to the unfortunute and calamitous position important announcement is made in second in which the country had been placed during the previous war, and he added:

editions of the newspapers in large type. But it would be as useless, if there were no troops within reach, to depend upon the 'A considerable part of our fleet was confined instructions consequent upon these teleto our ports to protect our dockyards; and thus we were obliged to do what Great Britain had grams as upon the notices in the newspanever done before, to carry on a defensive war-apers for opposing the landing of the enemy. war in which we were under the necessity of wast- We must now describe the special means ing our resources and impairing our strength, of resistance which ought to be kept in without any prospect of any possible benefit by readiness with that object.

which to mitigate our distress. .. Shame and We will distribute the invading army affliction were brought upon us by the American into four great divisions, each containing War. Was the House ready to stand responsible 50.000* men; and we will allot to each of to posterity for a repetition of similar misfortunes these divisions a separate bay for its atand disgrace? Were they willing to take upon The different vessels themselves the hazard of transmitting the dangers tempt at landing. and calamities which they themselves so bitterly approach the shore, and drop their anchors; experienced?' and the flat-bottomed landing-boats, which have been prepared for the purpose, come We are not aggressive now, any more alongside. Accommodation - ladders are than we were at that time; we wish for passed down; the infantry, who are the nothing so much as peace. Our neighbours first to land, make their way into the boats; are more restless, and they are outstripping they sit down, to screen themselves as much us a second time in the reconstruction of as possible; the commanding officer in each their navy. Their institutions are less sta boat takes his seat in the bow; and they ble, and their army is a master that they pull to land in compact order, under cover are obliged to propitiate. They have troops enough and to spare in constant readiness, and their railways may be made available, whenever the occasion arises, to convey those troops to different ports. Numerous steam transports would be found for their conveyance very soon after war was declared, and boats of improved construction for landing men on our shores. We ought not only to be prepared to repulse them on their arrival, but further to show them always a front so formidable as to prevent them from seriously entertaining the idea of an attack.

Each great division of 50,000 men could be transported for so short a distance in vessels having an aggregate of 50,000 tons; each would require two and a half miles of beach and anchorage; and each might, with good means and appliances, be disembarked with guns and stores in 12 hours in

fine weather.

When the British troops landed in Egypt in 1801, the 1st of March, but were detained by bad weather 17,500 men in 200 vessels reached Aboukir Bay on till the 8th March. At two o'clock on that morning they commenced operations; 5500 men were placed in 150 boats, and they pulled for the shore at 9 A.M. under a heavy fire. Out of the 27 000 French troops who were then in Egypt, 2000 lined the beach, flanked by 12 guns on one side and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats reached the land in admirable order: six minutes afterhour 5000 men were established on the heights wards the force stood in battle array, and in an beyond. The remainder of the force was landed under their protection.

We will suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that we are at war with France, and that the French have made arrangements for an attack upon us in great force, while we have, at the same time, been getting ready to receive them. A French The British army, of about 30,000 men, was confleet appears off Plymouth, and a British veyed to the Crimea in 1854 in 84 vessels, 34 for flect proceeds thither to attack it. While a the 14th of September, in six lines, at half a cable artillery and their horses. These were anchored on great battle is being fought there, the apart, and did not occupy a mile of anchorage. French move down their troops upon their They were miserably supplied with the means of seaports, and, embarking them in the course landing guns and horses, and a platform upon two of the evening, they direct them at once boats, which was extemporised for the purpose, upon three or four points of the coast be- from the Minna and Brenda,' and other small Their principal aid was derived tween Brighton and the Thames, that they steamers, from which the troops stepped ashore may reach their respective destinations across a smaller boat. They landed their infantry early on the following morning. Men on in one day, but the surf impeded their further horseback gallop to the nearest telegraph-field-pieces, and 2900 horses and mules, in less than The French embarked 29,000 men, 68 stations as soon as the flotilla is caught sight 100 vessels. They carried over large flats on the of from various points; telegrams are sent outsides of those vessels, with bows opening like a to Whitehall and Pall Mall, to the private ferry-boat, each capable of supporting half a batresidences of the Ministers and the Com-tery. mander-in-Chief, and to the naval and mili-structed vaisseaux-de débarquement of a superior Besides large transports, they have of late contary commanders in the vicinity; and the description.

soon broke up.

