265 1756. JOURNAL of the PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES in the POLITICAL CLUB, continued from p. 216. The laft Speech I shall give you in the Debate begun in your last was made by A. Baculonius, and was to the following Effe. Mr. Prefident, W but, on the contrary, they are generally men who had no character, or perhaps a bad one, before they lifted in the army: Whereas, in the former there will, I hope, be many gentlemen of fome fortune, and alA moft all of them men of fome fubstance and character before they lifted in the army. Is it not from hence evident, that officers who have been long accustomed to that rigour of difcipline and feverity of punishment, which is neceffary for compelling the common foldiers of our army here at home to behave well and do their duty, can never be proper judges of what fort of military laws ought to be established for enforcing good order and exact difcipline among the troops raised in America? D HATEVER the Hon. gentleman may think of the question now before us, I must think it a queftion of the utmost importance, even fuppofing that our fovereign has, by his prero- B gative, a power, in time of war, to eftablish what articles of war he pleases for the good government of his army; for even in that cafe the fovereign ought not, and I am fure, his prefent majefty would not eftablish any articles of war, without C the advice and confent of those who had under him the chief command of the army; and they would not furely advise or confent to fuch articles of war as would render it impoffible for them to augment or recruit their army, or fuch as might probably difcourage and difpirit the foldiers then under their command. Let us therefore confider, whether the gentlemen of our regular army here at home, or the gentlemen who were born, or have lived many years in America, are the best judges what fort of military laws may have this effect in that part of the world; and at the fame time we ought to confider, that the troops which have been raised, or may hereafter be raised in America do, and always muft con- ̧ fift, fo far as relates to the common F foldiers at least, of men of a very different character from those of our regular army here at home. In the latter we feldom, if ever, have any gentlemen, especially gentlemen of fortune, ferving as common foldiers; June, E The Hon. gentleman was pleafed to fay, that men of honour and character can give themselves no concern about the articles of war, or military laws, let them be never fo rigorous and fevere, because, for the fake of their own character, they will always do their duty, and confequently can never have any thing to fear from the feverity of the punishment. Sir, he may as well fay, that men of honour and character must always be infallible. The weakness of human nature is fuch, and our paffions are fo ftrong, that a man of the best character and ftrictest honour may by the former be led into an error, or by the latter hurried into one of the greatest of military crimes, a crime which is punishable even with death itself, if To the court martial fhall think fit: When I fay this every gentleman muft fuppofe, I mean that fort of mutiny which is committed by offering any violence against a fuperior officer. And indeed there is 266 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. fcarcely a fection in the articles of war, but what inflicts a punishment which muft be thought too fevere upon a man of any character: For example, the very firft fection appoints, that a foldier who ufes any unlawful oath of execration fhall not only forfeit one thilling, but be laid in irons for twelve hours, upon his fecond offence of this kind; and there are fo many trivial offences made punishable at the difcretion of a court martial, that no man of common fenfe will chule to make himfelf fubject to fuch laws. Nay, even our common foldiers here, cannot properly be faid to have ever chofen to do fo; for those who lift in our regiments here at home, are generally fuch as will not, or cannot earn their bread by their induftry, and are therefore forced to lift in the army for a fubfiftence, or they are cajoled, and I may fay, trepanned into the army by our recruiting ferjeants. Whereas the troops that are to be raised in America must confift chiefly of those who generously and voluntarily lift in the army, merely for the fake of ferving their country; and of fuch only we can propofe to raife a fufficient army in that part of the world. June of the military laws to which he is to be fubjected, muft give him fome concern; and if he thinks them too rigorous and fevere he will not chufe to fubje&t himself to them: Nay, he will avoid doing fo as much as A he can; and this he will do with the more care, when he confiders, that if he fhould happen to fail under the fufpicion of any military offence, he may chance to be tried by a court martial, confifting moftly of officers of what we call our regular troops, from whom he will at leaft fuppofe that he can expect no favour. But this is not all, Sir, a man might perhaps truft to his own fagacity, coolness of temper, and dili-g gence, for preventing his being guilty of any of thofe offences which are to be fo feverely or fo arbitrarily punished by the articles of war; but all thefe rare qualities joined together cannot warrant him against af falfe accufation; and if falfely accufed he may by falfe witneffes, or by