ART. I.-1. The Education of the World. By FREDERICK 2. The Education of the Human Race. By Gotthold 4. The History of Civilization, from the Fall of the Roman 5. The Philosophy of History. By G. W. F. Hegel.Translated from the German by J. Sibree, M. A. London. 1857. 6. The Philosophy of History. By Frederick Von Schlegel. Translated from the German by James Burton Robertson. Fourth Edition. London. 1846. The Philosophy of History is one of the creations of modern genius. Some writers ascribe the honor of having introduced this new science to Machiavelli, some to Bossuet, some to Vico, some to Montesquieu, some to Herder, and some to other authors. The works of all these men are, indeed, only so many streaks of the dawn, not the full-orbed disk, of the new science. That disk has not, as yet, risen above the horizon. In this instance, as in most others, it takes centuries for the science to rise like a new sun in the heavens, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise point of time at which it began to appear. It is certain, however, that Italy, France, and Germany are the three principal contributors to this important branch of human knowledge. The history of civilization is nearly, if not absolutely, the same as the Philosophy of History, or the Education of Mankind. These are only different modes of expression. for essentially one and the same thing. They convey to most minds, however, only vague, indefinite, and confused notions. This arises partly from the fact that the science itself is still in a rather nebulous condition; and partly from the little attention which has been paid to the great truths really established by the science. The first question is, then, what is meant by the Philosophy of History, or the Education of Mankind? Two things, says Hegel, should be determined by the philosophy of history: first, the end or final cause for which the world exists; and, secondly, the causes by which the world is impelled toward the goal of its appointed destiny. What is the final cause or end, and what are the means, in the world's development, are then the two great questions with which the philosophy of history has to deal. The world, that is, "the spiritual," "the substantial world,” says Hegel, progresses; but in what and toward what does. it advance? "The final cause of the world at large," says he, is "the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and ipso facto the reality of that freedom." Freedom is, then, according to Hegel, the great object for which the world exists, and toward which it should continually strive to advance. But what is freedom? "That this term 'freedom,'" he adds, "is, without further qualification, an incalculable ambiguous term; and that while that which it represents is the ne plus ultra of attainment, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors, and to become the occasion of all imaginable excesses, has never been more clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content ourselves with the term itself without further definition."* Here, alas at the very first step of our inquiry, the light of science deserts us, and darkness closes upon our path! The misfortune is, that most men content themselves, not for the present merely, but for their whole lives, with the term itself without further definition; and hence the fanatical worship of that dark, ill-defined, and misshapen idol called Freedom becomes "the occasion of all imaginable excesses. Hence Freedom becomes the Moloch of the modern world, on whose bloody altars countless hecatombs of human beings are sacrificed without mercy and without remorse. If Freedom were only seen as she is in herself, and not as distorted by human ignorance and passion, she would indeed appear the divinest of all earthly forms, and the most beautiful to look upon. She would then be seen, not brandishing, as she now does, the fiery darts of discord, but wielding the golden sceptre of universal peace and joy. But Freedom is seldom, if ever, seen as she is in herself; and hence it is that the world is so often deluged with miseries and crimes in her desecrated name. Hegel must, then, either make "this incalculable ambiguous" term freedom plain, or else confess that, if there be such a thing as the science of universal history, it is still beyond the reach of his philosophy. We do not say, at present, whether Hegel has fulfilled this requirement or not; we merely assert that it is the necessary and indispensable condition of the existence of such a science. M. Guizot, as well as Hegel, announces that progress is the great law of the world, or of human society. But here again we ask, toward what does the world progress? M. Guizot returns no answer to this question. The whole "philosophy of history," says he, consists in "showing the relation of events with each other-the chain which connects them the causes and effects of events." say, it shows us causes and means, but no end. That is to It shows us the stream, widening and deepening in its course, but no ocean toward which it tends. It shows us the forces of *Introduction to Philosophy of History, p. 20. †History of Civilization, Vol. 1, chap. 1. the world, both in their action and in themselves, but no sign or symptom of the plot of the grand drama,in which God himself is the chief actor. Now, whether the world progresses or not, we insist that the philosophy of history should not attempt to do so, until it is prepared to take its next step with clearness, precision, and firmness. We insist that the philosophy of history should stand absolutely still on its present position, that the world progresses, until it can show us, not in vague general terms merely, which may mean anything or nothing, but in clear and unmistakable language, toward what it progresses. As M. Guizot maintains that the human race progresses in civilization; so we may safely conclude, that he regards the perfection of civilization as the great goal of its destiny. His whole work indeed seems to imply this, though this is no where distinctly stated in his work. Is this, then, different from the doctrine of Hegel? Is there a contrariety of opinion, as well as a diversity of expression, between these two celebrated authors? By no means. For every element of freedom, the ne plus ultra of attainment announced by the one, is in reality an element of civilization, the end and aim of human progress in the system of the other. This is manifest to the student of their works. . But what is civilization? Do we not encounter here, also, an "incalculable ambiguous term?" M. Guizot explicitly refuses to tell us what is meant by the term civilization; and he does so on philosophical grounds. "In the usual acceptation of terms," says he, "there will nearly always be found more truth than in the seemingly more precise and rigorous definitions of science. It is common sense which gives to words these popular significations, and common sense is the genius of humanity. The popular signification of a word is formed by degrees, and while the facts it represents are themselves present. When, on the contrary, the signification of a word is determined by science, it is usually done by one or a very few individuals, who, at the time, are under the influence of some particular fact which has taken possession of the imagination. |