner, gen. Rantzow, col. Caroli, adjutant gen. Hager, and the marshal's fon, wounded, Gourfville and Laffi are alfo wounded. The enemy's lofs must be much more confiderable; we are affured, that three of their generals are wounded; we have made fome hundreds prifoners, among whom are a great many officers. A B HAT it were to be wifhed the re Tpublick were in fuch a formidable condition as to have no reafon to fear the menaces of France, and to be able to athift Great Britain: But the cafe being D otherwife, it follows of course, That the intereft of the republick requires that the fhould carefully avoid whatever might involve her in danger, or perhaps caufe her total ruin, when the is onder no obligation by treaty to engage in it. That as to the treaties, it is paft all doubt, that the republick is not obliged by any treaty to take part in differences, or a war kindled between other powers out of Europe. That the troubles at prefent in question owe their rife to differences concerning the refpective poffeffions of England and France in America: And fince the fift caufe of the hoftilities, which are now transferied to Europe, doth not concern the republick, fo the cannot be obliged to intermeddle in its cffects. It was in this manner that the ftates general reafoned en occafion of the war in Poland; witness the fecret refolutions of their noble and great mightineffes of the 8th and 11th of July, 1733, and of the 13th of January, 1734. And England thought at that time in the fame manner, as appears from the fecret notulas of their noble and great mightineffes of the third of February, 1734. That if, however, the treaties were to be applied to the prefent cafe, when the E F 463 hoftilities are transferred to Europe, the queftion would be, who ought to be adjudged the aggreffor in Europe? And the uncontrovertable answer must be, that England is the aggreffor in Europe, by her feizing a confiderable number of French flips. That the treaty of 1678, and the fubfequent explanations in 1716, and others, being only defenfive, cannot of confe quence take place in the prefent cafe. That the treaty of 1713, by which the fucceffion to the crown of Great-Britain is guarantied by the republick to the most ferene houfe of Hanover, cannot now be alledged, becaufe that fucceffion is no ways concerned at prefent, Great- Britain being threatened with an invation by his moft christian majesty, only to revenge, and obtain reparation for the injury which his majesty pretends to have fuffered by the capture of his ships of war and of the trading ihips belonging to his subjects. So that when the cafus fœderis proceeding from the aforefaid treaty actually exifts, it will then be time to deliberate on it, that is, when the faid fucceffion is really in danger. That the republick not being obliged by the tenor of treaties, as has been faid, to furnish at prefent the fuccours in queftion, it has, moreover, been judged, that neither the expediency of the thing itself, nor the republick's ftrict union with Great Britain, which feem to be motives for granting the fuccours, correfponds in any wife to the intereft and prefent fituation of the republick, inafmuch as they could be of no advantage to his Britannick majefty, becaufe, according to the declaration made by France to the ftate, the fending of thefe faccours would immediately lay the republick under a neceffity of demanding, in her turn, fuccours from Great-Batain. It appearing, then, from what is faid above, that the republick is not bound by her engagements, the is at liberty to declare rather for an exact neutrality, than to endanger the ftate, by giving England the fuccours demanded without being obliged to it by treaty. That they had well confidered, that the chufing this part would not be exempt from difficulties; but that neceffity, and the intereft of the republick, obliged them to take it, in confideration of her prefent fituation. |