of the coast, on the shortest notice. Five thousand men would be an ample force to secure the coast against any one of the four great divisions of the invading force above referred to; and, indeed, any attempt at landing in the face of well-trained men, amounting to only half that number, would probably be unsuccessful. One-tenth of these should be cavalry, two-tenths artillery, one-tenth engineers, and six-tenths infantry.

of a heavy fire from the fleet and from any
small craft and armed boats that may ac-
company them.
As the foremost boats
touch the shore, the officers jump out, fol-
lowed by their men; and they endeavour
to advance in skirmishing order, expecting
that the next detachment will supply them
with support. The meu of this first detach
ment will probably be selected for the duty,
and will make good use of any shelter that
they can find. They will not, like those that
follow at a later period, be loaded with If invasion were imminent, camps would
their baggage and provisions; their busi- be formed in convenient localities, and move-
ness being to drive back, if possible, any able brigades kept ready for immediate >erv-
force that may be assembled to oppose ice, composed of various troops, according
them, and at any cost to hold their own to circumstances. On the first alarm of
until their comrades can join them.

the approach of an enemy the Coast Vol-
unteers would be called out for active serv
ice, and would repair to the threatened spot,
where they would be posted by their officers
(in combination, of course, with all the regu-
lar troops which could be brought up in such
an emergency) in the disposition most suit-
able to the nature of the ground as the at-
tack was developed. During the progress
of the enemy's boats from his vessels to the
shore, their principal object would be to
pour upon them the most destructive fire
that could be made available, from shot,
shell, and rifle bullets; to sink as many of
the boats as possible; and to disable the
greatest number of men out of the crowded
masses in the remainder. Rifled guns and
muskets will be of great advantage in this
part of the operations. The guns will be
placed under cover from the fire of the ships,
thirty or forty feet, as nearly as may be,
above the level of the sea; the riflemen will
be scattered along the shore, behind rising
ground, sand-hills, breast-works, and any na-
tural or artificial cover that can be procured;
and all must be dispersed as much as possi-
ble, to diminish the results of the enemy's
fire, and to obtain a converging or a cross-fire
upon his boats. The cavalry will be placed
behind any natural cover near the beach that
is available, or behind banks of earth thrown
up for their protection, to keep them safe and
ready for duty at the moment when their
services are required.

A comparatively small force will suffice to check each of these attempts, if it be on the spot, and if it be well posted before the boats leave the ships; but it must afterwards, to be of any avail, be increased in proportion to the time that has been lost. Before the adaptation of steam power to na val purposes, the portion of coast to be guarded against attack on a large scale was very much smaller, and there was not, therefore, the difficulty that now exists in defending it. In 1804 a movable brigade was formed at Shorncliffe, for the protection of the coast of Kent, and was rendered highly efficient under General Moore during that and the following year, by its equipment, discipline, and tactical instruction, and by its being ready to move at a moment's notice. This brigade afterwards formed part of the Light Division in the Peninsular War, and its services in that capacity were no doubt owing in a great measure to the high training which it then received. When we are next threatened with invasion we shall want a number of brigades of this description, stationed as near as possible to the places at which their services are likely to be required; and, in aid of such a force, it will be desirable to employ as many Coast Volunteers as are found ready to undertake the duty, and can be maintained in a condition of efficiency. They would be made well acquainted, by constant practice, with the defensive capabilities of the assailable If a cool and accurate fire has been mainportions of the coast in their immediate tained by the defenders upon the boats durneighbourhood, and would be organised ing their progress towards the shore, the more especially with a view to their de enemy will be in no condition afterwards to fence. They would throw up field-works, resist a close attack upon gaining the beach. and might in some cases be advantageously They must be assaulted vigorously as they provided with works of a more permanent do so. Their gang-boards must be knocked character for the protection of those bays away from the boats if they attempt to use and beaches near them which offered pecu them; and if not, they must be charged by liar facilities to an enemy; and they would infantry and cavalry as they struggle out of remain ready to defend those works, and to the water. A soldier up to his waist in the assist in protecting other threatened parts | sea, after jumping out of a boat, is a most

helpless animal, and the first detachment | venting more heavily-protected vessels from will probably fall an easy prey to well-train-running into them, and doing an infinity of ed and determined men; but if it be other-michief in them. Floating batteries will wise, they must be charged again and again, be of still less use, because they cannot be and, if possible, either taken prisoners or made so strong for defence, nor so powerful destroyed before their supports arrive. A for offence, nor so steady for accurate firing, similar course must be pursued towards each as shore batteries, or batteries constructed succeeding detachment, if the attempt to upon solid foundations. Until we can proland be persevered in. Should it be so, and cure larger and stronger guns than have yet should the defenders be obliged to retreat, been constructed, which shall crush in the they must still continue to keep up as hot a sides of an armour-plated vessel, we have fire as they can upon their assailants, and to no other means of protecting these importharass them to the utmost, with the know- ant places than by stationing at them steamledge that reinforcements are being despatch-rams, to act in concert with the most powered to their own assistance with all possible speed.