the mistake or partiality of the court martial, be condemned, and punished in the most severe manner prefcribed or warranted by the articles of war; therefore let a man's G honour and character be never fo great, nay, let him be never fo confident of his own fagacity, coolnefs, and diligence, the rigour and feverity It is therefore evident, Sir, that if the military regulations eftablished by this bill be thought too rigorous and fevere by our people in America, the claufe now under our confideration, will, if paffed into a law, render it much more difficult, if not impoffible, to raife any troops in that country; and they will be much more apt to think these regulations too rigorous and fevere than they would be if it were left entirely to themfelves, and the very fame regulations eftablished by their own chief leaders and officers. In fome, and, I believe, in most of our colonies in America, it is ordained by their own laws, that in time of war, or imminent danger of being invaded, the martial law fhall be in force, and that the commander in chief, in a general council of war, fhall eftablifh fuch laws and articles of war as fhall be thought neceffary: Such laws the people always fubmit to without murmuring, because they know the law-makers, and have a confidence in them, that they will not confent to any law but what is neceflary for the good of the fervice; but we cannot expect the fame fubmiflion to military laws advised by perfons they never knew, and adapted to the government of common foldiers, who feldom lift in the army from any motive of honour or publick good; and as this is well known to our people in America, . they 1756. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. 267 they will naturally look upon themfelves as affronted, if not oppressed, by any law which renders it impofíible for them to concur in the defence of their country, without fubjecting themselves to the fame flavifh regulations. A D I am therefore fully convinced, Sir, that our agreeing to this claufe will infallibly have this fatal confequence, that it will either prevent its being pofiible for us to raife any body of troops in America, or it will make the troops we raife there g refufe to act upon any occafion, in conjunction with any of the British forces his majesty may think fit to fend thither; and confequently I must be of opinion, that our agreeing to this claufe will prevent its being poffible for us to carry on the war in America with that vigour and fuccefs which we might otherwife have good reason to hope for. This, I fay, Sir, is my opinion, and yet I am as fully convinced that fome new regulation is neceffary for the government of thofe troops that may be raised in America; becaufe for carrying on the prefent war in America with vigour and fuccefs, all our refpective colonies and plantations in that part of the world muft unite in raifing armies, or an army, to be commanded by fuch generals, or fuch a general in chief, as his majefty fhall be pleased to appoint; and fuch a general army cannot be governed by, or made fabject to the military laws of any particular colony or plantation; nor can the general, without a fufficient power for that purpose, establish a body of military laws to which all the troops under his command fhall be fubject. Whether his majefty can without the authority of parliament grant fuch a power may admit of fome doubt; but it can admit of no doubt, that he cannot now compel any man to take arms, or to furnish either a horfe or foot foldier, but by virtue of the militia acts now in force in this kingdom, or by virtue of the militia laws now in force, or that refpective colonies in America; conmay hereafter be enacted, in our fequently, the general army I have mentioned must be an army confifting chiefly of voluntiers, or fuch as our refpective colonies may voluntarily fend to it, and therefore no fuch military laws fhould be eftablished, as may difcourage voluntiers from lifting in that army, or their people to fuch military laws. our colonies from fubjecting any of jefly has by his prerogative a power, For this reafon, Sir, if his main time of war, to establish what articles of war he pleafes for the government of his army, even whilst Cnions, and can delegate that power it remains within the British domito any general he may be pleated to appoint, the articles of war for the government of the general army to be raised in America, ought not in prudence to be formed or established generals here; nor ought any fuch by the advice of any minifters or articles to be established, until after that army has affembled; and then the commander in chief ought to have a power delegated to him, to form and establish a body of miliarmy, by the advice and confent of tary laws for the government of the the chief officers, or the majority of the chief officers fent from the feveral refpective colonies. Or if it fhould be thought, that his majefty cannot by his prerogative delegate a ought to impower him to do so by power fufficient for this purpote, we liberately pailed into a law, for this a bill regularly brought in, and departicular purpofe; which, in my opinion, would be the best method, both because I doubt of the power upon an unexpected emergency, and by prerogative in this cafe, unless before a parliament can be affembled; and because in fuch a bill the quota of troops which each colony ought to furnish to the general army, G L12 and |