The defence of our rivers, harbours, and commercial ports, will become a difficult matter in any future wars with maritime powers possessing iron-plated steam-rams; and the measures to be adopted for the pro-ferred are the Royal Dockyards and Arsentection of the Mersey, the Tyne, the Clyde, and other centres of commerce, will require se rious consideration. Coast batteries at the mouths of the rivers, or the entrances to the harbours, though securing them against the entrance of smaller craft, will be of little avail by themselves in some cases for pre

Its anchorage is secure, it is easy of access, and it would be defended by him, if he obtained possession of it, with comparative facility. For these reasons it has now been strongly fortified at moderate cost.

struction, they are more especially necessary invading force that could obtain possession during war as places of refuge for disabled of them. 2. It would afford a valuable devessels, as secure rendezvous, and as bases of pôt for assembling fresh troops or collecting operations for the fleet. Volunteer forces, a useful entrepôt for stores The efficiency of the Navy could not be and munitions, and a place of refuge upon possibly maintained without docks and ba- which any body of men inferior to the enesins for repairing, re-coaling, and refitting my in numbers might retreat for a time. the different vessels of the fleet in security 3. It is a strategical fortress in advance of from time to time. Skilled mechanics must the metropolis, from which movements could always be ready in such places, with spare be made upon the flank of an enemy disemmachinery and all requisite materials at their barked either to the east or the west, to disposal. Without such appliances, which check his advance and impede his communiare far more necessary in these days of cations. Portland would also, with its insusteam than they were before, our fleets would lar position, its fine harbour, and its breaksoon become useless; and they also want water, be a most valuable port to an enemy. safe anchorages, in which to ship provisions, stores, and ammunition. It is further essential to our commerce that there shall be localities in which convoys of merchant vessels can safely assemble, and in which those vessels shall be able to find refuge when they The Government will no doubt complete are pursued by an enemy's cruisers. The the fortification of these vital points with as question as to how such places ought to be little delay as possible; and when this has protected from attacks by sea is a difficult been done there is no good reason why their one, and is still undecided. Some would garrisons in time of war should not be almost protect them by forts, others by ships, and exclusively composed of Volunteers. They others again by a combination of the two; would require 20,000 men for Portsmouth and this last is the method recommended by and the Isle of Wight; 15,000 for Plythe Defence Commission. If security is to mouth; a like number for the Thames and be obtained against steam-rams and iron- the Medway, including Woolwich, Chatham, plated vessels, it will be necessary to com- Purfleet, Deptford, and Sheerness; 8000 bine this compound system with solid artifi- for Pembroke; 6000 for Dover; and 3000 cial obstructions. Such obstructions were for Portland-making a total of 67,000 men used with good effect by the Russians during out of the 160,000 of which our Volunteer the Crimean War, both at Sebastopol and force is composed. This includes also a in the Baltic. In applying them, the chan- garrison of 1500 men for a work which the nels to be defended should be narrowed, as Defence Commission has properly recomfar as is consistent with other objects, and mended to be constructed, but which has hostile vessels should be compelled to pass not yet been decided on, at Shooters' Hill, at slow speed within close range of the forts for the protection, not only of the establishand batteries. These will of course be armed ments at Woolwich, but also of the metrowith the heaviest guns that can be construct-polis from that direction. The Volunteers ed, and perfectly protected, by armour-plat- are a most valuable acquisition for garrisoning or otherwise, from the fire of the ships. In any case it would be reversing the proper order of things to employ the fleet for the protection of the dockyards, instead of the dockyards for the repair, assistance, and security of the fleet.

ing these fortified places; and it is a duty for which a portion of them are peculiarly well adapted. When so employed they will be lodged partly in bomb-proof and other barracks, and partly in billets. They will be near considerable towns, and will have no difficulty in procuring anything that they can require. Tents or huts could be supplied by contract on short notice; stores and ammunition the Government must keep in readiness on the spot.

But it is not so much the sea defences as the land defences of these places that we have now to deal with. It is of the utmost importance that they should be well fortified and well garrisoned, and it is scarcely less necessary that Dover and Portland should These, and other measures which we have also be secure. The former is a stronghold already considered, will all have, indirectly, opposite the nearest part of the coast of a most important effect upon the defence of France, which must be held for three rea- the metropolis. The Channel is of course -1. Its naturally strong position, our first line of defence, guarded by the fleet. which has been fortified at great expense, The coast is the next line, which may, and and its harbour, would, in combination, be indeed must, as we have shown, be intrusted of great advantage as a tête-de-pont to any in a great measure to local corps and Vol

sons:

be done towards strengthening them after the enemy had appeared off the coast, and while he was landing; and the work would proceed with increased zeal and greater confidence after he had so far developed his plans and given indications of his probable lines of march. If he were successful in making good his landing, he would then of course be harassed day and night, and confined as far as possible to the ground on which he stood. Every impediment would be thrown in the way of his advance by such troops as could be employed for the purpose; each point would be disputed, and he would be continually compelled to clear the way before him. No chance would be missed of annoying him by demonstrations on his flanks or in his rear. Every available man would be summoned by telegraph, conveyed by railway, and hurried to the scene of action; and by the time he reached the third line above indicated, both men and works would be in a condition to receive him.

unteers. The commercial ports and vital | Thousands of 'navvies' and other workmen points may also be principally protected or would be at once employed upon them under garrisoned, as far as land service and coast- the guidance of the Engineers. Much might batteries are concerned, by the Volunteer force; and the regular forces and militia will therefore be most of them liberated for active duty in the field. Under these circumstances no invading force of less than 200,000 men would venture into the country; and the metropolis would be the undoubted object of its attack. We do not believe in the feasibility of the projects that have been put forward for the simultaneous advance of the different divisions of such a force from the Avon and the Exe and other points; nor should we expect it to come from the Humber, or even from the coasts of Norfolk and Suffolk. To have any chance of success it must be landed in three or four divisions on the south or south-east of the country; and these divisions must march in support of each other upon London without any unavoidable delay. This march upon London (if it ever come off) will not occupy many days; and, as long as there is any chance of its being undertaken, we ought to be prepared with prompt as well as vigorous measures for its prevention. Any attempt The Volunteers would render important on the part of the enemy to land separate aid in these proceedings. Those who found expeditions destined to converge upon Lon- themselves in rear of the enemy, or on his don would be to our advantage, as we should flanks, would close upon him as opportunity then, with our admirable means of internal offered, and add to his difficulties to the best communication, be in a good position to of their power. They would surprise his beat them in detail. As the coast between outposts, cut off his stragglers, and keep up Portsmouth and the Thames is that which a distant fire from all sides upon any bodies ought to be most carefully guarded by coast of his men who became exposed to it on the corps, so also the positions between that march or in camp; and the long-range wea coast and London are those which should pons of the present day would enable them receive the most serious consideration. The to do this with advantage. Those who were railway junctions form important strategical brought up in front would assist in checking points which would be attacked, and ought his advance upon the positions which were therefore, as far as possible, to be protected. being prepared to stop it, and in destroying The coast being the second line of defence, or carrying off anything that might be of as above explained, flanked by Dover and use to him. The Engineers would assist in Portsmouth, it follows that Canterbury, Ash-blowing up the bridges and viaducts in his ford, Tunbridge, Red Hill, Guildford, and front, would superintend the throwing up of Reading would be upon the third line, and intrenchments, and, while utilising all obsta Chatham and Stroud (or Shooters' Hill), cles favourable to defence, would level buildCroydon and Norwood, Kingston and Wind-ings, walls, bridges, and all other cover which sor, on the fourth line. The first great battle would be fought, probably, not far in advance of the third line; and the enemy would in no case, we will hope, be in a position to force the fourth line, even if he were able to attempt it.

Although we might not have time to drill an army, as Mr. Cobden proposes, while war was impending, and while the final preparations for an invasion were being completed, yet we should have ample means and opportunity during that period for throwing up temporary works in front of these positions.

would be likely to favour his operations. The artillery would pour shot and shell upon him from any heights available for the purpose, and would occupy the batteries prepared for their reception. Those riflemen who were not fit for more active exertions would man some of the intrenchments in which it was proposed to make a decisive stand with a view to a general engagement.

But the Volunteers who would do these things effectually must be prepared to remain in the field. Their active service against the enemy would not probably ex